Sudan’s Humanitarian Crisis

Sudan’s Current Humanitarian Crisis

The humanitarian situation in Sudan has reached catastrophic levels. After nearly 20 months of war, more than one-fifth of the country, over 12 million people, have been displaced from their homes. The country’s healthcare infrastructure has collapsed, with an estimated 70–80% of hospitals in Sudan’s conflict-affected areas no longer functional. And with the Rapid Support Forces militia pressing into the country’s agriculture heartland in recent months, Sudan’s ability to feed itself is rapidly eroding. This is threatening to extend today’s dire food insecurity into future growing seasons and to far outpace the international community’s ability to sufficiently fill the growing gap. Today, almost half of the country’s 50 million people are in need of life-saving humanitarian aid to stay alive, including more than 750,000 on the brink of famine as of early November.

Despite being the world’s greatest humanitarian crisis, the country’s global funding appeal remains only 60 percent met. The assistance that has been provided for many months has been unable to reach its intended beneficiaries due to a confluence of factors, both of design and circumstance. Already, many internally displaced persons (IDP) camps are reporting child mortality rates of nearly 12 per day due to famine. In August, the UN-supported Famine Review Committee made a declaration that more than 8.5 million people are reaching emergency levels of hunger, most of whom are living in areas under RSF control.

During any rainy season, roughly June to September, much of Sudan is unpassable. For this reason, humanitarians use historic precedent and projections to stockpile food and other aid where it is likely to be needed and at critical transport hubs. But that job has been made nearly impossible in the context of war, especially in light of tactical choices the RSF has made in recent months. New militia offensives that strike at the heart of Sudan’s most productive agricultural states have massively displaced farming communities, intentionally destroyed croplands and farm equipment, resulted in looting and resale of tractors and other farm vehicles in markets across the Sahel, and, most critically, led to a collapse of food markets. The destruction, unfolding in the context of constrained aid access and dwindling food stocks, is leaving record numbers of people in desperate need.

The main border crossing into the Western Darfur region through Adré, Chad, had been closed for months due to a military directive, until it was finally reopened in August 2024. Though the RSF technically controls the border crossing and the surrounding region, it does not exercise the sovereign authority the United Nations requires to undertake cross-border aid operations. Meanwhile, the Sudanese army fears that the RSF is smuggling in weapons under the cover of humanitarian assistance. This has created a stockpile of aid only a few kilometers from those who need it. Indeed, seemingly all regions of the country under RSF control, between one-third to one-half of the country, have had humanitarian distributions curtailed by the Sudanese authorities for this reason.

A History of Humanitarian Crises

Sudan is no stranger to food insecurity and humanitarian crises. Geography and changing climate conditions make Sudan perennially susceptible to the kinds of weather-related shocks that regularly befall the wider Horn of Africa region, be it seasonal rains and flooding, spreading desertification, or locust invasions. But it is more often manmade conditions that impact Sudan’s ability to feed itself and sustain the livelihoods of its people.

War, internal displacement, road closures, and a host of government bureaucratic impediments, such as technical work agreements, customs inspections, internal travel documents, and the provision of visas for international humanitarian staff, have become the tools through which the Sudanese government and its sometimes-opposing, sometimes-allied rebel groups and militias punish internal opponents and restrain the international community. Notably, during Sudan’s two episodes of north-south civil conflict, it is estimated that more than 2 million civilians died, mostly from famine-related causes. During the historic 15-year Operation Lifeline Sudan, the United States and other donors resorted to airdropping food aid over the Nuba Mountains region—an operation that is today being replicated on a smaller scale across the region.

Similarly, during the Darfur conflict of the early 2000s, more than 2 million civilians were displaced and regularly suffered from blocked aid routes, either due to government red tape or other intentional blockages. During one critical moment in 2008, President Omar al-Bashir expelled the majority of international aid organizations from Darfur as punishment for aid workers providing anonymous statements to the International Criminal Court’s chief prosecutor as part of Bashir’s genocide indictment. Estimates vary but the Darfur genocide is believed to have produced more famine-related deaths than conflict deaths during its nearly 10 years of intense fighting.

Measured against this history, what is seemingly old is new again in Sudan. The same tactics that stymied previous generations of humanitarian actors—opaque bureaucratic structures and byzantine decisionmaking processes across Sudan’s security agencies, intelligence apparatus, and ministerial offices—have again been employed to undercut current efforts, exacerbating the effects of the war and creating a record level of humanitarian need. Yet, this time, they do so with far less notice, as humanitarian crises in Gaza and Ukraine have drawn more attention and the conflict has not benefited from a broad public awareness campaign similar to that which brought atrocities in Sudan to global attention 20 years ago.

Humanitarian Assistance as a Bargaining Chip

Aid should not be treated as a bargaining chip, yet it routinely is in Sudan. The RSF has used it as part of its overall public relations campaign to try to demonstrate that it is a responsible international actor and capable of showing compassion, respecting international norms, and governing the areas under its control. However, the same group bears responsibility for the most excessive and egregious acts of murder, displacement, and destruction of humanitarian resources, including looting food stocks, stealing aid vehicles, and intentionally destroying healthcare facilities across the country. Meanwhile, Sudanese officials continue to use their bureaucratic control over the country’s borders and internal movements to flex their negotiating muscle with international aid workers and diplomats, who seemingly are more interested than the Sudanese government in saving Sudanese lives. Indeed, assertions of sovereignty are routinely used to justify aid denials and flout international humanitarian law.

Under this scenario, the Sudanese government is routinely able to deflect building international pressure to make political concessions to civilians or enter into ceasefire talks with armed opponents by turning that pressure into a crisis-response negotiation with the international community over aid access. By holding the civilian population’s well-being hostage, government negotiators have for decades been able to avoid hard conversations around peace deals, ceasefires, and political talks in favor humanitarian access negotiations where they routinely have the upper hand. Time and again, U.S. envoys, UN officials, and peace mediators are drawn into Sudan’s perennial game of whack-a-mole on humanitarian access—rushing to unblock aid in one area, only to see new restrictions crop up someplace new. This is again the case today.

In July 2024, the United States announced renewed ceasefire talks to replace the moribund talks previously co-hosted in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. As part of the announcement, U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken made clear, “The talks in Switzerland aim to reach a nationwide cessation of violence, enabling humanitarian access to all those in need, and develop a robust monitoring and verification mechanism to ensure implementation of any agreement.” However, the Sudanese army refused to send a delegation, offering instead to send “government representatives,” a tactic intended to earn the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) a higher standing in the talks compared to the RSF. As a result, the talks’ organizers were forced to pivot away from ceasefire negotiations, which might have forced the sides into painful political concessions, in favor of talks almost exclusively focused on aid access to affected communities.

The week of “around the clock negotiations” between representatives from the international community and the RSF, housed in luxury Swiss resorts, and various government and military representatives in Port Sudan, the current de facto capital, resulted in only modest humanitarian gains. Before the talks even began, a call between Secretary Blinken and SAF leader General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan helped achieve an initial agreement to open the critical border crossing at Adré, Chad, for cross-border humanitarian operations—a concession likely made by the SAF to blunt any criticism for not attending ceasefire negotiations. Subsequent talks with the RSF generated an agreement for the safe passage of a humanitarian convoy from Chad across RSF-controlled territories to reach those communities in most desperate need in central and eastern Darfur. The opening of a parallel aid route from Port Sudan was also announced, along with a commitment by the RSF to respect a code of conduct to refrain from further attacks against civilians. More recently, SAF officials have negotiated directly with the leader of Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North, Abdelaziz al-Hilu, and American humanitarian organization Samaritan’s Purse to open a humanitarian air bridge bringing relief supplies directly into the South Kordofan capital of Kadugli, with the promise of additional air access to come.

In the nearly four months since it was agreed to open the aid route from Chad, just over 300 aid trucks have crossed the border. However, the hardest hit Darfur camp, ZamZam, near the besieged city of El Fasher of North Darfur, requires at least 100 truckloads of dedicated assistance each month to meet the needs of the more than 450,000 civilians it shelters. While this opening is a notable start, it is hardly sufficient to begin to make a dent in the nearly 26 million people currently requiring assistance. This also assumes that these and future convoys will continue to be able to reach their intended destinations. However, Doctors Without Borders has already announced in late August that the RSF had seized and was holding several of their trucks in western Darfur that had only just recently crossed the border. Likewise, the United Nations reported in September that heavy rains across the region have severely damaged roads and bridges, limiting humanitarian movements into and within Darfur. These impediments are likely only the tip of the iceberg, since neither side has shown a genuine desire to assist civilians in need, out of fear of possibly conceding a win to the other side. It is likely that both sides will continue to use threats and blockages to humanitarian access as both punishment and leverage over the international community, which continues to press for unimpeded access at all border crossings and even over all Sudanese airspace.

In this context, it is worth recalling that it was not so long ago that the historic cross-border feeding campaign of South Sudanese during the north-south civil war led to a peace agreement that ultimately resulted in the partition of the country into two in 2011. This agreement denied the government the prestige of being Africa’s largest country, not to mention cut it off from the bulk of its hard currency earnings from its erstwhile southern oil fields. Similarly, in areas of Darfur, the government routinely fought to reassert control over rebel-held “liberated areas” during the period of the Darfur genocide where UN and other international humanitarian agencies were given special dispensation to operate over the government’s objections. These experiences remain fresh in the minds of Sudanese officials today, who, unlike the vast majority of their counterparts in Washington or Brussels, are in the same or similar positions today as they were 20 or more years ago during previous rounds of negotiations.

The final side of the humanitarian ledger that is much less discussed publicly, but which remains no less important, is how far the United Nations and international community are willing to push back against Sudanese-imposed restrictions to keep and expand aid access. As Sudan’s humanitarian situation continues to spiral, taking “no” for an answer must become less of an option. Coming out of talks in Switzerland, UN and international officials have spoken of moving from a “permission-based” aid delivery system to one that is “notification-based,” which assumes standing authorization for aid access and therefore only requires notification to help deconflict where there may be active combat operations. This is not the standard approach for UN officials, or their lawyers, who traditionally take a far more conservative and deferential approach to dealing with national governments. Non-UN humanitarian organizations argue that this is required to respond to the humanitarian imperative, which requires them to provide aid based on need and according to humanitarian principles and not acquiesce to politically motivated decisions to deny aid to a segment of a population under rule of an opposing warring party. However, to maintain such a system requires consistent pressure not just on the Sudanese government but also on UN agencies who are themselves under pressure from member states not to overstep their mandates and to respect state sovereignty. This will take sustained pressure by member states and NGOs on the United Nation and authorities in Port Sudan to maintain open access to aid routes going forward.

A Humanitarian Czar to Manage the Crisis

“Sudan faces the worst levels of food insecurity in its history,” according to a recent UN assessment. That is a startling assertion given Sudan’s long and tortured history of famine and should provoke a pause for anyone familiar with that history. Given what appears to be a lack of progress, or interest, from the parties to the conflict to negotiate an end to the fighting, let alone a transition to civilian rule, the greatest effort the international community can make now is continuing to work to ensure that Sudan’s humanitarian appeal is fully funded, that its humanitarian needs are met, and that every measure has been taken to ensure delivery of life-saving assistance.

Anyone with influence over the parties to the conflict should use their influence to urge compliance with international humanitarian law, which requires that they “facilitate and allow rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance to civilians in need.” While it is often viewed by political negotiators as demonstrating good behavior to comply with international humanitarian law, in reality it is a bare minimum that is legally required and should not be a substitute for progress on political negotiations. These tracks should be kept separate, so as not to position progress in the scaling up and facilitation of lifesaving humanitarian relief as leverage that can be withheld—at risk to people’s lives—to exact concessions in the political arena.

For these reasons, the Biden administration should immediately take steps to add a humanitarian czar to the roster of senior staff dedicated to addressing the crisis. Announced jointly by Secretary of State Blinken, USAID administrator Samantha Power and UN ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield, a humanitarian czar should be drawn from USAID’s senior ranks and possess a practitioner’s expertise and experience in leading the U.S. government’s response to complex humanitarian emergencies, specifically in Africa. While acting in close coordination with the overall efforts of the U.S. special envoy, their successor, or the political negotiations lead for Sudan at the State Department or National Security Council, the czar would be explicitly empowered to lead on a set of issues to which they would answer directly to the appropriate cabinet official. Importantly, such a position should not be a political appointment, nor be subject to Senate confirmation as new envoy would be, but rather be drawn from the career ranks and can thus serve in the position through Washington’s political transition.

First, the czar should be the lead official coordinating the U.S. interagency to achieve a true whole-of-government approach to the crisis that cuts across bureaucratic boundaries. The nature of the challenge in Sudan requires a comprehensive strategy that reflects the facts on the ground, starting with a massive refugee population spread across six neighboring states that is placing stress on local and international resources, plus an even larger internally displaced population that includes everyone from difficult-to-access rural populations to urban communities under daily bombardment. The cross-cutting nature of the crisis requires coordination and technical planning across a host of USAID and State Department offices and agencies whose lines of authority do not intersect, whose priorities do not often align, and whose budgets are rarely maximized for strategic impact. The czar should also be adequately staffed, in particular by having a deputy who is able to convene and lead the Washington-based interagency process during their extensive travel for humanitarian negotiations.

Second, the czar must also serve as a senior-level point person to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, along with relevant UN agencies in New York and on the ground in Sudan. Serving as a counterpart to the United Nations’ resident humanitarian coordinator, a czar can be pushing the alphabet soup of UN agencies on a daily basis to fulfill their mandates and push the boundaries of their own operational comfort levels to keep seeking creative solutions to the inevitable bureaucratic delays that Sudanese officials will throw up. Conversely, a czar can be a bridge back to Washington as well, ensuring that bureaucratic blockages in New York or in the field are being reported back and elevated in a timely manner. If U.S. officials truly mean that “there is not a moment to lose in our response,” then the United States needs a system that is poised to detect and respond to any delays, whether intentional or circumstantial, and is designed to respond.

A third role of a czar would be as a liaison to the broader donor community outside the United Nations, and in particular for the group of countries established at the recent Geneva talks, Aligned for Advancing Lifesaving and Peace in Sudan (ALPS). Here, the czar could work both as a coordinator of wider international efforts but also, most importantly, as a fundraiser to fulfill missing pledges for Sudan’s humanitarian appeal. Last April’s French-hosted donor pledging conference was a start, but it only raised$2.2 billion, only slightly more than half of the $4.1 billion the United Nations had projected it needed to meet needs in areas it could access at the time, and a lack of sustained follow-up has meant that donors have not been pressed to revisit or fulfill earlier pledges. While future donor conferences are in the works, Washington’s appointment of a humanitarian czar would send a signal to other donors of the United States’ seriousness and the need for others to do more. When Washington leads, others step up.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a humanitarian czar should serve as the United States’ lead interlocutor with Sudanese humanitarians and government officials on the day-to-day details of assessing needs and ensuring access. This role is all the more critical because it would move the negotiations with Sudanese officials over access out of the political realm, away from political actors—like special envoys, many of whom lack the technical expertise to negotiate on behalf of humanitarians—and back among humanitarians where it belongs. For sure, there will be coordination between humanitarian and political actors—in previous instances these talks have occurred in parallel (sometimes even in adjoining conference rooms)—but the message should also be clearly sent that humanitarian access will not be treated as a political bargaining chip.

The Precedent for Humanitarian Czars

Bureaucracies often bristle at the creation of new roles and the appointment of officials with broad mandates, especially if those mandates cut across cabinet agencies and touch upon the sacred cows of budget priorities or strategic plans. No doubt, the antibodies in the U.S. government will again surge in response to such an appointment.

Fortunately, there is precedent in both Sudan and the humanitarian community for such an appointment. As far back as 2004, the Bush administration appointed former USAID administrator Andrew Natsios as the very first humanitarian coordinator for Sudan. This high-level appointment came, like today, at a time when Sudan faced a complex emergency in both southern Sudan and Darfur. Like today, the U.S. Embassy in Sudan was closed and USAID mission staff were no longer in country where they could coordinate the international response and quickly verify the implementation of commitments made by Sudanese officials. Furthermore, Natsios’s appointment, coming on the heels of the first-ever appointment of a U.S. special envoy to Sudan, signaled to the Sudanese and the international community that the Bush administration was making a serious and sustained commitment to addressing the crisis in Sudan—something that statements nor social media posts can accomplish.

Similar positions have been created in responding to other complex emergencies in Afghanistan and the Middle East, with the Biden administration appointing a succession of humanitarian czars to manage the U.S. and global response to the crisis is Gaza. These appointees have played important roles in pushing for progress on humanitarian issues, including unsticking thorny problems with humanitarian access; maintaining consistent political attention; and providing access to technical operational knowledge about how to operate in complex humanitarian settings. Their impact has been tangible, but also limited, as in the case with continued humanitarian setbacks in Gaza and the lack of ability of the special envoy to achieve a baseline level of provision of assistance that would avert catastrophic food insecurity and meet basic needs, including protection of civilians and aid workers.

Conclusion

Sudan’s humanitarian crisis is reaching its apex as Washington becomes transfixed with its own politics and prepares for the arrival of a new presidential administration. By some estimates, more than 2 million Sudanese could die from famine and hunger-related causes by the time a new U.S. president takes office. The Sudanese government recognizes this and by some accounts may be trying to wait out the outgoing Biden administration in the hopes of perhaps getting a better deal or, at a minimum, greater latitude from a new administration that will take months to staff itself.

For this reason, it is critical that in its final days the Biden administration set in place a functioning structure that will carry over to the next administration and ensure no gap in attention or response to Sudan’s crisis. With the tenure of Biden’s current special envoy expiring at the end of the administration, a considerable staffing gap is already sure to be created. Reappointing a new special envoy that is required to stand for Senate confirmation, as is now required under law, will remain critical for the new Trump team, but such a move will likely take time and will realistically only come after other high-level appointments have been made. But recognizing that there will be a gap in high-level political leadership at such a pivotal moment for millions of Sudanese suggests that appointing a humanitarian czar now would also create a modicum of continuity when it is needed most. It will also importantly maintain separation between political negotiations—of paramount importance to end the conflict, and thus the root causes of humanitarian suffering—from the facilitation of humanitarian relief, which is a legal requirement and therefore should not be bargained over.

U.S. officials have been outspoken about their commitment to resolving the conflict in Sudan and addressing the humanitarian needs of so many millions in need. If those promises are to be more than rhetoric, it is critical to operationalize those commitments by appointing a humanitarian czar that elevates these issues in importance and ensures a degree of continuity at a time of transition. This modest action could affect the fates of millions of people.

Cameron Hudson is a senior fellow in the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.

Michelle Strucke is director of the Humanitarian Agenda and the Human Rights Initiative at CSIS.