Icebreaker Construction Woes

The United States has an ongoing and growing national security risk in the Arctic. Due to the lack of U.S. presence in the region, the country is unable to sufficiently counter, or even fully understand, this risk. While Russia’s over 40 polar icebreakers, compared to the United States’ current three (with only one a true heavy polar icebreaker) may seem like a glaring disparity, China’s four icebreakers (with a fifth on the way) are arguably more distressing. A direct comparison of icebreaker numbers with Russia is not a fair measure, because Russia has different operational demands in the Arctic (e.g., more ports, waterways, and Arctic area for their icebreakers to service). However, China is not an Arctic nation, and currently has more polar icebreakers than the United States—and is likely to continue outpacing the United States’ sluggish icebreaker construction effort. This constitutes a giant spotlight on the U.S. national security risk in the Arctic.

The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) polar icebreaker acquisition challenges are well known, having been the subject of several recent congressional hearings, multiple articles, and a comment recently made by President Trump about ordering 40 big icebreakers. The USCG’s then–deputy commandant for operations, Vice Admiral Peter Gautier, and then–deputy commandant for mission support, Vice Admiral Thomas Allan Jr., testified before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on November 14, 2024, on the USCG’s icebreaker recapitalization efforts. Those testimonies affirmed the U.S. national security risk in the Arctic, the USCG’s need for more ice breaking capacity now, and the sad state of the Polar Security Cutter (PSC) acquisition program. The continued PSC acquisition challenges were further acknowledged again by Vice Admiral Allan Jr.’s testimonies before the House Committee on Homeland Security on December 18, 2024, and the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on March 5, 2025.

The United States is fully aware of the growing national security risk in the Arctic: President Trump announced the creation of a White House Office of Shipbuilding in his 2025 State of the Union address and addressed the problem further in his recent executive order, Restoring America’s Maritime Dominance. But the PSC solution remains a distant reality. The USCG was unable to provide a date for delivery of the first PSC when the subject was raised during the recent hearings; 2033 was mentioned by Representative Rick Larsen during the March 5 hearing. But estimates have continued to slide for years, and the 2033 date must be eyed with skepticism.

The contract for the first PSC was announced in 2019 with a planned delivery in 2024. That date has passed, and the first PSC is still being designed (albeit nearing completion) and the shipbuilder and USCG do not have enough understanding of the totality of the project to provide a delivery estimate with any level of confidence. This is especially distressing as the three-ship PSC acquisition cost has ballooned almost threefold from $1.9 billion to an estimated $5.1 billion.

The Origins of the Problem

The PSC is a large, complicated ship, and the U.S. shipbuilding industry has not constructed a heavy icebreaker in 50 years. The reasons for the PSC being delayed and over budget are many, and they are all justifiable to a certain degree. Responsibility for the problems ends up being a circular argument where all stakeholders share portions of the blame.

One major overarching problem with all federal ship acquisitions is that they are sluggish, even in the best of circumstances. The laws and regulations governing major system acquisition programs are partly to blame, and are being targeted for reform by President Trump’s recent Modernizing Defense Acquisitions and Spurring Innovation in the Defense Industrial Base executive order. It takes years to amass all the written analyses, reports, and documents to support the acquisition of a major system. Ten years is used as the USCG’s general planning factor when starting a new cutter acquisition—that is about how long it takes to run the acquisition gamut between identifying a future capability gap to taking delivery of the first new cutter when all goes smoothly.

Taking the USCG’s Fast Response Cutter (FRC) acquisition as an example, the USCG documented the need to recapitalize their aging fleet of 110-ft patrol boats in a 1995 Mission Analysis Report and commenced the ignominious Integrated Deepwater System program in 1996 to comprehensively recapitalize its aged fleet of cutters, aircraft, and boats. After several fits and starts, the FRC program contract was awarded in its current state in 2008 and the USCG took delivery of the first FRC hull in early 2012. That is 17 years from documented need to delivery of the first hull, a distressingly long time for a class of cutters that is relatively simple and small, and that ultimately utilized an off-the-shelf design. The FRC acquisition demonstrates that even a 10-year planning timeline can be ambitious for a major system acquisition.

In terms of what is possible across the global shipbuilding industry from a construction perspective, take the Royal Caribbean’s Icon of the Seas cruise ship as an example. The contract for the Icon of the Seas was announced in 2016, construction began in June of 2021, and the ship was completed and departed on its first voyage in January 2024—less than three years later. Acknowledging the apples to oranges comparison, the Icon of the Seas is arguably more complicated than the PSC—the PSC has no waterparks, mini-golf courses, or ice rinks, and will accommodate roughly 7,000 fewer people. If a ship the size and complexity of the Icon of the Seas can be brought into operation in a matter of years, why not a heavy polar icebreaker?

It would be a miracle if the USCG took delivery of the first PSC before the end of the decade and lucky if a 2033 delivery comes through. If that is unacceptable to the administration and Congress, something must change.

The Current State of USCG Polar Icebreakers

The USCG operates the national fleet of active Polar icebreaking ships (cutters), including one heavy icebreaker, USCG Cutter (USCGC) Polar Star, and two medium icebreakers, USCGC Healy and the recently acquired USCGC Storis. Both the Polar Star and Healy are noble cutters and have served the nation admirably, but they are old (49 years and 25 years, respectively) and overdue for replacement. The USCG is largely succeeding in keeping their two legacy polar icebreakers operational by putting their operations and maintenance into “no-fail” status; essentially, they get 100 percent of needed funding. Ideally, all cutters would get 100 percent funding, but the USCG is only completing half of needed cutter maintenance due to funding shortfalls and competing demands. These constraints have outsized negative impacts to the readiness, safety, and effectiveness of the other 240 cutters in the fleet.

Despite the USCG spending an outsized portion of its cutter operations and sustainment budget on its polar icebreakers, it has struggled to keep them running. Healy’s equipment casualty in July 2024 called its annual deployment into question. This follows the significant fire in 2020 that necessitated a complex and lengthy replacement of one of its main propulsion motors. Keeping Polar Star running relies on cannibalizing parts from the inactive Polar Sea—a clear indication that the USCG’s sole heavy polar icebreaker and its maintenance program are far from state-of-the-art.

The acquisition of the former offshore supply vessel Aiviq from Edison Chouest Offshore, renamed the USCGC Storis, will certainly help the USCG provide additional presence in the Arctic. However, there are valid reasons why the USCG balked at the Aiviq when discussion around potentially leasing the ship started in 2016.

The delays in acquiring PSCs forced the USCG to embrace the Aiviq with open if wary arms. Because the Storis was designed and built for different operations than what the USCG intends to use it for, the USCG will attempt to secure appropriations to put the Storis through significant and expensive bouts of retrofits and design changes—including modifications and equipage to comply with damage control, survivability, and cybersecurity policies—to improve the vessel’s ability to perform USCG missions in the polar ice. To focus the Storis’ patrolling effort as soon and as often as possible in the Arctic, these retrofit periods must be shoehorned between regular deployments. Stopping and starting maintenance of that magnitude is typically undesirable due to repeated work shutdowns and startups that add time and cost to the overall project and reduce the time the cutter is available for the crew to operate and train on. However, doing so is necessary in this case to deliver the immediate and recurrent presence in the Arctic that Congress demands. The cutter is expected to perform well and to improve with each successive modification cycle. However, the Storis will forever suffer from issues associated with the design and configuration modifications and it will always be a single-class ship, which will present challenges and added costs for the life of the cutter.

President Trump’s June 2020 Memorandum on Safeguarding U.S. National Interests in the Arctic and Antarctic Regions directed the analysis of partner-nation icebreaker leasing options and his comment on June 25, 2025, during a NATO Summit press conference about buying a used icebreaker from Finland indicated continued interest in acquiring available foreign icebreakers. Buying or leasing foreign icebreakers could certainly increase the USCG’s presence in the Arctic, but these foreign icebreakers would suffer many of the same capability shortcomings inherent in the Storis. Purchasing a foreign icebreaker would necessitate costly modifications like those planned for the Storis. For a leased ship, it is unlikely that capability shortcomings could be meaningfully ameliorated with modifications given the nature of a lease; the USCG would have to return it in the same state they received it. Leasing contract renewals and the availability of the ships for deployments may not be guaranteed; and the ships may not be available outside of deployments for crew training to build operating proficiency. Some legislative gymnastics would likely be required to even get a foreign vessel purchase or lease on the table.

The risks to national security in the Arctic are urgent and growing and demand immediate attention. To address these risks, the USCG has identified a need for a mix of eight to nine heavy and medium polar icebreakers. Generally, heavy polar icebreakers are large ships that would enable the exquisite capability of year-round access to polar regions while medium polar icebreakers are comparatively smaller, have a shallower draft and less endurance, and less acquisition and sustainment costs. They will operate in shallower, ice-covered coastal areas where the majority of typical USCG mission demand in the Arctic is expected to occur. As previously discussed, the three-ship PSC program is delayed and overbudget. The planned USCG medium polar icebreaker acquisition program is named the Arctic Security Cutter (ASC) and currently has nothing to show for itself beyond its name.

The Way Ahead

Recent developments indicate a positive sea change on the horizon for the USCG’s polar icebreaker acquisition programs. Only July 4, 2025, President Trump signed the One Big Beautiful Bill Act into law, marking a huge windfall for USCG icebreaking acquisition programs. The bill appropriates the USCG $4.3 billion for the PSC program and $3.5 billion for the bourgeoning Arctic Security Cutter (ASC) medium polar icebreaker program. The appropriations will go a long way to helping make the PSCs and ASCs a reality, but funding does not guarantee the U.S. shipbuilding industry can construct and deliver either class of ship in a timely fashion on budget and on schedule.

In April 2025, the USCG issued a Request for Information (RFI) to industry to identify medium polar icebreaking ship designs for the ASC acquisition program that are complete or already in operation and global shipyards able to launch a medium polar icebreaker within 36 months of the contract being awarded. Seeking information from global shipyards is a significant development and is a clear indication that foreign ship construction may be on the table. Note, though, that the RFI seeks the ability to launch rather than deliver a ship within 36 months. A ship can be launched with potentially years’ worth of construction and outfitting yet to go. Because rapid operational deployment is desired and international shipyards have demonstrated the ability to deliver polar icebreakers the size of an ASC within 36 months, the USCG should instead use delivery timing as the desired performance measure. Otherwise, the USCG may find itself in a situation where an unproven shipyard is able to float the hull within 36 months, only to have the overall project flounder in the familiar ruts for years before delivery.

The fastest way the U.S. can acquire needed polar icebreakers is through foreign icebreaker construction. Yes, foreign ship construction is currently unacceptable for a variety of very good reasons, including compliance with current U.S. law, but it is possible if the U.S. is willing to make it happen. The spectrum of potential foreign involvement in U.S. ship construction spans from simple collaboration and information sharing through full ship delivery. Assuming two foreign shipyards are available to take on the work, a rough best-case scenario calculation is that the U.S. could potentially take delivery of four ASCs and have two of them in full operation by 2030. That is well before the likely delivery of the first PSC and before the USCG is able to make all of its planned annual iterative upgrades to the Storis.

Recommendations

There are several steps Congress and the USCG can take to put the ASC program into action.

Congress should take the following steps:

• Allow the USCG to bypass the traditional acquisitions process and go straight to a readily available solution—an existing medium polar icebreaker warship design in current operation, such as the Royal Canadian Navy’s Harry DeWolf–class offshore patrol vessel. This would enable an immediate start to construction, eliminating years’ worth of time devoted to establishing requirements; advertising, bidding, and awarding the contract; and vessel design. Program risk would be reduced through evidence of successful operation.

• Construct the ASCs in Canada and/or Finland (perhaps preferred, given alignment with the Icebreaker Collaboration Effort (ICE) Pact) and/or by other foreign partner nations. Negotiate a fair market price and commence construction immediately.

• Do not allow “analysis paralysis,” aspirational requirements, or significant design changes to slow the process. Put the acquisition reforms and innovation directed by the recent executive order into action.

• Construct five ASCs of the USCG’s advertised icebreaker fleet mix of eight to nine heavy and medium polar icebreakers.

  • Construct the ASCs in whatever foreign shipyards can accommodate their fastest delivery. Preference could be given to Canada and Finland to capitalize on ICE Pact collaboration, but other foreign partner shipyards should not be excluded from competition on a fastest ship delivery performance basis.

• Eliminate as many major system acquisition requirements and documents as possible. Allow completion of the most useful documents concurrently with the ships’ construction.

• Continue with long-term planning and programs to bolster the United States’ shipbuilding and maritime industrial base, such as those proposed by the Congressional Guidance for a National Maritime Strategy and the Shipbuilding and Harbor Infrastructure for Prosperity and Security (SHIPS) for America Act, and initiatives championed by the White House Office of Shipbuilding and directed by executive orders.

• Allow the PSC program to continue, despite the delays and cost overruns, and the requirement that it be reviewed for cancellation pursuant to section six of the recent acquisition modernization executive order. The $4.3 billion appropriated by the One Big Beautiful Bill Act should hopefully be sufficient to get the three ships completed. The PSC program and U.S. shipbuilding industry succeeding would be a point of pride for the U.S. and would help demonstrate the promised value of the ICE Pact, and the money invested would help strengthen and grow the U.S. maritime industrial base.

The USCG should undertake the following recommendations:

• Partner with U.S. industry for supporting equipment contracts for systems like the command, control, communications, computers, cyber, and intelligence (C5I) suite, weapons systems, small boats, and deck equipment (e.g., davits, cranes, and windlasses). Plan to conduct final ship outfits of all ASCs in a U.S. shipyard.

• While low on icebreaker capacity, and at little-to-no cost, the USCG should seek opportunities to partner with foreign navies and coast guards active in the polar regions through reciprocal professional exchanges of personnel, shiprider maritime law enforcement agreements, and deployments of law enforcement detachments.

The United States will not increase its icebreaker numbers by the end of the decade under the current acquisition plan. Foreign construction of USCG ASCs would be novel and would uncomfortably highlight the shortcomings of the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base, but could add four much-needed ASCs to the USCG fleet by the end of the decade.

Luke Slivinski is a captain in the U.S. Coast Guard and a Military Fellow with the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.