Europe And The Sahel

Introduction

The Sahel is acquiring a new importance due to recent events that have exponentially increased its capacity to influence the stability and security of the Mediterranean. It is an inhospitable area that is often discussed interchangeably with North Africa. But the Sahel and North Africa are quite distinct and are facing different realities, making it difficult to formulate a single strategy for both regions. North Africa will likely continue its current trajectory of closer integration with Europe, while the Sahel will continue to lag behind in terms of modernization, integration, security and stability, and economic development. The Sahel, therefore, currently requires the most attention from both the European Union and NATO, as well as from southern European nations.

The Sahel

The first difficulty in addressing the multiple challenges facing the region lies in defining its boundaries. Sahel means “edge” or “coast” in Arabic, and from this point of view, the Sahel would be a 5,000 kilometer strip stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea. But these boundaries have no cultural, historical, or economic meaning and include 12 very different countries. For this reason, it is more usual to use the term to refer to a group of five countries with common historical, economic, cultural, and social characteristics: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. Historically, these areas were part of the great Sahelian empires based on trans-Saharan trade. They were subsequently colonized by France, which left a common political and cultural legacy. This legacy currently coexists with the fundamental role of Islam as the majority religion throughout the region.

In 2014, the five countries established the G5 Sahel, born as a result of the conviction of these governments (and of European pressure) about the need to jointly implement a comprehensive approach to ensure the conditions for peace, development, security, and governance. In 2017, a joint force was added to the organization to coordinate counterterrorism efforts, aiming to curb the expansion of armed groups that seriously threaten regional security. The efficacy of this organization is uncertain now, since three of its five founding members have left it, but officially the organization has not been dissolved.

There are also other partially Sahelian states geographically — such as Algeria, Nigeria, and Senegal — which, despite their different historical experiences and current situations, influence the evolution of Sahelian developments.

The Challenges

The Sahel is one of the least habitable regions in the world. It has been characterized by a combination of great political instability, little economic development, and very unfavorable environmental conditions, the latter of which has exacerbated the unstable political context and driven migratory flows toward Europe. The lack of instruments to respond to these challenges has long been a source of structural weakness, resulting in a dependency on contributions from the United Nations, the European Union, or third countries. But perhaps the most worrying element is the Sahel’s position as the world epicenter of jihadist terrorism, an issue that has increased in severity since 2016. Not only is it fertile ground for recruiting rootless and disaffected youth into terrorism, but it also provides safe havens for terrorist organizations to plan and launch international attacks. Al Qaeda and the Islamic State are expanding violently in the region and the Sahel suffered 47 percent of all terrorism-related deaths worldwide in 2023.

The crises already known to have been lurking in the Sahel for more than a decade are, however, entering a new stage due to two main reasons: the domestic political climate and the regional impact of the war in Ukraine.

The political climate in the G5 Sahel has become more volatile in the last three years with the success of a series of military coups: in Mali in August 2020 and May 2021, in Burkina Faso in September 2022, and in Niger in July 2023. The latter is perhaps the most significant because it happened following the military coup in Mali in 2021, where French troops on the ground as part of Operation Barkhane were forced to conduct an accelerated withdrawal. Paris then decided to move its operational center to Niger, becoming the focal point for a renewed security partnership in the Sahel based on lessons learned from previous failures. The Nigerien government was also keen to host other European forces to counter Islamist insurgent groups linked to Al Qaeda and the Islamic State — so much so that the European Union decided to organize a three-year mission to train the Nigerien army. Niger had thus become the focal point of security efforts in the region.

After the 2023 coup, however, this delicate balance has shifted. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) — the main regional organization — has been unable to respond effectively, showing its weakness and causing Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Mali to leave its ranks. The G5 Sahel has also been abandoned by its own members. In December 2023, Burkina Faso and Niger announced their withdrawal from the G5 Sahel joint military force, echoing Mali’s departure in May 2022, while Mauritania and Chad have accepted these sovereign decisions. The military juntas of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger have also signed a new security agreement under the name of Alliance of the Sahel States (AES), whose priority will be the fight against terrorism. Outside the continent, France is consolidating a military withdrawal that began in Mali in 2022, continuing in Burkina Faso and more recently in Niger, although it maintains operations in Chad.

The United States, for its part, has tried to maintain military collaboration with Niger, where it has built one of the largest drone bases on the continent in Agadez. And yet, despite U.S. wishes and after months of tensions, Niger’s ruling military council announced that it was ending the agreement that allowed U.S. forces to be based in the country. Among the disagreements between the two governments was the desire of Niger to supply Iran with uranium and work more closely with Russian military forces. The United States had completed its military withdrawal from the country by early August 2024, a blow to its counterterrorism effort — and to the broader security situation in the Sahel.

Secondly, Russia’s military offensive against Ukraine is having a significant impact on the region. For one, it has decreased food security, exacerbating the harsh living conditions of Sahelians with rising wheat, fuel, and fertilizer prices. The energy crisis in Europe due to the war has also heightened Europe’s need to strengthen its partnership with African countries, whose natural resources attract them. Thus, in July 2022, Algeria, Niger, and Nigeria signed a memorandum of understanding for the formalization of the Trans-Saharan gas pipeline, which could have great potential for the transportation of gas supplies to Europe.

But the war in Ukraine has also made the Sahel more permeable to international influence efforts. In fact, it has grown in prominence within the framework of strategic competition, with the growing influence of Russia and China potentially challenging the security of NATO and the European Union.

Although relations between Russia and the Sahelian countries were established decades ago during the Cold War, today the presence of the Wagner Group in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger stands out. Its presence has been demonstrated in the last three years through participation in antiterrorist operations and support to the armed forces of some countries in the area. Since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, Moscow has continued to expand its influence in the Sahel, as shown through the Africa-Russia summit held in July 2023. That said, the death of the head of the Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, has led Moscow to create a new military structure under the Ministry of Defense called Africa Corps, with which it intends to replace Wagner’s mercenaries.

China’s presence, on the other hand, is more linked to the economic sphere and to the Sahel’s natural resources. China’s state-owned companies operate in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Niger. Mali potentially has one of the world’s largest lithium reserves, and the Chinese company Ganfeng Lithium has invested heavily in the country. China is the second-largest investor in Niger, with projects led by PetroChina (a subsidiary of China National Petroleum Corporation) and China National Nuclear Corporation. Investments in the oil sector in Chad have also been significant and have made the Chadian army one of the best equipped forces in Africa. And some reports suggest that China would be willing to use the conflicts in the Sahel to test its weapons products, although it seems more plausible to think that it will prioritize the protection of its interests in the region.

This growing influence and presence of Russia and China fuels the idea that the countries of the Sahel — along with those in North Africa — are aligning more closely with these two powers, or at least that they want to reinvigorate their foreign policy autonomy vis-à-vis the West in line with that of other countries of the “Global South.” In both cases, this is connected to the relative decline of the influence of Western powers in the region.

This growing influence and presence of Russia and China fuels the idea that the countries of the Sahel — along with those in North Africa — are aligning more closely with these two powers, or at least that they want to reinvigorate their foreign policy autonomy vis-à-vis the West in line with that of other countries of the “Global South.”

The European Union

After the coup d’état in Niger, the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, stated in her last State of the Union address to the European Parliament that the European Union should engage more with African countries. She stated that Europe had to show the same unity of purpose toward Africa as it has shown toward Ukraine, focusing on cooperation with legitimate governments and regional organizations. The president further accused Russia of sowing chaos in the Sahel and stated that military coups destabilize the region, making it prone to the risk of terrorism.

The European Union’s concerns about developments beyond the Mediterranean directly impacting the continent’s security and prosperity are not new. But the results of its actions have been disappointing, perhaps because of tactical errors in its approach or inadequate attention paid to the issue.

For years, the perceived risks emanating from the Sahel have generally remained low due to the intangible nature of many of them and the belief that they were somehow under the control of the intervening countries in North Africa. These are countries with which Brussels cooperates under the European Neighborhood Policy, with programs in a wide range of sectors, such as democratic and economic development, rule of law, and migration. The Sahel region was therefore perceived by European policymakers as largely a remote desert area prone to drought and in need of infrastructure and humanitarian aid.

Since the fall of Muammar al-Qaddafi’s regime in Libya in 2011 and the ensuing security crisis in Mali, however, Europe accelerated the process of expanding the borders of its immediate southern neighborhood into the Sahel. It committed more spending, launched more development and stabilization programs, and intensified its external military presence in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, which were beginning to be seen as part of the “gateway to Europe” — a source of dangerous population growth, unwanted migration, and violent extremism, not to mention the favored territory of Russian mercenaries.

In 2011, the European Union became involved in the Sahel with the adoption of the EU Sahel Strategy (2011–2020), which was reinforced in 2015 with the Regional Action Plan for the Sahel. These two strategies had a strong militarized approach focused on security. But Brussels also opened new embassies in the region, and an EU high representative for the Sahel was appointed to demonstrate continued diplomatic engagement. The European Union additionally became a founding member of the Sahel Alliance in 2017, pledging to coordinate international development spending in the region.

But the expected results were not adequately achieved and the European Union decided to move away from a preeminently security-oriented approach to a more integrated intervention, adopting the EU Integrated Sahel Strategy 2021. This was formulated at a time when most of the current crises had not yet emerged. Indeed, migration flows were fairly under control, political instability in the Sahel was not yet fueled by the ensuing succession of coups, the presence of the Wagner Group was not yet threatening the region, and the European Union was not facing a war on its eastern border. The strategy today must cope with a different and more hostile situation than initially planned.

In general, EU policies toward the Sahel have sought to satisfy different interests: to solve the migration issue for the countries bordering the Mediterranean with long-term development programs in the region, to support the French military efforts over the last decade, and to introduce a European dimension to the security and development sector in the region. But the European Union has proven itself not yet ready to respond in all of these dimensions. This lack of European success must be coupled with the unilateral French stance in the Sahel, which has caused considerable frustration among European partners and seems to have had a fragmenting effect on European efforts in the region. More recently, successive military coups in Burkina Faso, Mali, and especially Niger have imposed a limit on the Europeans’ military response capacity. And the latest worrying decision made by EU member states was to not extend the fifth mandate of the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali) beyond May 18, 2024, although it was due to expire in January 2025. The reason given was the evolving political and security situation and consultations with the Malian authorities.

In general, EU policies toward the Sahel have sought to satisfy different interests: to solve the migration issue for the countries bordering the Mediterranean with long-term development programs in the region, to support the French military efforts over the last decade, and to introduce a European dimension to the security and development sector in the region.

European governments are reluctant to support undemocratic governments because they undermine Europe’s own priorities, in particular that of advancing democracy. But at the same time, shutting down security support leaves the door open for other actors — such as the Wagner Group — to fill the void and offer support to governments in the aftermath of coups. For now, there seems to be no “good” for Europe in the Sahel. And yet, despite the current paralysis, the region remains of strategic importance to the European Union.

NATO

NATO’s southern flank has always existed, although it has been considered strategically secondary to its eastern flank. NATO’s southern members have historically been most concerned about security issues in the Mediterranean and its adjacent regions; they have also been among the most vocal advocates for NATO to pay more attention to its southern neighborhood. However, there is room for improvement in terms of the cohesion of the alliance’s approach, to the extent that, at times, the Mediterranean has become an area of competition rather than coordination among NATO’s southern members. It should not be forgotten that NATO is an alliance of sovereign countries, some of which have permanent interests in the south. That is why NATO accepted the UN Security Council’s invitation to protect civilians in Libya in 2011: it was reflecting French and Italian interests in North Africa. Similarly, in 2012, regional interests were at play when it was decided at the Chicago Summit to erect a southward-oriented missile shield for the alliance. Ultimately, it is the member states that decide to project stability in the south — bilaterally, regionally, or through the European Union, the United Nations, or NATO.

In general, NATO has not been very explicit in addressing risks emanating from the Sahel region. It was only in 2016 that the alliance formally launched the so-called 360° approach, which addresses threats from all fronts and ensures a focused and tailored response. Thanks to the political commitment of countries such as Spain and Italy, NATO began to adopt — at least theoretically — this global vision that valued all its borders with equal concern. Since then, NATO has tried to reformulate its policies toward the southern region according to the notion of “stability projection,” with the idea of contributing to a stable environment in NATO’s vicinity by increasing regional understanding and situational awareness and by supporting capacity building in partner countries.

The most recent NATO Parliamentary Assembly regional outlook reports have identified the security environment in North Africa and the Sahel as among the key trends that will shape the future. They point to the importance of the region because of its geographical proximity to Europe, as well as its cultural, social, economic, postcolonial, and migratory links. In addition, the latest strategic concept adopted in Madrid in 2022 confirmed the alliance’s commitment to work with its partners in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and Sahel regions “to address shared security threats,” including war, terrorism, and the growing challenges related to climate change — a commitment that would be reaffirmed at the summit in Vilnius the year after. A few months later, the secretary-general appointed an independent group of experts whose findings of a “comprehensive and deep reflection process” on the southern flank were reflected in a report published in May. The report laid the ground for “an action plan for a stronger, more strategic and result-oriented approach toward our southern neighborhood,” including the Sahel area, an idea that managed to be incorporated into the Washington Summit Declaration of 2024. It should also be noted that the declaration refers to new efforts in the fight against terrorism and the identification of key areas for long-term effort, one of which is undoubtedly the Sahel. The Washington summit also produced the establishment of a special representative for the southern neighborhood, a position to which Spanish deputy assistant secretary general for political affairs and security policy Javier Colomina was appointed shortly thereafter.

All this aside, the Eastern flank is still considered by the allies the immediate and primary challenge to NATO, while in the long term the Indo-Pacific is beginning to stand out. As a result, the alliance’s political and military leeway to the southern flank risks being limited. What does seem to be clear among the allies, however, is that the increasing instability in the Sahel makes it necessary to consider that a southward-oriented NATO strategy should not necessarily stop at the Mediterranean and its immediate areas of influence. Beyond the Maghreb, Africa is an integral part of the European and transatlantic security calculus.

But an extension of the security space beyond the Mediterranean and North Africa would imply closer cooperation with regional institutions and partner countries. Countries like Senegal and Nigeria could be important in NATO’s effort to “project stability” to the south. But from an operational point of view, NATO’s global engagement has obvious limits. It is therefore important to distinguish between the idea of NATO’s role in the Global South and the alliance’s role as a forum for the discussion of broader strategic concerns and policy coordination. From a political point of view, NATO’s southern flank can extend as far as the allies agree to take it.

When it comes to challenges such as terrorism, instability, and the migration crisis affecting Europe, NATO is not and should not be the first responder. National authorities, the European Union, and ad hoc coalitions should lead the way. Maritime, humanitarian, and low-intensity counterterrorism issues are indeed particularly promising scenarios for NATO-EU cooperation. Practical and effective collaborative strategies already exist, as demonstrated by the support provided by NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian to the European Union’s Operation Sophia, which aims to disrupt criminal networks of smugglers and traffickers operating in the Mediterranean. However, several other crises in the area have not been addressed through NATO-EU cooperation, exemplified by the current situation in Libya.

Planning for the long term in a manner that builds on the alliance’s strengths and is sustainable over time is thus an urgent need — even if this amounts to a relatively modest effort.

National Interests

In an increasingly unstable international environment in which a Global South is ascending regardless of Western diplomatic pressure, organizations such as the European Union and NATO are limited in their ability to influence countries beyond the West on security and defense issues. But in the Sahel, there is perhaps still room for them. In the Sahel in particular, governments have traditionally given more importance to relations and cooperation with states, such as France, Italy, and Spain, than relations with multilateral organizations.

France

The current wave of postcolonial African — and, specifically, Sahelian — unease with France may have originated in 2014, when France launched Operation Barkhane to fight jihadism in several countries in the region, starting with Mali. The operation lasted eight years, and although it achieved military successes on the ground, it prevented the collapse of Mali’s government and territorial integrity against a jihadist threat coming mainly from the north of the country. Its continued presence also created resentment and a focal point for growing public discontent with France. A wave of pan-Africanism, centered on anti-Westernism, has been on the rise, mobilizing sectors of the military and political elites in the Sahel countries and highlighting anti-French sentiment as a lever to seize power.

More than any other country, France has been exposed in Africa because of its military footprint and its adoption of measures perceived as neocolonial. It is the only former colonial power with a wide range of bases from Senegal to Djibouti, via Gabon, the Ivory Coast, and Chad. Since the independence of these countries, Paris has carried out more than 50 military operations or interventions on the continent. However, given the size of the region, its objectives were too ambitious for such a small military force, and this military solution was only a “band-aid” that failed to address the structural weaknesses of regional states. Seen from this perspective, France is reaping the consequences of its interventionism in Africa and its failure to successfully curb terrorism.

Hence, when powers like Russia, with no colonial history in the region, offered aid in fighting jihadism, they were welcomed, even if they were financed by appropriating part of the natural wealth of the Sahel countries. This is what French president Emmanuel Macron described as “the baroque alliance of the pseudo-Pan-Africanists and the new imperialists.” Reflecting on the above mistakes, Macron has expressed the desire to develop a relationship with Sahelian states “without paternalism or weaknesses,” warning that the recent string of coups in the region entails “a risk of weakening the West and especially Europe.” That is why Paris bet on Niger — but the partnership has not worked out.

France, however, will likely continue to have a military and diplomatic presence in Africa because it has (primarily geostrategic) interests to preserve. Moreover, France signed the Quirinale Treaty with Italy in 2021, which reflects a will to bet on reinforced bilateral cooperation, the effects of which have begun to be visible in the Sahel. It should be noted that this cooperation does not apply to North Africa, a region in which Rome and Paris have each developed deep ties with local elites, even if this has involved engaging in a struggle for influence that has benefited certain oligarchies.

Italy

Italy is another major European player in the Sahel, with a strategy reflecting a “return” to Africa. The focus on the Sahel fits into a more general reorientation of Italian foreign policy — in line with its European partners — manifested by an increase in diplomatic activities, including the opening of new embassies, and an involvement in bilateral military operations and European cooperation.

Niger has so far been the clearest representation of Italy’s new activities in the area, mainly because of its position as a transit country for migratory flows from sub-Saharan Africa. In its bilateral engagement, for example, Italy reinforced the contingent of its project MISIN (Missione Italiana di Supporto in Niger), which has been present in the country since 2018. Italy has also increased its support of European initiatives in the region, for instance by holding key positions on the ground during European missions and by appointing Emanuela del Re as EU high representative for the Sahel.

However, Italy’s engagement with the Sahel is not without attention to the political and security dynamics of North African countries. The links between the protracted conflict in Libya and the destabilization of the Sahel have long been a subject of debate in Italy, for example. This has manifested in the widespread adoption of the “wider Mediterranean” — an area of interest encompassing countries from West Africa to the Horn of Africa, including the Sahel — into Italian policy. At the European level, Italian engagement is also reflected in the recent creation of the “One Desert Initiative” committee, with Italy as the interlocutor between the European Union, Libya, and the Sahel. Thus, Italy’s new involvement in the Sahel, built through new bilateral proposals and greater leadership within European initiatives, also represents an important search for legitimacy, not only with African partners but also with European ones.

The latest impulse has been the presentation of the “Piano Mattei per l’Africa” initiative as a new model for Italy’s cooperation with the continent and, in particular, with the Sahel. It consists of three pillars: immigration control, regional development with investment in various productive sectors, and cooperation in the field of energy. It was presented at the Italy-Africa Summit organized by the government in January 2024 as the inaugural event of its upcoming presidency of the G7. However, it was precisely the Sahel countries that decided not to participate in the summit.

Given Italy’s ambitions and efforts in the Sahel, NATO’s decision to choose the Spanish Colomina as representative of the southern neighborhood was very badly received by the Meloni government, which sent a letter of protest to Secretary General Stoltenberg. But Italy has not given up the game and will resume efforts to push for an Italian candidacy for the post with the new NATO secretary general, Mark Rutte.

Spain

Spain could become a leading force on behalf of Europe in the Sahel. In fact, some international actors have spurred Spain on to play a larger role and increase cooperation in the region. In October 2023, Spain and the United States inaugurated the first meeting of the U.S.-Spain Working Group on the Sahel, which highlights the urgency of addressing the critical situation in the region and the role that Spain could play.

Madrid has consistently promoted and defended the need to devote more attention to the Mediterranean and surrounding areas, promoting cooperation frameworks and building trust between partners. But Spain’s main priority and concern is the Maghreb and, in particular, the spiral of tension between Morocco and Algeria, both fundamental countries with which Spain works bilaterally.

Spain is the only EU member state that has been in every civilian and military mission deployed in Africa since 2003. In some missions, such as EUTM-Mali, Spanish soldiers have accounted for nearly 60 percent of the total number of troops deployed. Spain has also played an important role in two international coalitions for the region: the Coalition for the Sahel, which has addressed security, governance, and development issues, and the Alliance for the Sahel, whose assembly it chaired for three years until July 2023.

However, unlike other major countries such as France, Germany, Italy, or Poland, Spain does not have a summit at the political level that reinforces its role with the African continent — beyond bilateral meetings or other bodies such as the G5 Sahel — despite the fact that Spain is the only European country that maintains a land border with Africa.

Therefore, despite having shown initiative and sometimes leadership capacity in this part of the planet and despite having supported the French and international military presence there, Spain has not managed to establish itself as a leading military actor in the Sahel. It was reluctant to extend the support provided by its armed forces to the Barkhane operation beyond logistical support, and it was absent from the Takuba special force entirely. And yet, the image of Spain’s presence in this region is generally positive — mainly because it has not played a colonial role in it.

For the last 15 years, Spain has done invaluable work for the improvement of West Africa and the Sahel, strengthening the capabilities of some countries in the region and strengthening international cooperation. It has done so in multiple areas and initiatives, establishing its own format in its relations with countries such as Mauritania. However, in recent years it has been unable to expand its role in parallel with the new needs that have arisen. This has meant that other European countries, such as Germany or Denmark — with fewer direct interests and less influence in the region — have filled the void left by Spain.

The good news is that Spain does not want to leave the Sahel behind. In addition to the aforementioned bilateral cooperation with the United States, Spain launched a series of new projects in Mauritania in 2024 with the support of the European Union. These include the development of green hydrogen and a broader strengthening of the partnership between Mauritania and the European Union, which will also serve as an engine for the stability of the Sahel.

Conclusion

The challenges emanating from the Sahel are growing more complex, and international attention devoted to the region has risen exponentially. European states must reflect on their existing policies, which are often inadequately adapted to local challenges, and move beyond an agenda focused primarily on containing threats instead of on addressing structural problems. Given the complexity of the current situation — the entire security architecture built over the last decade that was contingent on external support having collapsed in the last year — a reset in relations between Europe and the Sahel is direly needed.

A new geopolitical framework is emerging in the region where Europe and the West increasingly seem out of place. This situation seems to be leading southern European countries, mainly France, Italy, and Spain, to review their policies toward the region while prioritizing bilateral efforts ahead of multilateral ones.

This approach is a mistake, given the complexity of the challenges emanating from the Sahel. A better solution would be for these countries to set aside rivalry among themselves and coordinate to address the challenges emanating from the Sahel. France, Italy, and Spain are well known in the region and can work together to coordinate agendas, particularly as all have the tacit support of the European Union and NATO. At the same time, both the European Union and NATO could take advantage of the potential coordinated effort of these three countries to harmonize their strategies toward the region, thus reducing intra-European power struggles and increasing efficiency.

France, Italy, and Spain should also coordinate with the United States, which remains concerned about instability in the Sahel. Given the mediocre results of EU and NATO efforts in the region, the United States has recently been trying to approach southern European countries individually to find effective solutions to specific countries and challenges. With the assistance of NATO’s new southern neighborhood representative, it is time for Paris, Rome, and Madrid to engage in coordinated talks with Washington to try to find new solutions for the Sahel, again leaving aside the perceived competition between them.

Carlota G. Encina is a non-resident senior associate with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.; a senior analyst for the United States and transatlantic relations at the Elcano Royal Institute, a Spanish think tank; and a lecturer in international relations.