Dutch Navy In NATO

The purpose of this Whitehall Report is to examine how the Royal Netherlands Navy (RNLN) can optimise its force structure to meet its obligations to NATO in an Article 5 scenario, in which the RNLN will be an important contributor to allied naval plans, particularly in the context of Regional Plan Northwest. The RNLN will need to balance optimising for this task with the requirement to maintain a balanced force that can also meet other commitments further afield.

This will be an enduring consideration since the Russian threat to Europe is unlikely to abate in the short to medium term. In the maritime domain many of Russia’s key capabilities, such as its nuclear attack submarine (SSN) fleet, have been relatively unaffected by the war in Ukraine. The Russian naval threat will prove most acute on the Alliance’s northern flank, given that many of its most important naval assets are held by the Northern Fleet.

The character of the Russian threat in the north is likely to evolve in the next decade. Since in a war the Russian navy is intended to support army-led joint plans rather than playing an independent role, it is unlikely to represent an independent threat to NATO, with the exception of sub-threshold sabotage, in the very short term. However, it is likely that this will change before the end of this decade once the Russian army regenerates its capabilities. In an Article 5 scenario, the most important naval task for the Alliance on the northern flank remains containing Russia’s SSNs, a task which may increasingly have to be achieved near the Bear Island–Svalbard Gap in order to contain submarines equipped with long-range strike capabilities. This in turn places allied vessels at risk from the airborne assets of the northern fleet joint strategic command, such as the cruise missile-equipped TU-22M3/M3M, which an allied maritime component command will also need to play a role in containing.

Russia’s cold weather-trained troops from both the Airborne Forces and the 80th and 200th brigades have suffered heavy attrition in Ukraine and the time taken to train such troops suggest that in the next decade the requirement for amphibious reinforcement of the northern flank will be reduced. This challenge will likely re-emerge by the 2030s, however. In effect, the Russian threat in the north will initially be a two-dimensional threat based around submarines and air-launched cruise missiles, but will expand into a more full spectrum threat by the mid-2030s. For a navy optimising for the northern flank, the list of priorities is likely to initially narrow, with a particular focus on anti-submarine warfare (ASW), mine countermeasures (MCM) and anti-air warfare (AAW) before broadening in the medium term.

The RNLN is likely to see a considerable growth in its capabilities over this period as the fleet expands and key parts of its force structure are recapitalised. While the expansion of the fleet and reorganisation of the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps (RNLMC) will allow the RNLN to be an important contributor to NATO’s maritime capabilities, particularly on the northern flank, there are short-term risks that must be overcome to reach this point.

The requirement to maintain a balanced force means that the RNLN operates a number of vessel types with attendant complications for both manning and maintaining a diversity of vessel classes.

The existence of a large number of vessel classes with, in some cases, limited numbers of vessels in each class creates a competition between maintaining a steady tempo of operations and retaining the slack capacity to ensure both readiness and the ability to maintain enough trained personnel in key roles to enable the eventual expansion of the fleet. This challenge will be felt most acutely by the RNLN’s ASW frigate force. That the fleet currently operates a limited force of two M-class frigates poses challenges both with respect to maintaining vessels at readiness and personnel management. The extensive demands of a limited number of vessels means that the capacity to train personnel in key areas (for example, sonar operators and controllers) is limited and much of the activity undertaken by these vessels is not ASW-relevant. This poses a risk, given the requirement to maintain enough qualified individuals to eventually double the ASW frigate force, which will require more crews than ships in the short term. There is a possibility that, if unaddressed, this will result in key competencies both on vessels and in training establishments dying out before the force expands. A similar requirement for additional personnel in excess of current manning requirements will be needed to realise plans to grow the fleet’s submarine force.

In the short term, the centrality of submarines to the Russian naval threat creates incentives to prioritise the readiness of ASW capabilities and the capacity to train personnel for them, even if this comes at the cost of balance and the capacity to maintain deployments at sea. For example, the M-class frigate could be ringfenced for ASW-relevant activity and used on shorter deployment cycles, even if this created gaps in the RNLN’s ability to maintain vessels on deployment in the short term. Failing this, technologies which enable at-sea training comparable to those incorporated on the US Navy’s AN/SQQ-89 combat system might allow perishable skills to be maintained, despite the tempo of operations.

While the RNLN could well see its pool of available personnel grow and has robust plans in place to achieve this, there is a requirement to hedge against this not occurring given the requirement for excess capacity to set the conditions for growth in key areas. The fleet’s offshore patrol vessels represent a capability that might be sacrificed to provide headroom. In extremis, this might also extend to its landing platform docks as the requirement for amphibious reinforcement will subside in the short term and by the time Russia’s cold weather-trained troops have been regenerated the new amphibious vessels, which will support the RNLMC’s revised CONOPS, will have been delivered.

In the individual major areas of naval warfare (ASW, AAW, littoral warfare, mine countermeasures and strike), the RNLN’s planned capabilities largely meet the requirements of the emerging operating environment and adaptations that need to be made are of a relatively incremental nature.

In some cases, this involves conceptual focus. This is especially true of the RNLMC’s planned CONOPS, which would benefit from a specific focus on and optimisation against adversary medium-range SAM systems as a subset of the elusive high-value targets that the RNLMC is planning to be able to engage.

In other instances this involves capability generation. An example is the requirement for an anti-submarine rocket to better leverage standoff ASW concepts and mitigate the risk to frigates using LFA (which are currently outranged by the submarines they might hunt). Similarly, a small number of longer-ranged air-defence interceptors, such as the SM-6, which could allow air-defence frigates to better contribute to a defensive counter-air mission against cruise missile-equipped aircraft likely represents a more viable way to offset the air and missile threat than attempting to generate an unaffordable level of magazine depth.

In specific areas, however, magazine depth and capacity will be of considerable importance. This will be especially true with respect to long-range strike, given the likely need to prioritise the employment of systems such as Tomahawk for the most operationally significant targets. Shorter-ranged and more expendable strike capabilities will be required, particularly for operations in the littoral.

The potential reliance of parts of the force on the same enablers for their CONOPS is a potential challenge to be surmounted. For example, the Joint Support Ship would be required for both support to littoral operations and theatre ASW. Since the RNLN will operate in an allied construct this is not insurmountable but requires peacetime agreement and preparation to rely on allied platforms for some tasks.

Plans to leverage uncrewed or optionally crewed systems for tasks such as MCM and ASW, as well as the provision of additional capacity to the fleet through optionally crewed vessels, can add considerable value. In the case of MCM, capabilities being developed for use against mines can also support tasks such as protecting infrastructure in the North Sea. However, limitations with respect to the power and endurance on uncrewed systems should be considered when selecting functions and payloads, particularly for uncrewed surface vessels employed in an ASW role, which would be most efficient teamed with LFA-equipped frigates if they employed passive sensors. For some capabilities, such as the optionally crewed multifunctional support ship, the requirement for power and endurance may also provide incentives for the eventual adoption of larger variants of the platform for the next vessels in the series.

Introduction

This Whitehall Report is the primary output of research commissioned by the Royal Netherlands Navy (RNLN) to examine the ways in which it can optimise its force structure and planning to meet its obligations under the first main task – contributing to the defence of Europe in a scenario in which Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is invoked.

The report summarises the findings of research informed by desk research and interviews with officers of the RNLN and the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps conducted by the author over the course of two weeks at the naval headquarters in Den Helder, Netherlands, in early September 2024. Interviewees included senior officers responsible for force development, operational planning and sustainment, as well as commanding officers of several vessels and officers who have operated on these vessels. The research also included interviews with the army and defence helicopter command.

The report examines two facets of future force development: fighting the fleet (an examination of planned capabilities and concepts across the major warfare areas); and resourcing the fleet. It concludes that while the strategic orientation of the force is sound and its medium-term future bright, there are decisions that will need to be made soon, both to meet acute challenges and to ensure that the force retains the organisational sinews needed to capitalise on the imminent expansion of the resources at the RNLN’s disposal as a function of the budgetary uplift it is receiving.

The report has three chapters. Chapter I articulates how the Russian threat will evolve over the next decade and beyond, and the ways in which this will determine which of the RNLN’s capabilities are most important to NATO at different times. Chapter II focuses on fighting the fleet, discussing the technical capabilities of the RNLN and its tactics, techniques and procedures over the major areas of the naval warfare in which it participates. This chapter assesses where the RNLN enjoys relative strengths and challenges that might impede its contributing to NATO. Chapter III focuses on the organisational foundations of the fleet, and how it might be better resourced and sustained. The report’s conclusions are the author’s own, and do not reflect the views of the RNLN or any part of the Netherlands Ministry of Defence.

I. The RNLN’s First Main Task as an Orienting Mission

Since the 2014 Russian invasion of Crimea, the RNLN has made responding to a NATO Article 5 contingency a priority mission set, following decades in which matters such as stabilisation operations were of arguably greater importance. Such a response is the navy’s first main task, as defined in Article 97 of the Dutch constitution, which reflects the broader focus on allied deterrence within Europe expressed in the latest defence white paper from the Netherlands.

In the interests of parsimony, this report does not delve into the specific circumstances that might lead to a war between NATO and Russia. From a defence planning perspective, the key issues are twofold. First, the consequences of such a conflict would exceed any contingency that Europe has seen in the past 70 years by a comfortable margin. Second, a major bulwark against such a conflict – the US presence in Europe – will become less reliable due to the structural reality that the US will face an opponent in the Pacific, in the form of China, which even the most conservative predictions suggest will have rough parity with the US in economic and military terms by the end of this decade – something the USSR never came close to achieving, except in specific areas. There is, then, a strong basis for a “minimax” approach to managing this risk – allocating disproportionate resources to the most impactful outcomes, irrespective of the assessed probability of the risk coming to pass.

Furthermore, the Russian threat is not transient, particularly in the maritime domain. In spite of economic headwinds, Russia has been able to sustain a war economy with a relatively marginal fiscal deficit (largely by cutting social expenditure), and the country’s likely growth rates, while slow, will still leave it Europe’s largest economy in purchasing power parity terms over the next decade (arguably a better metric for a state’s capacity to generate military power than GDP in nominal terms, since most spending is domestic). While the challenge posed by Russia is far from insurmountable for Europe taken collectively, it should not be dismissed as temporally bounded.

For these reasons, the first main task and the role of the Netherlands in deterrence as part of allied plans for northwestern Europe – the primary region of concern for the RNLN – are likely to be priorities for the force over the long term.

Russia will pose different challenges at different times in the maritime domain. In the very short term, the Russian challenge is likely to be primarily sub-threshold. By the end of this decade, the Russian challenge on NATO’s northern flank will have evolved into an acute but narrow submarine and air-centric threat. By the middle of the next decade, the reconstitution of Russian cold-weather-trained troops will make the threat on the northern flank three dimensional once more. Since the Russian navy has historically been an adjunct to army-led strategic planning, it is unlikely to present an independent high-intensity threat while the Russian army is embroiled in Ukraine. Russia’s navy and its Main Directorate of Deep Sea Research (GUGI) could, however, pose a threat to critical infrastructure in the North Sea and the Atlantic, as a means of retaliation for support to Ukraine. While the resilience of cable networks mitigates the threat posed by the GUGI – which would need to damage so many cables to achieve an effect that any deniability would be lost – there is an acute threat to gas pipelines in the North Sea, where the loss of pipelines such as the Langeled pipeline to Norway could combine with tight global gas markets to force costly choices on Europe.

Should the war in Ukraine end soon, Russia will embark on an ambitious process of rebuilding its armed forces, as outlined by then defence minister, Sergei Shoigu, in March 2024. In the High North, Russia is likely to see a marginal increase in its aggregate nuclear attack submarine (SSN) capability, as the improved Akula-class fleet completes refits in the 2020s, and additional Yasen-class submarines are added to the fleet. The Northern fleet currently fields two Yasen-class boats with a third to be added imminently, and Russia has commissioned a further six boats, the first of which is likely to be delivered in the early 2030s (based on the build time for the last boat in class). The Yasen class is comparable in quietness to Western boats and, in addition to heavyweight torpedoes, is equipped with a UKSK 3P-14B vertical launch system (VLS) that allows it to launch the 3M-14K Kalibr cruise missile, among others. In the early stages of a conflict, submarine-launched cruise missiles will be an important tool of offensive counter-air and strikes on key nodes – which Russia views as critical to its ability to deflect a massed aerospace attack.

The threat posed by Russian air assets will also see incremental improvement in this period, although probably not to the same degree. Russia’s fleet of 30 Tu-22M bombers under the 40th Mixed Aviation Regiment is unlikely to grow, but more bombers are likely to be upgraded to the Tu-22M3 variant. Other aircraft, such as the MIG-31, will also pose a threat, although MIG-31Ks (optimised for surface strike with the KH-47M2 Kinzhal) are likely to be outnumbered by MIG-31BMs (optimised as interceptors for air defence).

One area where Russia may struggle to regenerate capabilities in the short term is cold-weather-trained troops. Both the Airborne Forces (VDV) and the 200th Arctic Brigade have taken heavy attrition in Ukraine, and the Russian requirement for officers in cold-weather units to have undertaken five years of specialised schooling, together with the subsequent need for unit-level training over multiple years, mean that even when the conflict in Ukraine ends and reconstitution of these units begins, Russia is likely to lack cold-weather-capable ground units before 2034. Additionally, Russia has struggled with the import substitution needed to produce engines for newer Gorshakov-class frigates and has had to extend the lives of vessels such as the Kirov class, suggesting a limited (but not entirely non-credible) surface threat. In effect, the Russian threat from 2027 to 2034 is likely to be an acute, but relatively two-dimensional, air and submarine threat.

Beyond 2034, it is likely that the Russian threat in the High North will once again become three dimensional. In addition, Russia is likely to pose a threat to allied reinforcement in the Baltic Sea, where, despite its relative inferiority, it can contest chokepoints such as the Skagerrak with a combination of naval mines and shore-based Bastion-P systems.

This means that in the next decade, the most important priorities for the RNLN as a contributor to NATO’s maritime forces will be anti-submarine warfare (ASW), anti-air warfare (AAW) and mine countermeasures (MCM). Short-term readiness in these areas is a priority. By contrast, the ability to deploy amphibious forces, while still important, will become more critical later in the next decade. There is slightly more time to pace the redesign of the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps (RNLMC) and ensure the availability and readiness of supporting shipping.

For the Netherlands, as part of NATO’s northwestern regional plan, the immediate priority will be contributing to an allied effort to deliver ASW forward in the Bear Island–Svalbard Gap, since preventing Russian submarines from breaking through this gap will be vital to mitigating the submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM) threat. Notably, while Russia cannot win a war at sea, it can lose one in the maritime domain, and if the Alliance can credibly execute ASW forward, Russia will also need to consider the vulnerability of its own nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) bastions – something that can offset any advantages Russia may enjoy on land in terms of mass. Achieving this in a context where allied SSN capability will be strained and the key US enabler is absent will, however, require the Alliance to rely more heavily on frigate fleets, air-defence vessels and diesel electric submarines (SSKs) to patrol the gap. In the Baltic, if Russia cannot close off Skagerrak, its maritime disadvantages in an area of considerable proximity will compound, and concerns such as the launch of allied SLCMs from the Baltic Sea will complicate Russian planning.

The maritime domain is, then, an area where well-resourced allied forces can impose considerable dilemmas on Russia, and the historical focus of the Netherlands on MCM and ASW are of value in Skagerrak and in the Bear Island–Svalbard Gap – the two pivot points on which a maritime campaign would depend. These therefore represent the most important contributions the RNLN can make to NATO in the next decade. In the medium term, as the Russian land-based threat is reconstituted, cold-weather-capable troops will be important to ensuring that Russia does not push into northern Norway to outflank a maritime force by emplacing ground-based anti-access area denial (A2/AD) capabilities further forward in positions from which they could engage vessels patrolling the northern chokepoints. Past the middle of the next decade, then, the importance of amphibious reinforcement against Russian ground forces is likely to grow. A short-term specific focus on ASW and MCM should then transition to the contribution of a broader set of capabilities, including amphibious forces.

The key area of focus for the RNLN thus remains contributing to NATO’s deterrence in the Alliance’s northern flank. This report seeks to address the question of whether tactical concepts will allow the force to deliver on these priority areas, and explores how resources can be best managed to ensure that it does.

While this report focuses on the navy’s first main task, it must be noted that the prospect of a separate crisis instigated by an ally of Russia, either in a maritime chokepoint such as the Bab-el-Mandeb or against parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in the Caribbean, is an important planning consideration that the RNLN cannot ignore. Nevertheless, in the event of concurrent crises, the outcome in the European theatre would determine events elsewhere – if Russian SSNs are not contained, reinforcing parts of the kingdom of the Netherlands across the Atlantic becomes much riskier. Equally, if Russia sustains considerable losses in the north and the Alliance has slack maritime capacity, rolling back the gains of a Russian proxy becomes a comparatively simple task.

Second, with respect to a separate crisis in the Caribbean, some of the capabilities relevant to the navy’s first main task, such as deep-strike capabilities, can, in tandem with a light tripwire force and the likelihood of allied intervention against a Russian client in the western hemisphere, serve as a hedge against territorial revisionism at the Netherlands’ expense. The kingdom could balance its commitments by adopting an economy of force posture, a version of Singapore’s “poisonous shrimp” approach of demonstrating the capacity not to defend or retake, but to inflict unacceptable costs, as its strategy for deterrence at reach.

While the question of missions beyond the first main task are discussed briefly, for the sake of brevity, the European theatre is this report’s primary focus.

II. Fighting the Fleet: Optimising and Combining the Elements of the Force

As noted earlier, in the short term, the RNLN’s priorities within NATO should be:

• Contributing to forward ASW in the Bear Island–Svalbard Gap.

• Contributing to the air defence of forces conducting ASW in a forward position.

• MCM in Skaggerak.

Assuming that the Russian submarine threat is contained and the maritime approaches to the Baltic Sea can be opened, Russia’s position in the maritime domain will be severely compromised, with the security of its bastions in the north and its Baltic A2/AD zone being contested. Additionally, the Russian air and missile threat from the northern flank will depend heavily on SLCMs launched from vectors that give air defences limited warning times. SLCMs cannot be used as effectively if Russia has to launch them from near to its coastline (giving air defenders ample warning time). Containing Russian submarines will also have a second-order effect on the security of airbases and allied critical infrastructure.

In the medium term, the prospect of a Russian campaign that includes an incursion into Norway by a reconstituted VDV and Arctic Brigade cannot be ruled out. In such a scenario, the ability to place Bastion-P coastal defence cruise missiles (CDCMs) and surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems in Norway after seizing territory would significantly complicate ASW in the north, as these systems could hold frigates and maritime patrol aircraft at greater risk, thus enabling SSNs to break out past the Bear Island–Svalbard Gap. As such, blunting a land incursion will become critical to fighting the maritime battle. Allied air power could support the land component to achieve this against larger Russian forces, but attriting Russia’s air defences would be a long and time-consuming task. On the other hand, if forward-deployed raiding elements can accelerate the rate of attrition suffered by Russia’s ground-based integrated air defence system (IADS), allied advantages in the air will begin to compound. In the medium term, there will be an additional requirement to disrupt Russian IADS with amphibious raiding forces to enable theatre entry by follow-on forces within Norway.

This report discusses the priorities in each warfare area in light of these overarching effects to which the RNLN must contribute.

Anti-Air Warfare

Air and missile defence has been of considerable importance to the RNLN over recent decades. A ballistic missile defence (BMD) role has previously been considered for the RNLN’s AAW frigates, which provided early warning data for intercept by a US Arleigh Burke destroyer during the Formidable Shield exercise, although there are currently no plans to purchase a BMD interceptor. AAW is an important aspect of NATO’s requirement of the RNLN.

In addition, as the Netherlands is home to a number of sensitive allied targets, including Joint Force Command Brunssum, some of the Alliance’s dual capable aircraft and one of NATO’s more credible non-US F-35 fleets, attacks on the Dutch homeland in an Article 4 situation, before an Alliance-level command-and-control construct has been set up, are a realistic possibility.

A threat to the Netherlands would emerge primarily from the north, given the amount of allied airspace that missiles would need to traverse to reach the Netherlands from the east. Currently, the threat is exclusively a cruise missile, as Russia does not appear to field a large number of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), with the RS-26 programme seemingly not at full operational capability. While Russia does appear to possess a new medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) (possibly a variant of RS-26), with a sizeable but still constrained missile production rate of around 18 short-ranged ballistic missiles per month, producing additional missile types with their own production lines and tooling at scale necessary to allow their employment in conventional roles (which require large salvos) is likely to take time, and the primary function of a Russian MRBM/IRBM is likely to be theatre-level nuclear use (which would change the character of any war). The decision to maintain BMD sensors but not single-purpose exoatmospheric BMD effectors is, therefore, optimal to the circumstances. However, as will be discussed, some of the solutions to other air threats can also provide a hedge against an evolution of the ballistic missile threat.

It is likely that platforms such as the Yasen-class SSGN and Russian strategic bombers would need to travel into the Norwegian Sea to launch cruise missiles such as the KH-101 or the 3M-14 Kalibr and, as a NATO Maritime Component Command was stood up, this would become increasingly risky. An early “bolt from the blue” strike conducted using SLCMs might be conceivable and provides some rationale for a limited homeland IAMD capability for the first days of a conflict. A quiet submarine with a considerable launch capacity could transit to a launch position and deliver such an attack against key military targets. However, a surprise attack on NATO targets at scale (since the Netherlands is unlikely to be the exclusive target) would require considerable visible preparatory activity, such as mating missiles to bombers and positioning multiple submarines, all of which would rob the Russian ground component of any element of the surprise that Russia has historically relied on.

More clandestine tools, such as merchant vessels armed with the containerised version of the Klub-K missile, could also be employed against targets in the Netherlands. Once a conflict began in earnest, any vessel leaving a Russian port would be treated as suspect, meaning that these capabilities represent a single-use weapon, which would, moreover, probably be employed against static targets, since tracking a vessel with a converted container would prove difficult in most circumstances. In addition, even containerised missiles require, for example, temperature-controlled storage and maintenance, which are not available at commercial ports and would need to be stored at and then moved from military facilities – also generating early warning.

Early warning about the movement of capabilities from Russian facilities would likely depend on allied assets. These capabilities are significant, however – by way of a metric, the US XVIII Airborne Corps passes satellite ISR feeds to Ukraine 32 times a day. It is also worth noting that in the medium to long term, the capacity for small and medium powers to generate sovereign strategic ISR may well grow with the exponential proliferation of commercial space-based assets. Cruise missile attacks from non-dedicated vessels cannot be ruled out, but only a limited number of vessels could be used in this way and over a limited time period.

To a significant extent, then, the air threat is one better interdicted by forward ASW capabilities operating against the submarines that serve as the stealthiest (and thus survivable) launch platforms. This will, however, introduce a considerable requirement for fleet air defence against (primarily) air-launched cruise missiles. Currently, the RNLN operates a credible fleet of air-defence vessels, tactically well suited to its potential roles and which will see an increase in capability in relation to ballistic targets such as anti-ship ballistic missiles with the installation of the Block II APAR X-Band radar, along with the Thales Smart-L on the two newest vessels in class (which is also planned for the Future Air Defender, the RNLN’s next-generation air-defence frigate). However, several officers who were interviewed noted that a lesson to draw from both Ukraine and the Red Sea is that capacity in terms of interceptor numbers will be a major issue, particularly since the SM-2 Block IIIA is no longer in production, leaving the RNLN with challenges in a prolonged conflict.

The threat in the High North will differ from combat in the Red Sea in one important way. While in the Red Sea and the Black Sea, the Ukrainians and Houthis are able to engage targets with ground-based launchers, the loss of which is inconsequential, in the Bear Island–Svalbard Gap, given the distances involved, Russia would need to employ expensive platforms such as the Backfire bomber. These limit the employment of ground-based radar such as the Monolit-B, which have 250–450-km ranges and are more relevant to the Baltic, while backscatter radar, such as the Podsolnukh-E, lack the granularity to enable targeting. In theory, aircraft or satellites could be networked with ground-based launchers, but – unlike the China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) – Russia has not demonstrated the capacity to do this. Indeed, the failure to field more than a limited number of electronic intelligence (ELINT) and electro-optical (EO) satellites in the Pion-NK and Lotos constellations will also limit the employment of cruise missiles from Russia’s SSGNs against dynamic targets (since SSGNs such as the Oscar class have typically been cued by either satellites or airborne assets). While the cruise missile threat to vessels is multivector, the air-launched component is the most important. Since the RNLN cannot optimise against all threats (and does not need to as it will operate in a multinational context), increasing its capacity to help an allied force defend against air-launched cruise missiles is the most valuable contribution it can make.

The risks incurred by airborne platforms against allied defensive counter-air patrols and surface-based air defences (to which bombers must expose themselves in order to receive adequate returns from their own radar) are understood by the Russians, as illustrated by the Soviet military’s colloquial description of Backfire crews as “kamikazes”. A missile attack in the High North would therefore be more intense, but also more temporally brief, than what is seen in the Red Sea or the Black Sea, because the platforms on which it depends are not unlimited in number, and Russian planners would need to make careful decisions about when they are massed for attack against a high-value target set. Thus, the challenge for allied navies such as the RNLN is one of enduring a relatively short period of very intense combat, as opposed to a long period of mid-intensity combat. In the Baltic Sea, ground-based launchers for missiles such as the KH-35 and the P-800 operating from Kaliningrad pose a greater threat to allied forces, making the analogy with the Red Sea more apt. Capacity is still a challenge, especially from the RNLN’s current baseline, but it does not need to be able to fight a multi-month air war comparable to that in the Red Sea to deliver on the first main task.

In the short term, the problem of magazine depth can be handled in several ways. First, increasing sensor detection ranges can enable threats to be engaged at greater distances, in turn allowing for more efficient shoot–look–shoot shot doctrines, which can have a disproportionate impact on missile expenditure. For example, spreadsheet modelling undertaken by RAND has suggested that the interceptor expenditure of a three-layer BMD system is 75% lower than that of a single-layer system. The RNLN is already in the process of developing a cooperative engagement capability (CEC) with France’s Marine nationale and expanding this capability to allow for cooperative sharing of tracks with elevated sensors such as NATO’s AWACS, and allied platforms, such as the E-7 Wedgetail, would be a logical step towards enabling layering. If the range at which threats such as the subsonic 3M-14 can be engaged is increased through cooperative engagement with airborne sensors, this will have an effect commensurate with a sizeable increase in interceptor stockpiles. Integration, while feasible and demonstrated in US programmes such as NIFC-CA, requires both software integration via translation layers and a number of enablers, including low latency relays and gateways. This is easier to deliver than large numbers of interceptors, however, given the congested production lines for these effectors globally. Layering may be more achievable against subsonic and supersonic threats compared with newer hypersonics, such as the Zircon. However, because of its inherent complexity and cost, the Zircon will likely represent a relatively small fraction of Russia’s anti-ship missile arsenal.

Second, greater efforts should be made to defeat an opponent’s sensors, as distinct from active defence. The De Zeven Provincien class has recently received an electronic countermeasures (ECM) refit, having previously lacked a credible ECM suite, but more can be done on this front in the relatively short term. For example, more modern digital radio frequency memory (DRFM) decoys disrupt the onboard processing on modern missiles, including their range gates, enabling the more effective use of other capabilities, which most modern missiles with multi-mode seekers are built to counter. DRFM decoys might be procured to limit vessels’ interceptor expenditure in self-defence. Spoofing guidance systems are another way in which capabilities that will be encountered in relatively large numbers can be engaged – employed to good effect by Russia in the land environment. While ECM can be overcome through means such as millimetric wave or dual-mode seekers, this increases the cost of a missile and decreases the size of a salvo. Most Russian missiles remain dependent on a single guidance system. Moreover, spoofing and barrage jamming can also target the sources of tactical ISR (primarily airborne radar in the case of the Russians), although this is power intensive and would likely rely on the onboard generation capacity of the ship. The relatively large size and generation capacity of the De Zeven Provincien class and the likely larger size of the Future Air Defender can be advantageous here. Historical studies of AAW at sea suggest that dominance of the electromagnetic spectrum is somewhat more causally relevant than the balance of interceptors and missiles.

Out-scouting an opponent, however, is most effective when one can engage the launch platform. While increasing magazine depth to the extent needed to engage large numbers of air-launched cruise missiles will prove difficult, the RNLN might benefit from procuring a smaller number of longer-ranged interceptors to strike aircraft. In the final instance, the most potent threat to vessels in the Bear Island–Svalbard Gap is air-launched cruise missiles, which must be cued by an aircraft’s organic sensors. Aircraft must get within roughly 200 nautical miles of a vessel to generate returns from their own radar strong enough for detection, although more powerful Zaslon radar on the MIG-31 may be able to generate target-grade information at these distances. Aircraft must also fly high – for detection. It is thus both viable and preferable to engage the archer, not the arrow. A number of missiles fit this profile and, given how important airborne surveillance is to the Russian concept of operations, the ability to engage high-flying aircraft at extended range may be more important than magazine depth.

A (non-exhaustive) list of missile options includes the SM-6 (370 km), the Barak-ER (150 km) and the Aster-30 Block 1NT (150 km). The SM-6 provides a degree of multifunctionality and a hedge against the emergence of a ballistic missile threat. While expensive, it would probably not be required in large numbers if used primarily against aircraft such as Backfires (which are not numerous) as part of a wider allied naval force with allies that also possess considerable surface-based air defences. It also has the advantage of being MK 41-compatible and provides a hedge against the Russian IRBM threat (which is likely not to exist at scale for reasons discussed). While the SM-6 will be in high demand within the US Navy, given its value in the Pacific, foreign military sales of the missile are not as heavily oversubscribed as those of air-defence interceptors with multiple foreign customers. If this is not viable, other options have roughly comparable value against aircraft. However, to employ 150 km-range missiles against aircraft, vessels would need to operate at some risk, since an aircraft could launch missiles at the maximum detection range of its radar. However, a combination of jamming (to make it more difficult to receive radar returns and thus incentivise flying closer to a vessel) and longer-range missiles could make it riskier for an aircraft to fly closer to surface vessels to receive stronger radar returns. Vessels would rely on ECM to ensure that the tracking aircraft does not receive adequate returns at its maximum range. Jamming a high-power Zaslon system will prove difficult, but spoofing and other measures may be more viable means of luring aircraft into a weapons engagement zone. The only other differentiating characteristic of the other air-defence options is that the hit-to-kill capability of Aster provides a hedge against some threat types, such as the Kinzhal, or a future ASBM, which blast-fragmentation missiles may not provide.

Regarding magazine depth, for the self-defence of vessels, the NATO-led effort to expand production of the ESSM missile Block 2 will provide opportunities to build resilience in the medium term. If the RNLN wishes to hedge against the possibility of this initiative failing to deliver, an alternative way forward is to seek component commonality with the country’s air force. The integration of PAC-3 interceptors on a US MK 41-equipped Arleigh Burke is notable in this regard, since Dutch air-defence vessels are equipped with the MK 41. If PAC-2 GEM and PAC-3 can also be integrated with naval vessels, this could allow for both coordinated procurement with the air force (and thus returns to scale) and the ability to take advantage of the eventual licensed production of Patriot in Europe. The range advantage which Patriot enjoys over ESSM can also enable more effective layering, helping solve the challenge of magazine depth. Currently, Patriot is an oversubscribed capability, reflected in both prices and lead times – but this is true of most effectors. In the medium term, coordinated procurement can allow for returns to scale, access to nearby supply chains in Germany and a consolidation of one weapons engineering and maintenance function across the joint force. This is important, given the fact that platform and system diversity and the maintenance burdens these entail were highlighted as a point of concern by interviewees. Of course, integrating a new missile on a vessel is more than a question of demonstrated hardware compatibility, and the question of whether the Guardian battle management system can be made compatible with PAC-2/3 the missile type is still open (although the system already handles a number of US-made missiles). The Air Defence and Command fleet also has a packed schedule, with the planned integration of the Tomahawk Block IV.

In the medium term, the RNLN aspires to employ optionally crewed or uncrewed vessels procured as part of the multifunctional support ship programme to expand VLS capacity while relying on lean crews of eight to 10 individuals. The hulls of the vessels are all but complete and will likely be paired with the Future Air Defender and the Anti-Submarine Warfare Frigate, which will arrive in service from the early 2030s onward. There is relative confidence within the force regarding the low-latency datalinks needed to enable cooperative engagement. The major challenge with respect to any effort to pad out VLS capacity with low-cost vessels, however, relates to the issue of size. Medium-sized vessels lack the endurance to remain at sea for extended periods of time, making them potentially useful close to friendly shorelines, but difficult to employ at reach. Even larger vessels such as the US Navy’s 90-m large uncrewed surface vessel have ranges lower than those of an offshore patrol vessel.

Larger vessels such as arsenal ships or civilian vessels with containerised missiles, by contrast, enjoy greater endurance but would have larger (but still comparatively lean) crews. Consider, for example, the South Korean joint strike ship currently in production, which is likely to have a crew size of 50. The challenge for some types of large vessel is that the short wavelengths of low-latency communications mean that VLS-carrying ships must remain relatively close to the air-defence vessel to which they are paired and thus, if they are relatively large or based on civilian vessels, they are liable to give away the fleet’s position, reducing the value of any effort to limit a naval vessel’s radar cross-section. A large low-profile ship comparable with the South Korean Joint Support Ship (JSS) would probably offer the best combination of capacity, endurance and low observability, and would involve a relatively lean crew of 50, but it would have considerably higher capital costs, of around $500 million – making them still cheap relative to most naval vessels, but not quite expendable. An early additional cost increase that accompanies size, however, can considerably increase the versatility of the multifunctional support ship and reduce support costs – and thus might be considered a long-term saving.

If the emphasis is to be on very low-cost and lean-crewed vessels, there are two options. First, models of resupply at sea are being tested. If this is the chosen option, aiming for larger vessels with more stability in high-sea states and greater internal capacity to limit the degree to which the vessel needs refuelling is likely to be a next step for the Multifunctional Support Ship programme. Even so, replenishing a vessel with a smaller crew (or none at all) may prove challenging when operating at reach, given the power-consumption demands of running a VLS system and of movement on a relatively small vessel. This will be especially important as the JSS and the Combat Support Ship (CSS) will also have other support functions and can allocate a portion of their capacity to replenishment at sea for uncrewed surface vessels (USVs).

Alternatively, prior coordination with Norway such that ports such as Bergen and Narvik are prepared to refuel optionally crewed vessels as part of the Norwegian defence plan might be explored. If the air-defence role allocated to the RNLN by Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) is close to a port (because, for example, it is providing air defence to the sea point of debarkation), this could also help resolve the challenge – although this would also mean that the immediate utility of the vessel is constrained. Finally, because missile warfare will be short but high intensity in the High North, low-endurance USVs could be employed intelligently – for example, they could be surged to the theatre when allied commanders assess the Russians to be preparing a large missile raid with bombers and surface vessels. As the process of preparing bombers and vessels for attacks is time consuming (Russia generates roughly one bomber-launched salvo every 72 hours in Ukraine), surging vessels from ports to the fleet is viable if allied early warning is robust.

All pathways should be explored in tandem, with resources committed in earnest once the viability of an approach is better understood. The immediate utility of the multifunctional support ship should be seen as limited outside port defence, and the inherent risks of the concept must be well understood. It is entirely plausible that the primary defence system of the Future Air Defender is still what is on board the vessel rather than capacity held offboard on uncrewed or optionally crewed systems – an assumption that is driving the expansion of VLS capacity and thus vessel size in China and Japan (among others) and that will likely drive the requirements for the Future Air Defender. This is not to say, however, that there is no viable pathway to employing these capabilities in a decade. This could become possible, either through improvements in the capacity to replenish medium-sized vessels at sea, or through the development of viable over-the-horizon CEC that can be used to cue them.

Anti-Submarine Warfare

ASW represents an especially important capability that the RNLN provides to NATO, and one that will be of considerable importance in light of the growth of the Yasen-class fleet. Dutch frigates equipped with LFAPS sonar enjoy comparative advantages in signal-processing algorithms in comparison to similarly equipped platforms in the Alliance, which could make them an especially valuable asset against the acute near- to mid-term submarine-centric threat in particular. In addition, the RNLN’s Walrus class has greater endurance than SSKs built for coastal warfare, and can thus support some ASW functions, although operating deep within Russian bastions will remain a function for SSNs, given the limitations of diesel boats in this respect.

A major problem for the ASW frigate fleet is its size, which will make both readiness and the retention of certain skill types more challenging. This will become easier in the 2030s, following the recent decision to purchase two additional ASW frigates in addition to the two replacing the force’s M-class frigates, but the challenge of skills retention will need to be carefully managed in the short term. This will be discussed further later in the report, while this section focuses exclusively on tactics.

The RNLN’s two ASW-equipped frigates have, as mentioned, considerable utility against increasingly quiet SSNs, against which passive detection will prove challenging except at exceedingly short distances. However, emitting also places a vessel at risk of counter detection and engagement. This represents an issue since the fleet at present lacks the means for prompt engagement of a target. The NH-90 helicopters on board FFGs can engage a contact at reach, but require time to be prepared and flown out, while the MK 54 torpedo is out-ranged by the Russian Futlyar heavyweight torpedo. To be sure, the risk of counter detection is determined by a number of factors, including the signal-processing capabilities of both the source and the receiver and the decision to emit at broadband or narrowband, but range is a risk factor. The most important short-term capability gap currently facing the M class and its successor is the absence of a heavyweight anti-submarine rocket comparable to the US RUR-139C. Scalable off-the-shelf solutions do not currently exist in Europe, but MK 41-compatible long-range anti-submarine rockets (ASROCS) such as the 30-km Type 07 are produced for the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force. While other solutions, such as the use of UAVs equipped with lightweight torpedoes, have also been proposed as part of future ASW concepts, these UAVs would compete for hangar and flight deck space with the NH-90, and while they might enjoy greater endurance, they would still be bound by maintenance and fly-out times. While potentially an important part of a cheaper and more scalable future ASW capability, at present UAVs appear to be an over-engineered substitute for the standoff that an ASROC can provide.

The available alternative is to rely on a more persistent helicopter presence. In a theatre ASW construct, a helicopter such as the NH-90 should be airborne at all times, with the JSS employed as a theatre ASW platform supporting the fleet at reach. There will, however, be a number of competing demands on the JSS, including fleet sustainment, Role 2 medical facilities and support for the Marines for up to 30 days of high-intensity activity. This is not an irresolvable issue, not least because the imminent addition of the combat support ship will ease a partial capacity bottleneck (albeit only if both the JSS and the CSS are available simultaneously). Moreover, the force will operate under MARCOM, and either the Marines could rely on allied sustainment (prepared with the Norwegians as part of their defence plan) or alternatively theatre ASW could be provided by an allied landing helicopter dock (LHD). Either avenue would require some preparation, for example in the form of regular cross-decking of the NH-90 with the ally likely to provide the LHD, if the JSS is likely to support amphibious activity. At present, this is difficult to anticipate because much allied ASW planning is focused on unit-level skills – a point which will be returned to later. The RNLN could, however, approach the subject on a minilateral basis with allies committed to the Regional Plan Northwest. Even with an available theatre ASW platform and a likely increase in the number of ASW-capable NH-90s, it should be noted that the lightweight MK 54 torpedoes carried on helicopters are range limited, have had prior performance issues in tests and, due to their warhead sizes, have relatively low lethality compared with heavyweight torpedoes.

The RNLN is placing considerable emphasis on the ability to deploy USVs of a roughly 12-m length from its future ASW frigates. There are several possibilities for the employment of these systems. Some have suggested the use of uncrewed assets as active emitters with variable-depth sonars, while others suggest the use of passive towed arrays. In the author’s view, the power consumption of active sonar is unsustainable on a 12-m vessel – an active sonar needed to achieve a 10,000 yard (roughly 10 km) detection uses half a million watts, for example. Less power-hungry options comparable to the dipping sonar on helicopters are an option, but this implies severe range limitations. On the other hand, USVs equipped with passive detectors (which require just one watt of power for the same detection ranges) deployed well ahead of a vessel could be useful enablers that extend the range of active sonar by receiving returns closer to the point at which waves are reflected, with a concomitant reduction in transmission losses. While the frigate would still have to emit, it could do so from greater distances, and thus mitigate its risk. The optical passive towed arrays on which the RNLN has conducted fruitful research are considerably lighter than traditional towed arrays and offer advantages in terms of sensitivity. This would make them fairly ideal candidates for integration on a USV. Their employment would be most useful in tandem with a long-range ASROC, since the range advantage they offer can be best exploited if a contact can be engaged at range.

Finally, training for ASW currently lacks realism, and is a concern both within the RNLN and across NATO. Exercises such as Dynamic Mongoose tend to involve unit-level training of a vessel or a platform (such as a maritime patrol aircraft) against a single contact, rather than the integration of ASW assets at a theatre level. Immediate exclusion from an exercise upon detection is not a norm, and the effects of other areas on the conduct of ASW (for example, a lack of situational awareness because P-8s fly at risk in the Svalbard Gap) are typically not incorporated. At the level of the RNLN, while vessel crews do train collectively, the majority of their education and training is stovepiped within their own specialisms (such as principle warfare officers or sonar operators), and training as a task group is not conducted regularly. This is exacerbated by the fact that operational deployments limit the time that the crews of a small force of M-class vessels can dedicate to ASW-specific activity. This also impacts training cycles, with some classes having to be cancelled because of a lack of attendees (as crews are deployed). The issue of realism in ASW training and the integration of effects is not easily resolved, but realism is achievable, as exercises such as NATO’s late Cold War free-play exercises in the High North illustrated.

While the subject of training pipelines will be addressed in more depth in subsequent sections, it is worth noting at this point that there is a real risk that certain skills perish before the RNLN’s ASW frigate fleet has doubled in the mid-2030s. The tempo of operational activity of a fleet reduced to two vessels means that the demands of operations and workup periods leave limited slack for certain skills to be trained or refreshed, with classes often being cancelled for want of attendees. Areas of particular concern include sonar operators and controllers, as well as principal warfare operators and operations officers. The limited number of vessels in the fleet and thus the limited pathways to promotion on board them also leads to the shedding of personnel. While crew rotation across the fleet will be difficult to sustain, it is important that the M-class frigate force has more crews than vessels if this issue is to be arrested, until such time as more platforms are available.

The RNLN cannot resolve every aspect of this matter unilaterally, and some issues, such as Alliance-level exercises, are ultimately a NATO responsibility. However, there are avenues through which elements of the issues identified can be targeted. One is through bilateral and trilateral exercises with the navies of countries such as the UK and Belgium, both of which partner with the RNLN extensively. These can be conducted on a smaller scale but with more operational realism than Alliance-level exercises, which necessarily involve considerable preparation and thus a requirement for participants to receive adequate training time. A number of militaries are also experimenting with the use of relatively low-cost uncrewed systems to simulate jammers, additional contacts and attacking aircraft, including China’s PLA (and this is already a feature of air-defence training in allied navies). While such systems cannot simulate the precise signatures of opposing targets, they can add clutter and a higher tempo of activity to an operator’s picture without a requirement for multiple assets to be allocated to an exercise, and can, as an additional benefit, provide a basis for experimentation with some capabilities that may be used as second-tier combat assets (as with the UK’s Banshee UAV, which was used as a strike drone in Ukraine).

Regarding the proportion of time that vessels’ crews spend in activity relevant to ASW, there are several possible options. Ideally, given the near-term centrality of ASW to the first main task, the two available M-class frigates would be ringfenced for ASW-relevant activity, being deployed at sea on shorter cycles for activity specific to the northern flank, even if this created gaps in the RNLN’s ability to maintain vessels on operational deployment in the short term. This may, however, not be viable. An alternative might be the incorporation of simulators into the vessels’ software. This is not a new technology – the US Navy’s AN/SQQ-89 ASW software has incorporated a training module that allows vessels at sea to simulate tactical ASW scenarios since the early 2000s. The incorporation of additional software into a vessel’s suite is not easy, and simulators would create requirements for establishments ashore (which bear responsibility for scenario generation and the collection of sensor data). This being said, additional activity may be beneficial, as one of the major challenges the training establishment currently faces with respect to ASW is a paucity of activity because trainees are deployed (which is driving losses among trainers, who the force needs to retain).

A final point concerns plans for future uncrewed aerial systems for ASW. The employment of the VTOL UAV currently being procured for the Dutch helicopter command as a multipurpose asset with ASW functions (with multifunctionality being deemed a necessity, given the command’s limited capacity) would probably see it equipped with a magnetic anomaly detector. In a similar vein, the prospect of equipping the air force’s planned 8 MQ-9 Reapers (four of which will have a maritime surveillance radar) to lay sonobuoys has also been discussed. While maritime patrol aircraft represent a real bottleneck in Alliance capability, uncrewed platforms have a limited capacity to lay sonobuoys. Similarly, magnetic anomaly detectors have very limited ranges. As such, the capacity of these systems to engage targets is likely to be limited. However, there are other possible concepts of employment. For example, uncrewed assets equipped with either lightweight torpedoes or sonobuoys that simulate weapon signatures (not unlike the US Navy’s Julie Jezebel sonobuoys) can play a role in suppressing submarines and forcing them to take evasive action by deploying these capabilities near a submarine’s last known location. This is important since “virtual attrition” – limiting the time a submarine spends performing useful functions – has often been of considerable importance over long ASW campaigns. Future concepts for the employment of uncrewed assets might benefit from a focus on suppression over attrition.

Littoral Warfare

The Royal Netherlands Marine Corps has, since 2014, been embarked on an ambitious force transformation aimed at operating as a very high readiness, littoral raiding force. As part of this effort, the force is to be reorganised into three, special-operations-capable Marine Combat Task Groups (MCTGs), arranged into strike and reconnaissance squadrons. Each MCTG retains a Marine Spearhead Task Unit on standby for rapid, worldwide crisis response operations. Organic means of indirect attack, including precision-guided rockets, loitering munitions and precision-guided mortars, are expected to be combined with direct-attack capabilities, such as sniping and extended range anti-armour missiles.

Additionally, it is assumed that the MCTG will be able to call in long-range, maritime precision fires, including loitering munitions from the multi-mission support ships.

The squadrons are intended to be able to self-sustain for seven days, while attached logistic and medical support sections from the Marine Support Group provide additional supplies, either for two days, or for prolonged field care if needed. For continued operations, replenishment will be brought from the sea base, at range, by surface and/or air connectors, including uncrewed systems, towards multiple littoral access points ashore, starting a new seven-day operations cycle.

A force built around capabilities that are either man portable or which can (in the case of a 120-mm precision-guided mortar) be carried in all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) will enjoy considerable mobility, and the risk of attacks by infiltrators can force an opponent to concentrate in ways that exposes their forces to massed fires, as illustrated in Exercise Green Dagger, where the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps and the UK Royal Marines played this role in support of a US Marine Corps regiment that provided the fires. Other empirical evidence of the effectiveness of distributed raiding forces as a means of imposing dilemmas on an opponent include the early days of the conflict in Ukraine, when light infantry held up Russian units to enable their destruction by artillery. The concept has also been wargamed and tested on modelling and simulation software against an opposing force based on the 200th Arctic Brigade over the course of a year. There is also some historical evidence to support the notion that raiding forces can impose costs and delays on a heavier opponent, such as during the 1940 “winter war” between the USSR and Finland, and it has been argued that the terrain of Norway is especially well suited to this type of warfare. Thus, the evidentiary base behind the Marines’ CONOPS is relatively strong.

There are several outstanding questions regarding the Marines’ CONOPS that require specification, however. The first relates to the specific high-value targets that the marines expect to prioritise, given that elusive and high-value targets will be the focus of the raiding concept and the force is expected to be able to operate at depths of up to 100 km, which could thus involve a range of targets. While it is unlikely that the force is going to be fixed to engaging only a single target type, specification is useful here, since this will impact the depth of operations, the effectors used and the likely expenditure of fuel and ammunition. For example, the short- and medium-range SAM systems, such as the SA-15 and the SA-17, will be emplaced relatively close to the forward line of own troops (reducing the requirement for penetration at depth), but they will also be in an area where the opponent has relatively high force densities – raising the prospect of engaging with hostile ground forces. By contrast, longer-ranged capabilities in rear areas such as the S-400 or long-range EW platforms such as the Krashuka-4 are emplaced in rear areas with lower force densities, but which involve infiltration over longer distances.

In the context of a conflict between NATO and Russia, there is a good basis for emphasising the destruction of short- and medium-range systems such as the SA-15 and the SA-17. This is because these systems represent the primary challenge posed by Russian IADS to NATO airpower, for two reasons. When linked to longer-range strategic systems such as the S-400, these systems do not have to turn on their own radar, making it possible for them to track aircraft without exposing their positions – and there is currently a shortage of MMW seeker-equipped air-launched munitions that can track them when they are not illuminating. Moreover, the systems represent highly effective point defences for ground forces, making munitions expenditure rates unacceptably high. While historically an IADS was destroyed from the inside out – with the attrition of the longer-range systems the key priority – the opposite is the case now. Robbed of an outer layer of more numerous shorter-range systems, longer-range SAMs are relatively vulnerable. There is an especially strong contribution to be made to a joint campaign through the engagement of the short- and medium-range outer layer of an IADS, which should be a priority target set, since a successful counter-IADS effort can allow NATO’s advantages in the air to be brought to bear.

The consequence of this focus would be that short-range precision strike would take precedence over longer-range systems, since the priority targets are not necessarily deep within an opponent’s rear. Moreover, completing kill chains for short-range systems without reach-back will be considerably easier. Rather than range, the most important characteristics of tactical strike will be seeker fidelity, and employment in a contested electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). MMW seeker-equipped tactical precision-strike capabilities will be of particular importance, given that the most important characteristic of a munition is not its payload (most systems are quite fragile), but its ability to track elusive targets. Since there are unavoidable trade-offs in precision-strike capabilities if the CONOPS focuses as a priority, as this report proposes it should, on elusive but soft-skinned targets at brigade/division depth, range and payload should be traded for sensor fidelity and survivability in a contested EMS. This will be discussed further in subsequent sections.

The second point worth noting is in response to the range of hard- and soft-kill measures likely to be employed against airborne threats. Reversionary methods of attack are useful. The planned order of battle includes several such mechanisms, including mortars and snipers. This report proposes that mines should also be considered, since they represent a means of hedging against convoying systems (as illustrated by their use in the “Scud hunts” of the 1991 Gulf War, after Iraqi forces formed larger protected convoys). Many modern mines include stand-off and top-attack options, cued by movement in proximity.

If operating primarily against targets that are at a motor rifle brigade’s tactical depth or just beyond it, a high opponent force density is to be expected. While the CONOPS of the Royal Netherlands Marines is predicated on avoiding contact as much as possible, contact may prove unavoidable in some instances. Previous experience of the activity of raiding forces against elusive targets, including the Scud hunts of the 1991 Gulf War and the operations of Military Asistance Command Special Operations Group (MACVSOG) in the Vietnam War, suggest that opponents are likely to increase force densities around elusive targets in response to raiding. In the Vietnam case, this led to contact being made more frequently, while in Iraq, special forces teams largely avoided the southernmost parts of the country for this reason – which limited their effectiveness. The fact that this was necessary against primitive adversary ISR (mostly visual detection) shows that high force-to-space densities represent a problem, even if effective counter-ISR methods against capabilities such as the Orlan-10 and other UAVs are employed as expected. However, in a joint context, this may be less of a challenge, since, for an opponent, concentrating around high-value targets can create vulnerabilities to other modes of attack. For example, in the context of Green Dagger, concentration by the opposing force commander to counter raiding forces resulted in his incurring high levels of attrition. This being said, the lesson from historical experience is that raiding forces not backed by fires that can punish concentration either see their effectiveness diminish (as in the 1991 Gulf War) or see their burden in terms of munitions expenditure and casualty evacuation grow (as in Vietnam). The assumption that fires will only be available when the follow-on force arrives is thus a potential risk and to work a raiding concept requires the vanguard force to have some capacity to punish adversary concentration.

In principle, II MEF could provide the capacity to punish adversary concentration as part of an allied force construct. As will be discussed in the later section on strike, there could also be avenues to exploit the MSS as a fires platform for 300-mm rockets that can also be employed on the army’s PULS MLRS, although these are more radical and potentially costly. An alternative way of approaching the question would be to adopt different measures of effectiveness. Concentrating in order to protect high-value targets can lower attrition to raiding by Marines, who will have fewer opportunities to engage, but this would also likely rob a Russian unit of mobility and offensive power – buying time for allied follow-on forces to deploy. Finally, the higher likelihood of direct engagement can be accepted as a necessary risk – which was not possible in 1991, for policy reasons, but was accepted by MACVSOG in Vietnam.

The planning assumptions of the Royal Netherlands Marines is that they will return to shipping on a six-day cycle (two days to find a target, two days to strike and two days return to shipping/retasking). This represents a reasonable tempo of activity, roughly consistent with US Special Operations Forces teams in 1991 and shorter than the cycles of activity of the SAS in the same conflict – which means that there is slack capacity to extend operating cycles if compelled to do so by unanticipated factors.

Regarding sustainment, it is relatively difficult to quantify sustainment requirements for raiding forces relative to regular units, because this depends to a significant degree on their mission – whether infiltration, ISR, battle damage assessment or strike – and their success in avoiding contact. A unit is likely to either expend very little fuel and ammunition, or to expend much of its capacity in short engagements prior to attempting withdrawal. This being said, historical evidence shows that irregular units typically have very limited sustainment requirements, with one estimate suggesting that the resupply rates for all Viet Cong forces in theatre during the Vietnam War was as low as 60 tons per day. They also typically break contact considerably faster where possible, with direct exchanges of fire rarely exceeding an hour (although units typically expend most of their munitions load in these engagements). This means that, all other things being equal, the ammunition expenditure of an irregular unit is a fraction of that of a regular light infantry unit. Fuel expenditure is likely to be more considerable, although fuel is comparatively easy to move and to pre-position. Nonetheless, judging by the target set most relevant to this report, contact (and thus the expenditure of ammunition) would be expected to be on the higher side of the spectrum, but still lower than the expenditure rates of a conventional infantry force. Relatively light forces can also be fuel efficient, especially in a relatively narrow theatre such as Norway.

Regarding the employment of shipping in the context of Norway, unless Russian forces push to the coastline and emplace Bastion-P systems, the A2/AD threat will be limited by a reliance on air- and surface-based assets, which will themselves operate at some risk from allied combat air patrols and vessels at sea. This, coupled with the geography of the Norwegian littoral, which makes tracking vessels difficult, incentivises an approach based on vessels hugging the shore, rather than relying on stand-off. There will still be a requirement for surface connector range for the movement of personnel and supplies along littoral access points along the shoreline, however.

With respect to connector design, the requirements for stability (to enable Marines to deploy), range, carrying capacity and low observability must be traded off against one another, especially as travel over very long ranges carries the risk of musculoskeletal damage. By contrast, goods can be moved over much longer distances, enabling distributed resupply. This provides an incentive to subdivide connectors into transport and manoeuvre/CASEVAC functions, since once the requirement to move humans over long distances is removed, a range of plausible solutions in terms of design range and storage capacity become viable. For example, the US Marine Corps is testing low-observable vessels, based on narco-boats, for resupply functions. Although these 12-m vessels would be unsuitable for moving personnel, they can carry 10 tons of goods over very long distances.

One major question for the CONOPS, however, is the degree to which it is dependent on the JSS (which may be tasked to theatre ASW). The amount of support shipping available for sustainment in the Dutch context is roughly consistent with the assumptions of forces such as the Royal Marines (although not identical, because the size of the vessels involved differs), but the reliance on the JSS for support in both Operations Cycle 3 and Role 3 medical support make this a single point of failure. The risk with regard to sustainment could be mitigated by deploying caches sufficient to enable Operations Cycle 2 to be carried out with pre-positioned assets, with the ATS then supporting Operations Cycle 3. The issue of Role 3 medical support may prove more difficult to overcome, although in an allied operation vessels such as the Royal Navy’s MRSS will also be in the theatre. It may be the case, based on the assessments in previous paragraphs, that medical capacity will be a bigger challenge than fuel and ammunition consumption in the context of a raiding CONOPS. If so, one solution might be to expand the medical facilities on two of the planned ATS, to ensure that one vessel in a three-ship formation can provide Role 3 support. The reduction in outload could be managed through a heavier reliance on pre-positioning. The alternative would be to rely on ships taken up from trade for Role 3 support, much as was done with the SS Canberra during the Falklands War.

There do appear to be some potential points of disconnect between the RNLN fleet and the Marines regarding the amount of time needed for preparatory activity before vessels are moved into the adversary weapons engagement zone. This does not preclude the deployment of the Marines, who are likely to be pre-positioned in an escalating crisis, but it does have ramifications for resupply and CASEVAC in the first 30 days of a conflict. Either vessels must be expected to operate at greater risk earlier on – even presuming the survival of some adversary area denial threats – or there is a requirement for the pre-positioning of stocks to enable MCTGs to self-sustain for longer than one operations cycle in the early phases of a conflict. Since the Marines’ operating cycle (seven days) is relatively short and the resource expenditure of irregular forces low, there is room for extending it in the early stages of a conflict without exhausting personnel or creating an unsustainable requirement for forward logistics if the availability of shipping early on is limited.

This is linked to a broader issue, namely that amphibious exercises as currently conducted (particularly at the NATO level) tend to be timebound relative to the task – both the Dutch fleet and the Marines need to exercise a range of functions, so times for each activity are compressed. Theatre entry is thus not practised in a realistic way. Moreover, logistics are typically allocated for a fixed time period, and the possibility of logistical overstretch is not realistically examined. The fleet and the Marines might benefit from separate amphibious exercises focused on theatre entry, sustainment and operations ashore to give each time to practise its respective skills. Exercises might be run in parallel, with deductions from each then shared. While exercises on a bilateral or trilateral basis (for example, as part of the UK–Netherlands amphibious force and the US Marine Corps) represent a gold standard in this respect, if vessel availability impedes this, modelling and simulation might prove a useful substitute. As the Newport wargames of the 1920s and 1930s showed, fairly simple tools can yield meaningful analytical results. The Dutch Marines’ taskings are less onerous at the moment, with the end of the commitment to EUFOR ALTHEA (overseeing the Dayton agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina) leaving limited standing commitments beyond a troop-sized element in Romania training Ukrainian marines, and fleet marine squadron protection detachments. As such, the capacity of the Marines to test their own assumptions regarding movement and logistics and examine the possibility of longer windows through exercises is relatively high.

There are some differences of opinion within the force regarding the role of the NH-90 for both CASEVAC and the sustainment of forces ashore presuming contested airspace. The man-portable air defence (MANPADS) and short-range air defence (SHORAD) threat to helicopters is real, and improvements in areas such as acoustic detection for purposes such as countering uncrewed aerial systems (using machine learning to sift propellor signatures from noise) will further negatively impact the survivability of rotary-wing systems against a peer competitor, given that they will operate in contested airspace. There is a significant threat posed by systems such as the SA-10, the SA-11 and the SA-15. However, most lower-tier systems are either line-of-sight systems or relatively short ranged, meaning that rotary-wing systems can still be used to provide speed and mobility at the theatre level, behind friendly lines and in safer offshore positions, such as the littoral access points where Marines plan to be exfiltrated (since they enjoy an advantage in speed over connectors in the golden hour). Ensuring that CASEVAC is performed by rotary-wing assets can allow surface connectors to be employed for insertion and sustainment. For example, the NH-90 could be used to deposit supplies on Norway’s many offshore islands, from which they could be moved ashore by connectors (which do not always need to return to their parent vessel, per the Marines’ planning). Equally, surface connectors could move wounded personnel offshore from where the NH-90 could provide more rapid CASEVAC to the JSS. As such, the role of vertical lift in amphibious sustainment remains relevant to the High North.

Achieving alignment between different elements of the force, including the defence helicopter command, the navy and Marines, demands a logistical plan to complement the CONOPS as a necessary next step for the force redesign, and this should precede any decisions regarding either shipping or connectors. It is reasonable that conceptual development has taken precedence thus far, but logistical alignment should precede any efforts to translate concepts into material capability.

Mine Countermeasures

The RNLN is in the process of replacing its MCM fleet, which has fallen from six to three vessels (with two retired and one training Ukrainian sailors) and will return to its current strength between 2026 and 2031, with new MCM vessels developed in tandem with Belgium. MCM vessels are a significant part of the Netherlands’ offering to NATO.

The force will shift to a stand-off MCM concept in which vessels will rely on the USV-90 and sidescan sonar-equipped AUVs, with the Skeldar UAV acting as a relay to the vessel. This enables the use of steel-hulled vessels which do not have to enter a minefield.

Russia can deploy a range of mines, from relatively crude MDM-1 and MDS-1 moored mines to self-propelled mines with magnetic and acoustic sensors, which are rough analogues to CAPTOR. The most likely area in which mines will be encountered in northern Europe is Skagerrak, where the narrow chokepoint can be closed with a relatively limited number of mines, which Russia’s Baltic Fleet could lay clandestinely using Kilo-class submarines or the midget submarines operated by the fleet’s Spetsnaz, as well as auxiliary vessels. Mining in the High North should also be expected. Laying mines has historically been an important part of the layered bastion defence concept, as well as a means of restricting freedom of access in the Norwegian fjords. However, the area to be covered, the difficulty of mining a large area on a clandestine basis, and the risk to the platforms laying the mines means that this will be a more limited challenge, with mines most likely to be encountered by SSNs operating near the Russian continental shelf. Russia could, in principle, conduct mining operations in the North Sea or the approaches to Rotterdam during a crisis, although the depth of the water limits the use of submarines, and visible minelaying with surface vessels would rob the Russians of operational surprise. These limitations also limit the Russian mine threat to Dutch harbours and make mining at scale unlikely, although in principle some capabilities (such as midget submarines) could be employed in this role on a limited basis.

There are other chokepoints in the Alliance’s wider area of responsibility that Russia might also seek to mine, including the Dardanelles and approaches to ports in Romania, although minelaying on the scale seen in the current war was enabled by a level of air superiority and initial maritime superiority that is unlikely to be replicated in a conflict with NATO, where the Turkish navy enjoys local overmatch of the Black Sea Fleet. Finally, mining is also likely to be a prominent feature in an extra-European conflict that occurs either separately or concurrently at a chokepoint such as the Bab-el-Mandeb. It is worth noting that the commitment of MCM vessels was the RNLN’s major contribution to European energy security during the Iran–Iraq tanker war in the 1980s.

Since chokepoints covered by cruise missiles are the most likely areas for adversary minelaying, an emphasis on stand-off MCM is astute, as the threats of mines and cruise missiles will overlap substantially. MCM vessels in Skagerrak would fall within the range of systems such as the P-800M (the extended-range version of the P-800) operating from Kaliningrad in a context where the vessels would have limited tactical mobility within a minefield. Moreover, as illustrated by the fighting in the Black Sea, lightly armed support vessels that follow predictable trajectories (such as MCM vessels clearing routes) are especially vulnerable to cheap means of sea denial such as uncrewed vessels, which have limited effectiveness against surface combatants.

There will thus be two questions of pertinence for the Netherlands’ MCM fleet. The first relates to how MCM vessels train. In recent years, the focus of MCM activity has, unsurprisingly, been on the core tasks of detection and classification of targets, with a particular emphasis on home waters. In chokepoints, MCM vessels will face a considerable risk of air and missile attack even if operating at reach, as they will still be within the weapons engagement zones of VKS aircraft such as the SU-30 armed with the KH-31A, which will likely conduct some sorties even under the assumption that NATO enjoys air superiority, much as the Ukrainian air force has from a position of relative disadvantage. Design choices such as reliance on steel hulls will introduce marginal risks in terms of the prospect of classification by the active seekers on cruise missiles. Air defence will be the responsibility of other vessels’ organisations, but MCM vessels will need to consider how their role and employment will change in a context where they can potentially only operate in narrow windows of time. This is not a new challenge, but it must be made part of how the force trains, and it may suggest the inclusion of passive defences such as chaff.

The second question relates to the role of MCM vessels in seabed warfare, given the fact that many of the capabilities they employ, such as both USV-90 and sidescan sonar-equipped autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs), are relevant to tasks such as classifying objects placed near critical national infrastructure (CNI). MCM vessels have a much higher operational readiness level than the rest of the fleet and have utility in CNI inspection. A question the navy may face in the future pertains to the installation of a seabed warfare module comparable to that which will equip French MCM vessels based on the same hull. The average depths of the North Sea, which will be the primary area of focus for the RNLN with respect to CNI protection, do not necessitate the ability to control especially deep diving uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUVs), comparable to those being considered by the Marine nationale. However, the MCM vessels could serve as useful testbeds for other autonomous systems, as well as for the use of existing systems in new ways. For example, rules of engagement for the direct interdiction of uncrewed remotely operated vehicles such as the Russian Harpsichord may be more flexible in peacetime than those pertaining to crewed systems – a point illustrated by incidents such as the PLA Navy’s seizure of a US naval UUV in 2016. Mine disposal systems such as the K-STER might also be employed in a counter-UUV role. Similarly, MCM vessels might serve as testbeds for proposed concepts for UUV employment that involve the use of non-acoustic sensors to detect underwater targets.

Organisationally, growth of the MCM fleet from three to six vessels by 2031 will create requirements for considerably more personnel than currently serve within the mine service, as will the requirement to operate the MCM toolbox that will control the uncrewed systems operated from each vessel (which adds a need for 12 individuals per vessel). This, combined with the existing obligation to operate the RNLN’s hydrographic vessels, will result in the service’s considerable growth in proportional terms, although the change represents a relatively small number of individuals. Notably, certain tasks, such as the operation of MCM modules, are relatively easy to learn and thus MCM vessels might represent an area where capacity can be grown relatively rapidly (including perhaps with reservists), with the exception of areas such as engineers and divers, who account for a limited part of the force.

Strike

The RNLN will invest in the Tomahawk Block IV as part of its efforts to generate a land-attack capability and will also incorporate the Naval Strike Missile on the De Zeven Provincien-class frigate. The Tomahawk will be incorporated on the fleet’s air-defence command frigates and its future submarines, which will be based on the French Barracuda class. Along with the planned procurement of the JASSM by the air force and the PULS MLRS by the army, Tomahawk will give the Dutch joint force a greater capacity for deep strike than it has hitherto enjoyed.

The capacity for deep strike has operational utility both within Europe and outside it. In Europe, the allied capacity for deep strike on multiple vectors is a matter of significant concern for Russian military analysts, and can force the commitment of both air defences and interceptors such as the MIG-31BM to the northern flank – in turn making the task of suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD) on the central front easier for allied air forces by reducing the number of targets to be engaged. In the long term, the melting of Arctic ice will also make it possible for SLCM-equipped SSKs to operate further forward than is currently the case. While any Dutch procurement of Tomahawk would probably be limited in scale, given the cost of the missile, Russian analysts would be likely to view such a procurement as part of an aggregate balance of forces in tandem with the strike capabilities procured by other European states, in addition to the US arsenal of deep-strike capabilities.

Deep-strike capabilities can also represent an economy of force means of achieving deterrence by punishment at reach. For example, in the Caribbean contingency discussed by several RNLN officers (an invasion of the Antilles backed by Russian arms), rather than the defence or retaking of islands, the ability to cripple terminals such as Jose Terminal in Venezuela (from which 89% of Venezuela’s oil departs) might be an effective means of making a potential attack on the Antilles unacceptably costly, and could be a complement to the light tripwire force of Marines and army personnel that are already deployed in the region, in combination with the prospect of allied support. Deep strike may, then, be a means of managing conflicting commitments without overstretching resources.

While there is a sound rationale for equipping naval platforms with long-range missiles, there are several matters to consider. First, while the Netherlands is developing the capacity for advanced target development (matching weapons to targets and generating the data to enable capabilities such as Digital Scene Mapping Area Correlation), it will have a limited sovereign capacity for intermediate target development, given that the joint targeting cell being set up to enable deep strike will only be a 25-person cell. This is not especially problematic in the context of a NATO Article 5 scenario, as decisions regarding launches will be determined by the Joint Force Air Component, which will also have responsibility for intermediate target development, but it will mean that sovereign employment of TLAM will depend on partner support. There was some disagreement among interviewees about the ramifications of integrating Tomahawk Block IV with a French combat information system, and while there is general agreement that this is considered feasible by the US, the question of whether it will be more of a challenge if the navy ever wishes to shift to Block V should be raised in advance.

The second consideration for the RNLN will be that of alternative means of stand-off. As illustrated by the 2016 strikes on Shayrat by the US (which saw 59 TLAMs used) and recent strikes on the Houthis in Yemen, the employment of deep-strike capabilities even against sub-peer threats can absorb complex weapons at a scale that medium powers cannot sustain and, in the case of TLAM Block IV (which is ceasing production), judicious employment will be especially important. This raises the question of whether to employ more readily available strike systems for less important tasks, or those that require shorter ranges.

One option in this regard is procuring larger numbers of the (comparatively) cost-effective Naval Strike Missile, which can perform land-attack functions, albeit over shorter ranges with a smaller payload than Tomahawk and integrating it on a wider range of vessels. Loitering munitions like the Israeli Harop represent an alternative which, although limited in speed and payload, can be used against targets that do not justify the expenditure of a Tomahawk (examples being many of the coastal radar against which TLAMs have been used in Yemen). A more radical alternative approach might be one that employs 300-mm guided rockets which can also be launched from the PULS MLRS that the army is procuring. The US Marine Corps has experimented with the employment of HIMARS from a San Antonio LPD and, in principle, any vessel with enough deck space (such as the MSS) can act as a platform for a launcher. Indeed, the Russian navy has integrated MLRS systems on the Zubr landing craft and the South Korean company Hanwha has demonstrated a similar concept. While shorter ranged than a cruise missile, with a maximum range of 100 km, 300-mm guided rockets could provide greater weight of fire. They could also, if employed from the MSS, provide a means of breaking up adversary concentrations if the MSS is supporting littoral operations. Commonality with the army with respect to munitions would also create efficiencies. The cost, however, would come in the form of a requirement to procure, integrate, operate and maintain a new launch system (which currently only the army operates) on a platform such as MSS, as well as competition for magazine and deck space, given the vessel’s other functions. This would also impose requirements for vessel size, stabilisation and the management of heat and exhaust on the MSS.

There is an additional presumed requirement for a tactical 100-km+ long-range strike weapon for support in littoral operations which is intended to be employed on the multifunctional support ship. The question for the RNLN with respect to supporting the Marines will be about managing the trade-off between reach, speed, payload (including sensors) and price. Scalability can best be achieved by sacrificing range and payload in order to accept cost with respect to other characteristics, such as weapons survivability in a contested EMS and sensor payload, all of which will be of considerable importance against the high-value targets the Marines wish to optimise.

To use an illustrative example, Brimstone has a low unit cost, despite its millimetric seeker, because it is short ranged and has a low payload, and thus does not need an expensive propulsion system. Since many of the critical nodes in an adversary A2/AD system such as EW complexes or air-defence radar are soft skinned, payload is of comparatively limited value against them. Moreover, additional range imposes several costs on a forward-deployed force. Prompt communications over extended distances cannot be guaranteed, and operators will need to maintain overwatch over targets to provide positional updates and battle damage assessment and battle damage assessment for longer periods of time, thus incurring risks, much as Russian Orlan-10 operators do in Ukraine when cueing missiles such as the Iskander against tactical targets. Moreover, long-ranged missiles either have extended fly-out times (as with the Israeli Harop) which can pose challenges against some fleeting targets or add considerable cost and complexity, as with cruise and ballistic missiles. Additionally, the loitering times of the 60-m MSS may be limited, while a larger vessel may be a more viable target for adversary attack. In view of this, rather than a ship-launched long-range missile, a larger number of 50-km-range munitions comparable to the IAI Green Dragon, or an extended range variant of Brimstone that can be mounted on the BvS-10 Viking, would make a more sensible choice for a stand-off precision-strike capability to support the Royal Netherlands Marines in the Norwegian context.

Summary

Across the major warfare areas, the RNLN’s priorities should be incremental and evolutionary changes since its major force design choices are well suited to the priorities on which it should focus in the coming 15 years. Incremental improvements such as a CEC and longer-range interceptor for air defences or passive sensors that can be deployed forward for ASW can considerably increase the coverage and efficiency of some platforms. The RNLMC can, similarly, refine its existing CONOPS (which appears valid) to narrow its target set, which will have knock-on effects for capability selection. In a similar way, decisions made with respect to long-range strike can usefully support missions, such as spreading Russian air defences, but a “high–low mix” of strike capabilities can allow for additional magazine depth. In effect, the broad thrust of the RNLN’s force modernisation plans is well suited to meeting the requirements of the first main task – most of the changes it requires involve the better enablement of existing or planned capabilities rather than radical shifts to its planning.

III. Organising and Resourcing the Fleet

The RNLN, like most European navies, faces personnel shortfalls, with its FFG fleet currently crewed at around 80%. This challenge will be especially acute for some competencies, specifically those relevant to ASW, as key organisational competencies depend on a relatively limited number of individuals and growing this cohort is difficult, given the tempo of activity of the M class and limited opportunities for career advancement on ASW vessels. This is, however, a challenge across the force. Notably, intake is less of a challenge than retention, with the outflow of experienced personnel aged between 28 and 32 a particular concern for the force. Lopsided tooth-to-tail ratios between the shore establishment and the fleet afloat represent another point of concern. The gulf between available personnel and requirements could grow if left unchecked, particularly because, in order to maintain the skills needed to eventually sustain organisational growth, both the submarine service and the ASW fleet require more crews than vessels – both to rotate crews in order to enable skills to be taught or refreshed and to maintain the personnel base needed to sustain an eventual growth in platform numbers.

Several initiatives are being undertaken to rectify this, including lateral entry for certain skills and the Dienjaar pilot programme, in which school leavers spend a year with the fleet before receiving the option to enlist (the programme has enjoyed early success, with 60% of attendees indicating a desire to enlist). There has also been a revision of career pathways to both accelerate promotion and enable individuals to spend more time at sea earlier in their careers (allowing them space for shore jobs and education at the point in their lives when familial commitments become a consideration). It is certainly possible to reverse negative trends in retention: examples include the US Navy, which is currently meeting 107% of its retention targets through a variety of initiatives, including financial incentives and a decision to waive the fitness test results for experienced personnel on a one-time basis, providing individuals with a chance to ensure that they will be retained.

This report offers three suggestions. First, the navy could take a billet-based approach to promotion, not unlike that chosen by the US Navy, in which a willingness to participate in operational deployments is a criterion for professional advancement, rather than an outcome that accompanies advancement.

Second, the RNLN would do well to increase the size of its active reserve across the force. Currently, the reserve is a relatively small cadre of 1,000 individuals with niche skills in areas such as communications and cyber capabilities. Since parts of the training pipeline are effectively underworked due to the tempo of fleet activity (as illustrated by the ASW example), a larger active reserve would not necessarily overburden it. However, it would be a mistake to try to generate reservists on the model applied in many countries, where reservists train and certify in a manner analogous (but not identical) to regulars. The focus on targeted training for niche skills should be maintained with a minimal requirement for basic training, but the range of skills emphasised could be expanded to include areas such as sonar or air controllers. Targeted training of reservists for these skills would not necessarily absorb as much of an individual’s time as the naval training process (an air controller takes 20 weeks to train, for example) and refresher courses could be similarly targeted. Minimising basic training and limiting it to critical areas such as fire control to free time for individuals to specialise might create risks, but with the reward of mitigating force-level points of fragility. Additionally, to the extent that reservists devote most of their time to deep specialisation in a specific task, they can generate an identity within a service that is distinct and more valued than that of a rating or officer of last resort – a perception that has led to reservists in other countries feeling undervalued.

Third, there appears to be a general perception that naval life, with its long but stable employment, is unappealing to young people who seek professional mobility. This view may be misplaced. Although this description is accurate with respect to the millennial generation who are seen to prioritise factors such as work–life balance and rapid advancement prospects (which predict mobility if these requirements are not satisfied), this tends to be less true of generations that have seen financial or other crises in their formative years, including much of Gen Z. According to large-N studies, members of Gen Z treat job security as their highest professional priority. Assumptions based on the attitudes of individuals born between 1981 and 1996 may then not transfer to those born more recently, and the navy’s traditional offer may be more appealing than is sometimes assumed. This could be better exploited in recruitment drives, which tend to de-emphasise the long-term stable employment aspect of naval life.

While there are ways in which human capital can be increased, the RNLN does require a hedge against the possibility that the situation does not improve. In this context, a “nuclear option” is that in the next six years, availability for crew rotation in capabilities critical to deterrence, such as ASW and AAW frigates, should be found at the expense of the OPV fleet and in extremis, the LPD fleet. The Holland-class OPV has limited utility in a major contingency and some of its tasks (such as maritime surveillance and interception in counter-narcotics) can be provided by the MQ-9 Reaper. Since the Russian submarine threat will become acute around five years before the Russian land threat in the High North is reconstituted, due to the time it takes to regenerate cold-weather troops, maintaining both LPDs at extended readiness until the arrival of the ATS is also an option (albeit a decidedly suboptimal one). Critical elements of the Royal Netherlands Marines’ CONOPS can be practised without amphibious insertion (particularly since they depend on pre-positioning in the Norwegian scenario), and this can include the use of surface connectors to manoeuvre around the littoral. Moreover, the fleet can practise core elements of amphibious activity (such as shaping) separately. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, separating the marine and naval elements of littoral combat to give adequate time to both has some advantages, and the LPD is useful but not critical to practising many elements of littoral warfare.

Finally, the air-defence command frigate can host a command element up to 1* level for the rehearsal of command functions. However, the LPD does offer a useful capability with which to rehearse amphibious resupply, and this should be a choice made in extremis. Given the symbiotic link between the British Royal Marines and the RNLMC, the rotation of the Royal Navy’s Albion class and the Rotterdam class as part of a shared fleet of four (with either a Dutch or British LPD at readiness at any time) might also be explored, since both navies face similar considerations and could plan around a shared rotation schedule. While this involves a loss of flexibility and is likely to be politically difficult, the alternative may well be the early loss of the capability by both fleets. This being said, the announcement of a decision to scrap HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark may, if realised, pre-empt this option.

Logistics and Maintenance

The RNLN is in the process of rationalising its logistical support and consolidating functions that are currently distributed throughout the organisation. This distribution of logistical functions has several effects. Often, the requirement to meet a vessel’s day-to-day needs falls on chief petty officers, who often must take responsibility for ensuring a vessel is resupplied.

At present, therefore, the logistical system is not set up to support operations at scale. Supporting a force operating multiple vessels in tandem at high intensity and coordinating activity with allies and partners on the northern flank will require considerable additional capacity. The major shortfalls are:

• The lack of a consolidated logistics chain and front office to manage vessel demand.

• A peacetime work structure within J4 (Logistics).

• A lack of suitably qualified personnel to manage the movement of dangerous goods, which makes demand management in peacetime difficult.

This is not a strictly naval consideration – the J4 at The Hague and Allied Maritime Command will bear primary responsibility, and this would be a MARCOM concern in a NATO Article 5 scenario – but the RNLN does have a role in setting the conditions for a shift to a wartime logistics chain, with a planned first step being the creation of a single assembly point ashore.

Several additional steps might be taken in coming years. First, there are relatively straightforward ways in which logistical burdens can be made less onerous. Functions which are distributed throughout the fleet (and indeed defence) can be consolidated. To use an example, the organisation of support for embarked aviation on ships (which currently requires the aviation crew to engage with the transportation directorate) can be made part of a single logistical chain managed from the vessel, rather than having a separate logistical chain for aviation.

Second, the strain on dangerous goods cells can also be reduced, through a re-categorisation of the rather broadly defined term, which currently includes items such as lithium-ion batteries. The current broad categorisation adds to the workload of personnel tasked with managing dangerous goods and adds unnecessary process to the movement of a number of items.

Third, there are several fairly basic targets, such as building a track-and-trace system for the delivery of standard goods and shifting from a civilian work cycle which can be met immediately.

Fourth, a push-driven logistical model will become ever-more important, since it is probable that the movement of resupply will be contested from home ports onwards and the IT on which resupply depends will be subjected to cyber attacks. As such, anticipating the demand signal from deployed vessels rather than waiting for it to be communicated will be of ever-greater importance. This cannot be feasibly achieved across the board, but can perhaps be done for less scarce items, such as routinely used spare parts. A rule of thumb with respect to predictive analytics is that its value is inversely proportional to the consequences of an incorrect prediction – a vessel being given an air-defence interceptor it does not require is considerably more consequential than if it receives an excess of spares for its main gun, to use a somewhat exaggerated hypothetical example.

At a more tactical level, there will be competing demands on both the JSS and CSS Den Helder. While the arrival of Den Helder should ease the demand for the JSS to support fleet replenishment, the movement of solid goods and the provision of Role 3 medical support for amphibious forces will to some extent compete with support for the fleet fighting the battle in the Bear Island–Svalbard Gap, as well as theatre ASW. One possible consequence is that the ATS sees its share of the burden of amphibious support (and thus its size) increase, with ramifications for plans to build a relatively large number of ships that can double as OPVs. Pre-positioning stocks at Narvik and Tromsø represents the most viable means of avoiding this challenge, but this will require preparatory activity.

Memorandums of understanding with Norway and the UK regarding the pre-positioning of stocks and the degree to which local support can be relied on will be crucial to both logistical and operational planning, since core assumptions regarding the resupply of both the fleet and the Marines will depend on this, with second-order ramifications for how assets such as the JSS and future ATS are employed. Allied assumptions regarding logistics also have ramifications for elements of the Norwegian defence plan, such as the allocation of ground-based air-defence systems. While forward positioning sites have been identified by NATO, the requirements that determine how these sites have been resourced have not been specified and the question of how resources will be allocated has not been answered. Preparatory work with partners likely to operate in the northern tier will thus be of some importance, both to create reversionary sources of supply and to hedge against shortages, since allied planning assumptions regarding logistical resupply are often based on a principle of sufficiency, with logistics in exercises, for example, typically planned to support a force for precisely the number of days for which the exercise runs.

Fleet maintenance is another area where a more efficient approach could increase the availability of vessels by reducing the time allocated to scheduled extended maintenance periods (which, with 26-week work-ups, take up to a year). Currently, there are several factors that complicate the process of maintenance. These include a reliance on a small and ageing civilian workforce for planned regular maintenance and the need to use civilian docks for larger vessels. The existence of multiple bespoke vessel types within the fleet also complicates the process of maintenance considerably, given a lack of commonality with respect to components and the layout of vessels (extending to matters such as electrical wiring). This creates a demand for bespoke skill sets that are not used most of the time.

More regular maintenance to rectify specific minor issues can allow periodic maintenance/deep refit periods to be shortened. There is a risk that more regular maintenance raises the risk of converging demand being placed on the maintenance establishment without careful planning aided by predictive analytics. There are several approaches that can be taken to predictive maintenance, the most sophisticated of which requires the gathering of significant amounts of data in real time for processing by tools such as neural networks to enable condition-based maintenance. This approach, while promising, will require the employment of sensors and their enablement with adequate software – a process that will compete for capacity with a number of other priorities, such as the replacement of the navy’s systems applications and products, the digitisation of the HR system and IT support for logistics, all of which must be run through a central IT procurement system. A somewhat quicker approach might involve the division of the vessel into usage profiles for individual component parts, an assessment of the maintenance rates relative to a given usage profile, and a mapping of the usage profile of subcomponents on routine deployments, which requires considerably less real-time data gathering and less novel software.

With respect to commonality in vessel types, there is relatively little that can be done in the short term, although the consolidation of the OPV and amphibious shipping should prove useful. Standardisation to the extent possible should, however, be made a core consideration with respect to the design of future vessels.

Generating Tactical and Organisational Flexibility

A number of factors currently impeding the flexibility of the force can be resolved with little to no material or financial input. Key among them is the number of certifications that individuals across the force must receive for fairly basic functions, which are both time consuming and limit experimentation.

One example of this is that the Royal Netherlands Marines were able to train Ukrainian forces to operate the BvS-10 in a week – a process that takes seven weeks within the corps, and personnel must certify on each vehicle they may drive (including civilian vehicles), even when skills are fungible. Another example is that the process of certification for basic medical support is longer than necessary, which will be especially salient for the Marines given the need for forward-deployed forces to perform as many support functions as organically as possible. Extended certification and recertification periods rob personnel across the force of time better spent and are likely to be a major impediment to certain types of experimentation. For example, the employment of modified, commercial off-the-shelf UAVs or UUVs on an experimental basis – a necessary preparation for the likely expenditure of stockpiles of dedicated systems at a scale that exceeds the rate of replacement – will be inherently difficult in this context. This would also apply to generating the capacity for members of the force to employ systems they are not certified to use on a reversionary basis, in the event that casualties are sustained.

This represents a lost opportunity since the colocation of the navy and the maritime procurement element of Command Material and IT (COMMIT) can and often does allow for requirements to be passed into COMMIT more rapidly than is the case for the other services. In principle, the RNLN has a more ready pipeline from experimentation to scaling of new capability, if it is enabled to employ it.

Existing standards regarding the crewing requirements for vessels may also be surplus to requirements, with vessels such as FFGs potentially up to 30 crew members over the number they need to perform many of their functions. Greater flexibility regarding the crewing requirements for ships, especially on routine and low-intensity activity, could have an important impact on aggregate fleet readiness.

Conclusions

This report has sought to offer an assessment of whether the RNLN’s plans are matched to the emerging threat environment in military terms, and whether they are likely to be adequately resourced. Its findings are that the RNLN has articulated a sound force design to meet its obligations under the first main task, and the force’s major areas of focus are sound. In the medium term, the RNLN will be able to emerge as an important contributor to European maritime security. However, to accomplish this, short-term prioritisation is needed to preserve the organisational sinews that will allow the force to grow. Since the threat in the context of the first main task will evolve from being initially based on submarines and missiles to more multidimensional, availability of ASW and AAW frigates and the human capital to grow these fleets will be vital. This will, among other things, require deployment cycles for ASW vessels to be built around the need to retain competencies within the force, rather than maintain a predetermined amount of time at sea. Technical solutions such as at-sea learning may also help balance these trade-offs.

Second, certain parts of the force, such as the ASW and submarine fleets, need to grow in numbers of personnel before they grow in terms of platforms. This will have ramifications for how crews are rotated but, in extremis, might incentivise the temporary contraction of the fleet in the near term, with human capital moved from assets such as OPVs. This being said, contraction is a “nuclear option” and other possibilities, such as the more creative use of a currently very limited reserve capability, should be explored.

The RNLN is making a number of necessary long-term investments in distributed lethality. However, relatively short-term investments might be made in areas such as ASROCs, where the solutions needed to enable some of the fleet’s concepts (such as stand-off ASW) are relatively anodyne capabilities. Cautious capability growth in other areas, including additional systems employed from MCM assets, and a larger number of medium- and short-range strike systems, to respectively add magazine depth and support the Marines in a counter-IADS capacity, might also be considered.

The RNLN can play an important role in the contest for the critical chokepoints on which the outcome of deterrence in relation to Russia depends. In the medium to long term, the force’s planned growth in capability will make it an increasingly useful contributor to NATO’s regional plans for the northwest. Reaching this point, however, requires careful navigation of the next 10 years.

Sidharth Kaushal is Research Fellow for Sea Power at RUSI. His research at RUSI covers the impact of technology on maritime doctrine in the 21st century, and the role of sea power in a state’s grand strategy.