The federal government’s latest guidance aimed at improving the nation’s cybersecurity demonstrates a commendable shift in priorities — moving away from perimeter defense and firewalls and instead embracing zero trust architecture (ZTA) to create resilient systems. For the government to succeed in this transition, it must recognize that ZTA is more about mindset and culture than it is a standardized roadmap.
Ukraine was not the first “cyber war” — the term itself makes little sense — but it was the first major conflict involving large-scale cyber operations.
The SMB-Winning Consortium’s Guinea Dapilon Port
This CCP Inc. case study explores how Chinese diplomatic, regulatory, financial, and commercial actors work in concert to secure critical minerals in the West African nation of Guinea.
How to gain national advantage from the development and governance of key technologies?
If data is the new oil, it could be said that chips are the new steel — a fundamental component of national power similar to the foundational role steel production played in the industrial age. As such, semiconductor chips are a natural focus for government intervention and support to accelerate growth and build secure supply chains.
Despite China’s pro-Russia stance with respect to the invasion of Ukraine, divergent perspectives exist among Chinese policy elites toward the Ukraine war and China’s relations with Putin’s Russia.
In the U.S. and Europe, China is seen as Russia’s tacit supporter, but what do Russian experts think?
There is little probability that Putin will stop now.
Russia has failed to achieve most of its objectives in Ukraine because of poor military planning, significant logistical problems, low combat readiness, and other deficiencies, which undermined Russian military effectiveness.
Although China’s official position on the war has been that of neutrality — not aligning with the West against Russia and not directly supporting Russia’s war in Ukraine — its communications about the war, in particular its propaganda via state media and Foreign Ministry spokespeople have carried a more pro-Russia stance.
This article examines China’s diplomatic responses to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It argues that the war created an immediate diplomatic “trilemma” for China as it sought to balance three competing interests: alignment with Russia, adherence to core principles of Chinese foreign policy and need for stability with the United States and Europe.
Ukraine is the beginning, not the end, of a more acute phase of 21st-century great power crises.
There will be more crises like Ukraine that pull in great powers, spark escalation risks based on fear and uncertainty, and test the viability of integrated deterrence.
The longer a conflict such as Ukraine lasts, the less likely it will be confined to one state.
The national security community will need to develop tools and techniques for assessing competition, escalation tendencies, and risk attitudes among foreign leaders that combine old concepts from political psychology with new capabilities afforded by data science and natural language processing.
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