The History, Present and Future of the Communist Party of China

2021 is the centenary of the founding of the CCP, and it has been in power in mainland China for more than 70 years. The rise, rise, and power of the CCP run through the entire modern and contemporary history of China. Today’s CCP regime has become the world’s largest, longest-running (one of) and most stable dictatorship, and it is becoming increasingly difficult to shake. The CCP has profoundly affected the fate of China, the Chinese nation, and the life of every Chinese citizen from the founding of the party to its ruling and the century to the present. In order to understand China's history and current situation and promote the realization of democracy and the rule of law in China, it is necessary to analyze the history of the CCP since its founding, dig out the secrets of the CCP, and look forward to the future trends of the CCP. Only in this way can we find a way to break the CCP's "perfect dictatorship" and pave the way for change.

(1) History of the CCP’s prosperity and why it seized power

To study the CCP, the first thing to do is to study its history of prosperity and understand how it became a behemoth that ruled China step by step. Regarding these, in fact, there are a lot of research results. Whether it is China or foreign countries, the CCP itself or its opponents, there are long and long historical materials and analysis. Not only the process from its rise to power, but also many other issues about the CCP discussed in this article have countless ready-made research results. On the other hand, I tried not to use the systematic and specific research results of other scholars, but based on the basic historical background and preliminary historical facts of that era to conduct reasonable reasoning analysis and review. The final conclusions may be similar to those of other researchers, but the analysis process is independent.

(1) External forces

Closer to home. The birth and early development of the CCP have a strong foreign and Western background. As we all know, modern communism in a narrow sense and its predecessors, humanism and enlightenment, were born in Western Europe (the core is France). The founders, Marx and Engels, were both Germans. The Communist Manifesto was first published in Britain. And its early organization, the First International, was also mainly active in the advanced industrial countries of Western Europe. Later, the communist movement surged in Russia, and Russia became the first country in the world to establish a long-term socialist regime. The spread of communist ideology in China, the establishment of communist political parties and the development of communist/socialist movements all originated from the West and the North (Russia).

Not only did communism come from the West in terms of its origin, but the early communist activities in China (1915-1935) and the establishment and operation of the CCP were also deeply influenced by forces outside of China. In fact, the Communist International, which was controlled by the Soviet Union, had long manipulated and even dominated the operation of the CCP, guiding or commanding the labor movement and armed uprisings in China.

External forces were crucial to the early rise of the CCP. Regardless of ideological indoctrination, or material money and material support, as well as assistance in establishing organizational structures and providing intelligence, all are prerequisites for the CCP to be able to establish the party and gain a firm foothold in China. Although the influence of external forces on the CCP was greatly weakened in the mid-1930s and after, it was still an important reliance for the CCP to seize power. For example, from 1945 to 1947, the Soviet Union’s support for the CCP in Northeast China, such as handing over hundreds of thousands of captured Japanese military equipment and obstructing the reception and deployment of the national army, played a key role in the CCP’s victory in the Liaoshen Campaign role, and then laid the foundation for the CCP to win the entire civil war.

It can be said that without external forces, it is impossible for the CCP to develop and grow, let alone occupy the entire Chinese mainland and gain power. Although the support of external forces is not the decisive factor and the only factor for the CCP to seize power, it is an indispensable factor. Compared with such historical facts, the CCP frequently accuses foreign countries of "interfering in China's internal affairs" and reviling dissidents and social activists for "collaborating with foreign forces" today, which is sheer irony.

(2) Support from the three major groups, especially farmers

Of course, for the CCP to seize power in the end, internal factors are still the first and decisive. And the internal causes are multifaceted. Among the internal factors, the most important thing is that the CCP’s ideology and policy program can attract the peasantry who account for the majority of the population, the working class that is large in number and represents modern productivity, and the influential and key intellectuals. support.

Unlike the Russian Revolution and the communist movement in Western Europe, where the working class was the main force, the CCP relies the most on farmers, to be precise, the lower and middle classes of farmers, such as tenant farmers and self-cultivators with small plots of land. Mao Zedong's famous work "Investigation Report on the Peasant Movement in Hunan" deeply analyzed the class issues in rural society, and also designed a detailed and feasible plan to agitate the peasant movement and even armed riots in the countryside. Mao Zedong and some other CCP leaders keenly observed the huge potential of the peasant class, which accounted for more than 80% of the domestic population at that time, as well as the rural production relations and class contradictions represented by the relationship between tenant farmers and landlords, and chose to become "poor farmers" such as tenant farmers and small owner farmers. The spokesperson of the "lower-middle peasants" (in contrast, the Kuomintang tends to support the rural elites such as the landlord class and gentry groups). Through propaganda and mobilization, they recruited activists among the peasants to join the party and the army, while more ordinary peasants were coerced by the leaders and the general trend to become supporters of the CCP and members of the grassroots organizations and the army of the CCP.

The decision of the CCP to rely on the peasantry is undoubtedly a success. The agrarian revolution was a more common form of the CCP's armed seizure of power, and its actual importance surpassed that of urban workers' riots. Whether it was the first Kuomintang-Communist Civil War from 1927-1936, the second Kuomintang-Communist Civil War from 1946-1949, or even the Anti-Japanese War from 1937-1945, peasants were the main source of soldiers for the CCP, and rural areas were the CCP’s material and supplies. main source of . In the 22 years from the CCP’s armed uprising to the founding ceremony, except for the siege in the last few years, the CCP’s sphere of influence was almost entirely in the countryside most of the time. The big cities are all Kuomintang-controlled areas, and most of the CCP can only carry out underground activities. Only a few cities such as Chongqing can carry out limited public activities during the Anti-Japanese War. And the impact of underground activities and open occupation and activities on the ground is not in the same dimension at all. Therefore, it is not an exaggeration to call the CCP before the victory of the War of Liberation the "Peasant Party".

The most direct reason for the CCP to seize power is military victory, and the main reason for the CCP’s military victory is that it has several times or even more voluntary soldiers than the Kuomintang. During the two civil wars between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, the difference in weapons and equipment between the two sides was actually not that big, and the number of troops was still very important. Human sea tactics were still a decisive factor in this kind of lower-level warfare. The number of "poor and lower-middle peasants" that the CCP relies on is far greater than that of landlords and gentry. The "poor and lower-middle peasants" benefited from and appreciated the CCP's land policy, and generally voluntarily and actively joined the CCP's army and militia organizations. In addition, many farmers who benefited from the forced land reform/bloody land struggle were also forced to join the army to help the CCP win the war in order to avoid being liquidated by the Landlords Returning to Homeland Mission. In the war, whether it was out of brainwashed political ideals or practical interests such as defending or obtaining the achievements of the Agrarian Revolution, or fearing being liquidated by the Kuomintang and landlords, they generally fought aggressively and bravely. The CCP’s strong control over the military and its strong ability to infiltrate and mobilize the grassroots are also important reasons why the CCP has few deserters and is active in combat. Soldiers of the CCP army are also worried that they will be liquidated and criticized by the grassroots organizations of the CCP after returning to their hometowns. In addition to the support from the landlord class, the Kuomintang army can only supplement its military resources by "grabbing strong men". Such supplementary sources of soldiers often have no fighting spirit, weak fighting will, and are prone to mutiny and flight. The national army does not have strong enough control over the soldiers and their hometowns. Deserters do not worry about being liquidated after returning to their hometowns, and at most they will be caught on the battlefield again. The CCP also often launches psychological warfare to induce the national army to surrender, and uses different methods for senior officers and ordinary soldiers to induce surrender. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that the balance of forces between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party gradually reversed during the War of Liberation.

The countryside and peasants are the foundation of the CCP's process of seizing power, while the factories and workers are the CCP's iron arms extending into the cities. In the process of the CCP's seizure of power, the role of the working class is very subtle. In the early days when the CCP was active, workers had cooperated closely with the CCP, including surging labor movements and armed riots in some cities. But in the 1930s and the following ten years, big cities became "white areas" of white terror or occupied areas occupied by the Japanese army. The CCP suffered heavy blows in areas where workers lived, and the relationship between the CCP and workers became alienated. While the CCP is still active among the urban working class, its influence is not as strong as it was in the 1920s. When the CCP re-entered the city in 1949, Liu Shaoqi lamented that urban workers had become strangers, accustomed to the policy of reconciliation with the capitalists during the Kuomintang rule, and had a gap with the CCP. However, the working class has not been truly tamed by the Kuomintang regime. It is still closer to the CCP in its heart and intends to be the master of the country. The factories in the city have always been the base of left-wing forces and left-wing culture. During the second civil war between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, some workers still launched many movements to restrain the Kuomintang. When the CCP re-entered the city, the workers quickly and completely sided with the CCP, and immediately surpassed the peasant class after the CCP was established, and became the biggest reliance of the CCP regime during the period of peaceful construction.

The constitution promulgated after the founding of the Communist Party of China stated that "China is a socialist country led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants." If we comment on the relationship between the CCP and workers and peasants before the founding of the People’s Republic of China, this sentence needs to be reversed, that is, the CCP at that time was a political force that relied mainly on farmers and secondarily on workers.

Intellectuals are a key force in the CCP's process of gaining power. Although the number of intellectuals is not as large as that of farmers and workers, and they cannot become the main body of society, they have the role of "four or two". The CCP has always attached great importance to attracting intellectuals. The early CCP leaders themselves had a large number of intellectuals. Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao, Qu Qiubai and others were not only communists, but also outstanding figures in the Chinese literary and ideological circles at that time. Most of the leaders of the CCP have the experience of staying in Europe, the Soviet Union, and Japan, and they are also among the top students in the country. The CCP's attitude towards intellectuals can be described as "thirsty for talents" and "respectful corporals", which has won the favor of many intellectuals. During the Ruijin period and the Yan'an period, the CCP had close contacts with the Chinese intellectual circles. On the other hand, Chinese intellectuals are generally pro-communist, and some have defected to the CCP from the Kuomintang-controlled areas. A large number of young students who were rare and precious in that era, some went to Yan'an, some carried out student movement or even worked underground in the Kuomintang-controlled area, representing the choice of the future Chinese elite. The CCP has also successfully wooed the "third force" dominated by intellectuals to form a united front against the Kuomintang regime. From the Chongqing negotiations to the civil war, and then to the convening of the CPPCC led by the CCP, intellectuals provided considerable public opinion, ideology, and network support for the CCP to seize power.

In short, on the way to seize power, the CCP successfully won the strong support of farmers, workers, and intellectuals, surpassing the Kuomintang regime in terms of number and influence. Therefore, the CCP is not wrong to a certain extent when it says that what determines history is "the support of the people". It's just that the CCP only uses these three major groups to get support through false and deceitful promises, and gradually changes its face after taking power. Intellectuals and peasants have paid a painful price for this, and the workers have not really achieved democracy and liberation. The CCP itself (or the "new class" composed of the CCP's privileged class, leading cadres and their families) has become a leader over them. rulers above, rentiers.

(3) Military factors

As mentioned earlier, the military victory is the most direct reason for the CCP to seize power. In the second civil war between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, the reason why the CCP won the final victory was not only the above-mentioned factors of military resources and foreign aid, but of course there were also operational factors such as the war itself, strategy and tactics.

There is no doubt that the level of the CCP commanders and fighters such as Mao Zedong is higher than that of the Kuomintang led by Chiang Kai-shek. When the Kuomintang was obsessed with the occupation of big cities, the PLA chose to "regardless of the gains and losses of one city and one place", and made preserving its own strength and annihilating the vital forces of the national army as its main goal. The "comprehensive attack" and "focused attack" planned by the national army were all dismantled by the PLA, and the national army's heavy blows hit cotton. The People's Liberation Army took advantage of local advantages and concentrated its forces to eliminate the outstanding and most elite national army, and the rest of the troops would collapse without fighting. The proficient use of this type of tactics has allowed the PLA to win more with less, and the weak to defeat the strong.

The national army also faces the problem of internal disunity and disunity of orders. Although Chiang Kai-shek unified the warlords and armies of various places in name, in fact, the various forces in the army still have greater autonomy. Senior generals regard the troops as their own private property, and often put the preservation of strength in the first place in civil wars , The comrades were besieged and refused to save them, which greatly reduced the overall combat effectiveness of the national army. For example, in the Battle of Menglianggu, Zhang Lingfu's 74th Division was wiped out, which was related to the fact that other nearby national troops preserved their strength and did not actively rescue them. On the contrary, the People's Liberation Army has highly centralized military power. The People's Liberation Army of the whole country obeys the orders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. The army is the party's army, not the "private soldiers" of a general, and has the same interests and common goals. While the military power is highly centralized, the authority to formulate specific tactics is delegated to ensure the flexibility and initiative of commanders and fighters at all levels.

In terms of military discipline and fighting will, the national army is also significantly inferior to the PLA. There are great differences in the military discipline and quality of different troops in the national army. For example, the direct line troops have better discipline and strong combat effectiveness, but the miscellaneous troops are much worse. The national army has only a few direct descendants, and most of them are miscellaneous troops. The lower-level officers and ordinary soldiers of the Kuomintang generally have no political beliefs, and they don't know why they fight. They are just forced to serve as soldiers or to fill their stomachs. When the defeat of the Kuomintang was obvious at the end of the war, the army was even more indecisive. Although the military discipline of the PLA is not as strict as the CCP boasted, it is better than the national army anyway. The ideological education and combat mobilization of the PLA have been implemented at the grassroots level, making officers and soldiers who already have beliefs and clear interest demands more effective in combat. When the People's Liberation Army was at a disadvantage in the early stages of the war, it was still able to persist in fighting, indomitable, and eventually grew gradually.

Another military advantage of the CCP is that it has a rear and base area that can stably support the army and military operations. As mentioned earlier, the CCP relied heavily on the countryside and farmers, and opened up a large number of base areas during the War of Resistance. These bases are all controlled by local party organizations and serve the CCP's strategic goals in a unified way. During the War of Liberation, these bases provided personnel (including sources of troops and former migrant workers), food, money, information, and cover for the transfer of the main force, and successfully completed the task of serving as the rear of the war (even though these bases were not geographically must be inside the liberated area). Except for a small amount of infiltration and minimal harassment and damage, these bases can be described as rock-solid. If the national army sends the main force to attack, it will become a cannon to fight mosquitoes, and it will not be able to cause too much damage to the fragmented grassroots forces of the CCP. Contrary to the fact that the CCP is like a fish in water, although the Kuomintang holds the major cities and the Kuomintang-controlled areas of the whole country, it is unable to control the grassroots, and the urban and rural areas have been infiltrated by the CCP. Student riots and labor riots frequently broke out in major cities, and the activities of various anti-KMT political groups have been semi-open, making the KMT exhausted. Such a "rear" simply cannot play its due role as a rear.

The CCP's victory in intelligence warfare has become the key to the PLA's victory over the national army. The CCP’s intelligence system has already infiltrated the KMT’s senior leadership, so that the CCP knows the deployment and movements of the national army well. For example, during the War of Liberation, Major General Guo Rugui, who was at the decision-making level of the national army, disclosed to the CCP the deployment of the Chinese army in the Huaihai Campaign, which led to the encirclement and annihilation of the originally superior national army by the People's Liberation Army. There is also Wu Shi, an official to the deputy chief of staff of the Ministry of National Defense, who is also a CCP spy. He was not exposed until the national army withdrew to Taiwan. The Kuomintang, on the other hand, was completely unable to infiltrate the command system of the PLA, and knew nothing about the strategic decisions of the top CCP leaders. The results of the two sides in intelligence warfare can be described as disparity.

"Government grows out of the barrel of a gun". In the KMT-CPC struggle for hegemony, the outcome of military contests is the most direct and decisive. In the final analysis, the CCP was able to seize power and replace the Kuomintang to rule mainland China, and it was achieved by violence. Of course, military victory or defeat is affected by many non-military factors. For example, the source of troops depends on the support base of both sides, and foreign aid depends on diplomacy.

(4) Luck and chance

It has to be said that the fact that the CCP finally won power is due to its extraordinary luck. In the early days of the founding of the party, the CCP was almost "supplied with one pot". In 1931, Gu Shunzhang's rebellion almost wiped out the CCP in the center of the "white area". But compared to these, the most fortunate thing for the CCP is the Xi'an Incident and the outbreak of the Anti-Japanese War.

From 1927 to 1934, after repeated encirclement and suppression by the Kuomintang army, the territory controlled by the CCP continued to shrink, and was finally forced to "Long March". It is worth emphasizing that the main reason for the defeat of the Red Army in the Jiangnan Soviet Area was not an accidental result caused by the wrong command of Bogu Lide and others as claimed by the CCP, but an inevitable result of the comparison of the strength of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party and the political, military and social conditions in China at that time. Under the powerful force of the Kuomintang regime, the CCP can no longer gain a foothold in East and South China, which are close to the center of the Kuomintang-controlled area.

From 1935 to 1936, several routes of the Red Army came to northern Shaanxi to settle down after the arduous journey of the Long March. At this time, there were only tens of thousands of remnants and exhausted soldiers, but they were facing the encirclement and suppression of hundreds of thousands of Kuomintang troops (Northeast Army, Northwest Army) stationed in Shaanxi. People nowadays take northern Shaanxi as the end of the Long March for granted, thinking that the Red Army will automatically be safe when they reach northern Shaanxi, but this is not the truth. If there were no subsequent changes, northern Shaanxi would probably be a place where the Red Army had to stay and leave in the process of fleeing, just like Xiangxi and Sichuan. At that time, the weak Red Army was about to face a fatal blow from the national army. If an attack occurred, the Red Army would either be wiped out or "long march" again, fleeing to the Soviet Union and Mongolia. Although the Red Army also achieved victories such as the Battle of Zhiluo Town during this period, it was still not enough to compete with the main force of the national army in Shaanxi. The disastrous defeat of the West Route Army of the Red Army by the armed Majia Army in the Northwest proved the fragility of the Red Army at that time.

But at this time, Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng launched the Xi'an Incident, detained Chiang Kai-shek, "forced Chiang to resist Japan", and threw an olive branch to the Red Army. As a result, Chiang Kai-shek's anti-Japanese plan was exposed in advance, causing Japan's vigilance and early invasion of China.

If the Xi’an Incident allowed the CCP to take a breather, then the outbreak of the Anti-Japanese War made the CCP recover and rise. After the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in 1937, Mao Zedong read "Lugou Xiaoyue" to imply that the fate of the CCP will be bright. And indeed it is. The national army could only concentrate on dealing with the Japanese army, and was no longer able to suppress the CCP. Faced with the pressure of public opinion to establish a national united front, Chiang Kai-shek had no choice but to allow the Red Army to be reorganized into the Eighth Route Army. Since then, the CCP regime can legally exist in Chinese territory, and is no longer a "bandit", and no longer suffers the fate of being displaced and being chased everywhere.

Mao and the CCP were not satisfied with the state of separatism. Once they got a respite, they thought about strengthening their strength and expanding their power in preparation for seizing power. The Eighth Route Army soon established an anti-Japanese base in Shanxi where the Japanese Army, the Central Army, and the Jinsui Army were intertwined. Since then, the Eighth Route Army and CCP guerrillas have emerged in all provinces north of the Yangtze River (excluding Northeast China and Qinghai and Xinjiang), and anti-Japanese base areas have blossomed in all directions. In the south, the remnants of the Red Army were also reorganized into the New Fourth Army, which was also expanding. Because the New Fourth Army in the south was on the side of the Japanese and national troops, its expansion was slow. The Eighth Route Army in the north, however, rapidly expanded its army, recruiting troops in the base areas and the Japanese-occupied areas of the Kuomintang-controlled areas, and soon exceeded the number of people it should have as a group army. By 1940, the number of the Eighth Route Army had increased to 400,000, 10 times that of when the army was founded. In 1945, the number of the Eighth Route Army exceeded 1 million.

While expanding its military, the CCP is also expanding its territory. When the national army and the Japanese army were fighting bloody battles, the CCP seized the opportunity to establish bases in rural areas and cultivate its own power. Among them, the expansion in Shandong, Hebei, Shanxi and other places is the most rapid. In areas where the Japanese army could not effectively control due to insufficient troops and other factors, the Eighth Route Army made every effort to establish anti-Japanese base areas or guerrilla areas. Although the Eighth Route Army also fought against Japan, it could not compare with the national army in terms of the scale of the battle and the number of enemies wiped out. The few battles that the CCP is proud of are also very watery. For example, the Battle of Pingxingguan, which has been touted by the CCP until now, actually only wiped out 300-500 Japanese troops. The massive "Hundred Regiments War" was mainly aimed at destroying the Japanese army's communication lines, but it had limited damage to the active forces of the Japanese army. If the Eighth Route Army fought many battles with the Japanese army before and after 1940, then after the "Hundred Regiments War" in 1940, there were very few fierce battles with the Japanese army. The Southern New Fourth Army attacked the Japanese army even less. During the anti-sweeping battle, the Eighth Route Army swam without attacking, and used civilians as human shields and cover, making civilians a punching bag for the Japanese army. As a result, more civilians were killed and raped by the Japanese army in retaliation, and villages were burned to rubble. Such a war of resistance outweighs the gains(I'm not saying that the Chinese military and civilians should give up resistance, but this kind of guerrilla warfare is really not worth the loss. Millions of Chinese civilians were killed and raped, and many villages were wiped out by the "San Guang". If hundreds of thousands or only a hundred thousand enemy troops can be wiped out It is still worth it, but this kind of war behind the enemy line also wiped out thousands of Japanese troops in eight years (the other annihilated about 300,000 Japanese troops were achieved through frontal battlefields or large-scale battles (not guerrilla warfare) even though they were behind enemy lines) ).The Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army often had frictions or even large-scale conflicts with the national army and other anti-Japanese armed forces during the War of Resistance. Of course, this is not the responsibility of the CCP, but it is also not a unilateral problem of the national army. For example, the CCP always mentions the Southern Anhui Incident where the National Army "fighted against each other", but deliberately ignores the previous Huangqiao Battle in which the New Fourth Army wiped out the National Army.

The eight-year war of resistance transformed the CCP from a small separatist vassal with less than 50,000 troops and limited territory in northern Shaanxi and other sporadic bases to a huge force with 1.2 million regular troops and 900,000 militiamen, controlling and influencing a population of more than 100 million regime. The party organization of the CCP, which suffered heavy damage after 1927, was also restored during the Anti-Japanese War, and the number of party members rebounded from the bottom and surpassed the number in 1927. The CCP, which was dying before the outbreak of the Anti-Japanese War, was able to confidently stand against the Nationalist Government at the end of the Anti-Japanese War. In his later years, Mao Zedong made many remarks "thanks to Japan for invading China", which was indeed from the bottom of his heart and could not be restrained.

After the end of the Anti-Japanese War, the CCP’s good luck continued. On the issue of China, the United States has always been hesitant. Different from the firm establishment of an "Iron Curtain" against the Soviet Union in Europe, the United States only regards Japan and South Korea as the bottom line of inviolability in Asia, and is ambiguous about China's future. The CCP’s political performances in Yan’an and Chongqing have successfully confused some American military and political officials, making them feel good about this seemingly simple and idealistic force. Comparing the two, these Americans hate the corrupt national government even more, and naturally they will not say anything good for the national government. Truman, who succeeded Roosevelt, had a gap with Chiang Kai-shek and was unwilling to fully support the latter. The mediation work led by the United States also gave the CCP a breathing space at critical moments. Unlike the real support given to the CCP by the Soviet Union, the United States has always limited its support to the Nationalist Government. As a result, the national army has only a small number of American armed forces. Great impact on the ground battlefield.

It took more than three years for the CCP to defeat the Kuomintang regime under the hesitation of the United States. Even so, Truman did not intend to prevent the CCP from liberating Taiwan. He once planned to acquiesce in the CCP’s unification of China in exchange for the CCP’s relative neutrality in the Cold War confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. It wasn't until the outbreak of the Korean War that the CCP strongly supported the Kim Il Sung regime's invasion of the southern peninsula that the United States sent the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait to avoid the complete destruction of the Kuomintang regime. But this only allowed Chiang Kai-shek to keep the small island, while the CCP quickly occupied the entire mainland of China and became the master who has ruled it to this day.

(5) Summary

The reason why the CCP was able to seize power was not only because it did represent the interests of the majority of people at a certain time and received the support of the majority, it was also due to luck and opportunities; its own struggle and initiative were very impressive, but outside Support is indispensable. Its military success is the most direct reason for its power. "Government grows out of the barrel of a gun" is not deceiving. In addition to the reasons mentioned above, there are of course many other factors for the success of the CCP, such as the strict organization of a Leninist party, the strong capabilities of Mao Zedong and other leaders, and the support of domestic regional interest groups. But because they are relatively minor, it is inconvenient to discuss them one by one in this article.

(2) The reasons why the CCP has survived despite the catastrophe of previous political campaigns

From the eradication of counterrevolutionaries in the Soviet area, to the rectification movement in Yan'an, to the suppression of counterrevolutionaries, anti-rightists, the Cultural Revolution after the founding of the People's Republic of China, and the June 4th suppression, all of these have caused great trauma to the country and the nation. It is also inevitable. But the regime has continued to maintain a strong vitality. This seems puzzling.

However, it is not so mysterious to explore the reasons.

First of all, the CCP regime has absolute control over the country and has monopolized various important resources including violent resources, and no one can restrict and confront it. The prerequisite for the downfall of a tyrannical regime is the existence of a force capable of overthrowing it (or such a resistance force has the opportunity and conditions to brew). Otherwise, no matter how rampant the tyranny is, the victims will be powerless to resist, and no cruel atrocity will bring down the regime. And the CCP has exactly this characteristic. For example, during the Anti-Rightist Movement and the Cultural Revolution, there was no force to resist, and sporadic resistance could not prevent tragedies from happening. The great famine is more typical. Even tens of millions of people starved to death, but they could not stop and unite to fight for survival. Because the military and police forces are completely monopolized by the government, and the household registration system and the existence of team clubs, streets, work units, and related grassroots party organizations make the atomized people powerless to resist, and even be deported when they flee famine to beg for food. Mainland China is completely under the control of the CCP, so where can they escape? Mao Zedong led the CCP to create many revolutionary bases to resist the national government, but after it came to power, it was most wary of grassroots sparks and did not allow another revolutionary base to appear.

Very similar examples include the Kim regime in North Korea and the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, both of which created catastrophic disasters but did not lead to effective resistance from the people (the Khmer Rouge regime was overthrown only because of the invasion of Vietnam). Eastern society advocates order and centralization, and a lot of personal freedom has been deprived. However, the communist regimes in the East, deeply influenced by the modern totalitarianism of Lenin and Stalin, have intensified, weaving a denser net on the basis of using the old nest, so that the victims Those who can only be at the mercy of others. When the whole society is a big prison, people with bare hands and imprisoned in all kinds of tangible or invisible cages, no matter how many people there are, no matter how severe the persecution is, they can only bear it. People in Western countries cannot understand this, largely because they live in a completely different social environment from Easterners. For example, they think that it is natural to allow people to move freely and protect private territories. They never imagined that there is a country where even clothing and food are strictly controlled.

Second, the CCP is an organization with a strict system and strong cohesion, and its unity, discipline, and absorption capacity are all amazing. Such organization means that it cannot be easily broken from the inside. As mentioned earlier, the CCP regime has a strong control over the country, and people outside the ruling class are powerless to resist. What about within the ruling class?

The operation of the CCP ruling group combines the characteristics of various political organizations such as the Leninist party, the Stalinist bureaucracy system, and the traditional Chinese hierarchy. This is the result of Mao Zedong and others' deliberate efforts. I don't know the specific details of its operation. Judging from the tip of the iceberg and its effects, it can indeed keep members loyal to the party, even if the party is persecuting them. Even if he is persecuted, he will regard it as the personal behavior of some people in the party, and will not be anti-party or betrayal because of this (unless there is a strong external force pulling). When a person becomes a member of the CCP system, he often falls into the established routine involuntarily. He will make a specific response to his own persecution through brutal political struggles, and actively defend the CCP and its system. It is difficult to escape The value system created by the party.

Third, the CCP has strong self-healing and error-correcting capabilities. Political campaigns do not go on indefinitely, stopping when a certain opportunity arises or a certain threshold is reached. The CCP will also make some remedies for previous mistakes, even if the degree of remediation is limited, the benefits are uneven, and it is a drop in the bucket. In some cases, its changes and revisions are very decisive. For example, after the Cultural Revolution, various unjust, false and wrong cases since the founding of the country were rehabilitated relatively quickly and on a large scale; In the situation of the tyrannical Mao era, Deng Xiaoping established the "socialism with Chinese characteristics" line of political conservatism and economic openness through the southern tour and the convening of the 14th National Congress, and adhered to the "four basic principles" of the party's leadership and ensuring that the regime "does not change color". "At the same time, it insisted on reform and opening up and economic construction as the center, allowing the Chinese economy to continue to drive in the fast lane after June 4th. In this way, neither inside nor outside the party will completely lose confidence in the CCP, and naturally they will not want to overthrow or destroy it. What's more, Chinese people generally have a high tolerance for the crimes committed by powerful and powerful people. As long as the harm is stopped or just reduced (the harm continues), people will be grateful and will not consider any compensation or accountability at all. Therefore, the regime keeps making mistakes, correcting mistakes, making mistakes and correcting again, and it can go on forever.

Fourth, no matter how the members of the CCP ruling group suffer, they still enjoy vested interests. And differentiated resource allocation can always make vested interests loyal to the regime. Although members of the CCP and even high-level officials have been victimized in all previous political movements of the CCP, their suffering is generally lower than that of ordinary people and vulnerable groups. For example, most of the powerful elites of the CCP who were exiled during the Cultural Revolution still enjoy relatively high treatment. Even if they serve their sentences in prison, they are often in Qincheng Prison, a noble prison specially built for the upper class, or enjoy special treatment in ordinary prisons. If they don't die, they all have a chance to come back. After the Cultural Revolution, a large number of leading cadres who were knocked down became dignitaries again. This is an example. Corrupt officials who are now in prison are much better than ordinary people in prison. What's more, these people have passed various paroles and commutation of sentences, and soon returned to their days of drinking and drinking. Even if they themselves do not have a bright future, their children can draw on the vast resources and networks they leave behind.

So they know that as long as they are members of the party, they will still have a good life, and there will be better days waiting for them in the future. If you rebel against the Communist Party and challenge the entire vested interest class, not only is there little chance of success (even most people can't find an effective way to resist), but they will inevitably die without a place to bury their children and even their families. Of course they will make relatively optimal choices.

(3) The characteristics and evolution trends of different leaders of the CCP in power

Due to the different backgrounds of the times and the differences in the personal values and personalities of the leaders, the CCP in different periods has shown very different political styles, which are reflected in the actual policies and the ideology it advocates. But on the other hand, the CCP has consistent characteristics from the establishment of the party to the establishment of the government. Different leaders have consistent views and propositions on some important issues.

(1) The CCP before Mao Zedong came to power

During the period of the first CCP leader Chen Duxiu, the CCP was still a very idealistic and non-violent party. At that time, the CCP had not yet become a Leninist party, and the atmosphere of democracy within the party was still strong.

During the Northern Expedition, the CCP began to degenerate into a utilitarian political party with the goal of seizing power. At this time, the CCP developed rapidly and its members were mixed. Although it has begun to become a Lenin-style political party with strict discipline at this time, it has not yet formed a dictatorship within the party. During the Northern Expedition, the CCP’s actions in cities and villages have revealed its characteristics of violence, cruelty, and achieving its goals at any cost.

After the "April 12 Coup", the CCP suffered a severe blow, and the entire party became sensitive and neurotic. Under the harsh internal and external environment, the CCP has become more and more cruel, and this cruelty has begun to target internally on a large scale. The tragic "anti-revolutionary" movement in the Soviet area (such as the "beating the AB regiment" and the "Tomita Incident") is the most typical manifestation. At this time, the CCP was no different from the Soviet Communist Party. There was no democratic rule of law and timely error correction mechanisms within the party. There was no channel for peaceful resolution of differences and disputes between people, and political struggles intensified. For the "purity" of the party and the private purpose of eliminating dissidents, reactionary purges have intensified and vicious circles, and physical annihilation has become a common method in inner-party struggles.

(2) The era of Mao Zedong

After 1936, Mao Zedong gradually took control of the CCP, which lasted for forty years. Mao Zedong was a politician with distinctive personality, strong desire for power and superb fighting skills. Mao's profound influence even reshaped the CCP, and its influence continues to this day. During the heyday of Mao's power, Mao himself was the embodiment of the CCP, and the CCP was completely a tool for Mao to realize his personal will.

During Mao Zedong's rule, the CCP realized the unity of ideology and will, the unity of discipline, and the unity of action. Of course, this kind of unity refers to the macroscopic and overall. It does not mean that when and where all members of the CCP are in step with each other and have no differences. In the previous CCP, people with common ideals gathered together for a common goal, but there was no realistic leadership core. The emergence of Mao gave the CCP a "backbone" and an object of actual allegiance. At the same time, the cult of personality also emerged and formed. Mao Zedong was deified, his speech became the golden rule, and his every action was endowed with a great and upright meaning. The voice of criticism gradually disappeared, and Mao became the master of the CCP and China.

After Mao Zedong came to power, the CCP not only established the leadership core, but also clarified the specific goals to be achieved and the path to be taken. The future of the CCP became clear. Mao Zedong was both a genius theorist and a firm doer. The thick "Selected Works of Mao Zedong" is full of Mao's wonderful thoughts, which makes people have to sigh. The reason why the CCP was able to defeat the strong with the weak and defeated Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang group, Mao Zedong's correct decision-making in various aspects such as politics, military affairs, and ideology, played a very important role.

The CCP in the Mao era was generally violent and revolutionary, and the political changes were drastic and extensive. Whether it was the military conflicts during the Anti-Japanese War and the Civil War, or the political movements from the Yan'an Rectification Movement to the Anti-Rightist Cultural Revolution, blood and lives were everywhere. This is significantly different from the situation when the subsequent CCP leaders came to power.

The CCP under Mao Zedong was a mixture of idealism and pragmatism. On the one hand, it still takes the realization of communism as its goal. Before the founding of the People's Republic of China, it promised to establish a new democratic regime, promote democratic experiments and "three-three systems" in liberated areas, and after the founding of the People's Republic of China, it implemented public ownership, collectivization, and even launched the Cultural Revolution. The ideal is placed in a crucial position.

On the other hand, after Mao came to power, the CCP actually abandoned its adherence to the basic teachings of Marxism-Leninism and replaced them with ideology and policies with Chinese characteristics, such as relying on peasants rather than workers to win the revolution, and using traditional Chinese feudal ideas of loyalty to the monarch Manipulating society with the art of controlling the people, rejecting Westernization and modern humanistic and individualistic ideas, insisting that national independence is higher than the cooperation of international communist forces, etc. Mao's Sinicization of Marxism-Leninism allowed the CCP to exist in China in a "down-to-earth" way. During the Anti-Japanese War and the Second Civil War between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, in order to win more forces, the CCP took the initiative to extend an olive branch to all classes, including making compromises with landlords and capitalists, and establishing a united front. After the CCP marched into the Northeast, it also pardoned, recruited, and retained a large number of Japanese soldiers and former Manchukuo soldiers (including some war criminals), as well as professional and technical personnel in the economic, political, transportation, cultural and educational systems of the Manchukuo. These are all pragmatic measures for the survival and development of the CCP. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the CCP’s pragmatic behaviors in domestic and foreign affairs are too numerous to list, such as choosing to reconcile with its ideological opponent, the United States, and allying with the United States to contain the Soviet Union, abandoning claims against Japan in exchange for the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, and holding a meeting of 7,000 people to review its rash advances, severely The intellectuals were suppressed but the generals of the national army were readily pardoned, and some downed cadres and technicians were reappointed after each political climax.

These characteristics of the CCP in the Mao era were not only caused by the current situation, but also caused by Mao's personal decision-making. In any case, Mao Zedong's subjective behavior had a very significant impact on the CCP. Mao Zedong shaped the CCP more subjectively and actively than any other CCP leader. Other leaders mainly followed the current situation, while Mao led the CCP to create and transform the current situation.

Because Mao Zedong was in power for a long time, the characteristics of the CCP in Mao's era had obvious changes, such as the difference between before and after the founding of the People's Republic of China. But the commonalities outweigh the differences.

(3) Hua Guofeng Period

Hua Guofeng's reign was a well-known transitional period. "Two whatevers" and "governing the country by grasping key principles" were the key words when he was in power. The reason why he is said to be "in power" rather than "in power" is because he did not hold all real power at the time. He relied on the support of Mao's loyalists such as Wang Dongxing and the support of Ye Jianying, Li Xiannian and other CCP veterans to barely sit in the big position.

During the Hua Guofeng period, the CCP oscillated between conservatism and reform. At that time, people's minds changed, and Chinese people were generally dissatisfied with the serious damage caused by the Cultural Revolution, such as economic collapse and anarchy, and hoped to put the country on the right track. But because Mao had just passed away, Yu Wei was still there, and the ultra-left forces still held important positions, opposing major changes in the principles and policies of the Mao era. Hua Guofeng, who has no prestige and lack of ability, cannot make any positive decisions, and can only let the situation change and develop under the manipulation of other political strongmen.

With the comeback of Deng Xiaoping and the rise of the reformers, the transitional period came to an end. Hua Guofeng also ended his short career as a "wise leader", sadly left the center of power and finally retired from politics.

(4) The era of Deng Xiaoping: the political spring dominated by the Hu-Zhao Kaiming faction and the "humility to make a fortune" under Jiang Zemin after the premature death of democratization

From 1978 to the mid-1990s, the real supreme power in China was Deng Xiaoping. Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, Li Peng, and Jiang Zemin were all just executors of Deng's line at different times. Of course, these people also had a certain degree of independence and initiative, but in the final analysis they were shrouded in the shadow of Deng Xiaoping.

The CCP in the Deng Xiaoping era almost completely abandoned idealism and fully embraced pragmatism. For example, Deng's "cat theory" and "no debate" both emphasize practice, development, and accumulation of strength. Stop taking class struggle as the key link internally, stop exporting revolution to the outside world, focus on economic construction, and keep a low profile. The liberalization of the private and individual economy, the restructuring of state-owned enterprises, the popularity of the household contract responsibility system, the disintegration of the collective economy, and the introduction of external capital and technology all marked the return of capitalism. After decades of destructive exploration, China has "returned to pre-liberation", and its economic form has become capitalist, with a large proportion of bureaucratic capitalism. And "adherence to the four basic principles" is not to adhere to political ideals, but to maintain rule and escort economic construction.

During the administration of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, the CCP tended towards democracy and the rule of law. At that time, the pace of China's reforms did not lag behind the Soviet and Eastern countries. Political enlightenment brings about the openness of public opinion and social freedom. China ushered in the first relatively long political spring under the CCP’s rule. If the transition to democracy goes smoothly, the CCP may transform into a social democratic party, from an autocratic party to a democratic party, completely changing its nature.

But 8964 ended this trend, and China's democratic process died prematurely. But it is reasonable for democracy to be suppressed to a certain extent. Because most of the CCP leaders, including Deng Xiaoping, are opposed to political pluralism in their hearts, and they had no intention of turning China into a "Western-style democracy" country. They only agree to carry out drastic economic reforms, and are very cautious about political reforms. The bottom line is that the CCP’s one-party dictatorship cannot be shaken. They do not want China to continue the poverty and turmoil of the Mao era, but they also do not want China to "go down the wrong path." Although Hu and Zhao were once the top leaders in name, the real power, especially the military power, is still in the hands of Deng Xiaoping and the veterans of the Central Advisory Committee. How can these shallow-rooted enlightened factions survive the cunning and cunning, and have experienced the baptism of wars and previous political struggles? of the CCP veterans.

The development model after Jiang Zemin came to power was Deng Xiaoping's favorite. The characteristic of this model is that under the premise of the CCP’s monopoly of political power, a certain degree of reform and opening up will be carried out to eliminate unnecessary political interference, give the people basic stability and limited freedom, stimulate economic development, and achieve national strength and national living standards. The improvement of social security and the protection of the special interests of the privileged class and vested interests through differentiated distribution. Conversely, in order to safeguard these vested interests, the privileged class will actively defend the CCP regime. Ordinary people who get a share of economic development will also approve of the regime's rule. In this way, the CCP regime can be stabilized, and the country will enjoy long-term stability. At this time, the source of the CCP’s regime legitimacy is not ideology, but the fruits and dividends of economic development. The CCP has also completely transformed into a super-community of interests, which no longer has moral and ideological legitimacy.

In order to make up for the lack of ideals and beliefs caused by essentially abandoning the pursuit of communism and the spirit of revolutionary struggle, and to cover up the regime's shame and internal ideological cohesion, the CCP in the Deng era and after it chose to hold high the banner of "patriotism" and associate the CCP with China, The Chinese nation binds and even forcibly equates it to resist the universal values and liberal democratic thoughts from the West. Although in fact, the CCP is the political group that has harmed and betrayed the interests of China and the Chinese nation the most. To a certain extent, the CCP has indeed succeeded in equating "anti-communist" and "anti-China", using the narrow concept of the celestial dynasty and nation to restrain the people and fight against the West. But in the final analysis, the CCP still wins people's hearts through pragmatism such as economic development. "Patriotism" and "national rejuvenation" are more just propaganda, which can no longer arouse the crazy political enthusiasm like the class struggle in the Mao era.

Deng Xiaoping confirmed the "road of socialism with Chinese characteristics" designed by Deng Xiaoping through his speeches on the southern tour in 1992 and the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. Deng Xiaoping passed away in 1997, and Deng's line was still implemented for a long time after his death. Deng didn’t need to worry about being overturned and policies terminated before Mao Zedong’s death, because the reform and opening up conformed to the trend of the times, and most people from top to bottom were unwilling to return to the extreme scarcity of materials and the brutal political struggles one after another. years.

(5) The period of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao

When Hu Wen was in power, Deng Xiaoping had passed away for many years. But throughout the Hu-Wen period, we can see the shadow of Deng Xiaoping's theory everywhere.

Hu Wen is a typical conservative king. What they have done is to follow the steps of Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, continue to immerse themselves in development, and make some minor repairs to some new or increasingly prominent problems. "One center, two basic points" have been inherited verbatim by Hu and Wen. The economy continues to take off, politics continues to be autocratic, and people are still "making fortunes silently." This period of time can be described as "the era of Deng Xiaoping without Deng Xiaoping".

During the Hu-Wen period, the disadvantages of reform and opening up became more and more apparent, such as the prominent gap between the rich and the poor and the solidification of social classes, economic reforms faced bottlenecks due to political lag, corruption intensified, and social conflicts intensified. So the stability maintenance system came into being. The stability maintenance system in a broad sense has existed since the founding of the CCP, but the professional suppression system that specifically targets citizen movements, social movements, rights defense movements, and other group incidents or individual radical behaviors took shape during the Hu-Wen era.

The Hu-Wen regime is also facing pressure to democratize politics. They are unwilling and unable to solve this problem head-on, but drag the problem down with regime inertia and stability maintenance system. Hu and Wen neither want to go back, nor want to further reform and opening up, and they often have an ambiguous attitude when dealing with political and social issues. Radical political movements are suppressed, but moderate opposition is growing. The rapid development of the Internet has given citizens relatively free conditions to explore history and comment on reality. At that time, Internet control was not yet strict, and the atmosphere of democracy and freedom pervaded the Internet and often affected offline. The development and popularization of the Internet has given the Chinese people, who have been suppressed by the stability maintenance system, a certain degree of freedom by accident. "Crowd watching to change China" became a popular slogan at the time.

In this tight and loose state, the Hu-Wen regime came to an end. When Wen Jiabao attended the last press conference, he said, "If the political system is not reformed, the tragedy of the Cultural Revolution may repeat itself." This can be regarded as expressing an attitude of heart for change and opposition to retrogression. Both Hu and Wen are technocrats, and they follow the rules. They have neither strong political ambitions and autocratic desires, nor the courage and ability to implement reforms. They can only follow the old policies of Deng Jiang's period and lead the CCP to silence And anxiety rules China.

(5) The era of Xi Jinping

When people thought that China would continue to stumble forward on the road of gradual improvement, that officials would make limited changes or at least not go backwards, and that civil forces would develop more maturely, Xi Jinping's coming to power reversed all this. This kind of reversal is somewhat beyond the expectations of the Chinese and the world, but it has indeed happened, and it will profoundly affect China and the world in the 21st century.

In his first year in power, Xi Jinping once displayed a pro-liberal stance. He claimed to deepen reform and opening up, vigorously fight corruption, and realize national rejuvenation. The country once showed an upward atmosphere. But in 2013, the situation took a sharp turn for the worse. China's limited freedom of the press was also deprived, marked by the incident of the Southern Zhou New Year's message. Later, the "party media surnamed the party" and the rectification of Yanhuang Chunqiu magazine further realized the CCP's complete control of public opinion. However, the Gongmeng, Chuanzhixing, Yirenping and other civic organizations and public welfare organizations have been banned or forced to cease operations one after another, which has destroyed China's hard-won civilized and organized citizen power. The "709" mass arrests have dealt a blow to the key force of citizens' rights protection and struggle - rights defense lawyers, making it difficult for the majority of wronged people to seek justice through legal channels, and the "ruling the country by law" advertised by the CCP has completely become empty talk. The "Seven Don'ts" and the "Sixteen Points" symbolize the strengthening of the CCP's control over colleges and universities during the Xi era. Schools that were supposed to be at the forefront of academics, enlightenment, and social change have become lifeless prisons.

Xi Jinping not only spared no effort to attack the opposition forces outside the party, but also showed no mercy to the forces within the party who challenged him. "Second Generation Red" opinion leader Ren Zhiqiang was sentenced to 18 years in prison, and Cai Xia, a professor at the Central Party School, was expelled and forced to go into exile abroad. In addition, the super-large-scale anti-corruption campaign he launched during his first term was also aimed at purging political enemies and unanimous orders. prison. "Do not discuss the central government indiscriminately" also wiped out the "democracy within the party" that the CCP has long advocated. With the convening of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China and the abolition of term limits in the following year, the fixed-term system and collective leadership system that the CCP once implemented were terminated. Xi Jinping achieved unprecedented political centralization and became the leader of the CCP with the most centralized power after Mao Zedong.

Xi Jinping not only imitated Mao Zedong in controlling power, but his governance style and value orientation were also close to the Mao era. For example, the political slogans of the Mao era, such as "Party, government, military and civilian studies, the party leads everything", openly proposed to emulate the "Fengqiao experience" of grassroots governance in the Mao era, etc. The Xi Jinping regime has also increasingly proposed to learn from the spirit of the Long March and the spirit of Jinggangshan in the Mao era, and regards carrying forward the red tradition as one of the political education contents for the people. On the contrary, reform and opening up are less and less mentioned, and the commemorative activities for the 40th anniversary of reform and opening up in 2018 are very low-key. As for things related to "bourgeois liberalization", they are strictly prohibited. For example, Zhou Qiang, President of the Supreme People's Court, said that he would resolutely resist the Western trend of "constitutional democracy" and "judicial independence".

In terms of foreign relations, Xi Jinping proposed the "One Belt, One Road" initiative to actively expand China's foreign influence and compete with the United States. In the first few years of his administration, Xi Jinping took a tough external stance, including holding a high-profile military parade for the 70th anniversary of the victory of the Anti-Japanese War. However, with the deterioration of the domestic economic situation and the deepening of international resistance to the CCP, the CCP has lowered its attitude towards neighboring countries such as Japan, South Korea, and India, and turned to deal with the US trade war, the diplomatic and intelligence containment of the "Five Eyes Alliance", and the European Union. human rights offensive. However, due to factors such as the Huawei and Meng Wanzhou incident, the new crown epidemic, Hong Kong-related and Xinjiang-related issues, the CCP regime’s foreign relations have become more and more stretched, and it has become increasingly trapped in a deeper quagmire from which it cannot break free.

For Hong Kong and Xinjiang, two domestic "hot spots", Xi Jinping has adopted a very tough strategy. After successive defeats of the "Occupy Central" and anti-amendment movements in Hong Kong, the CCP has tried to put Hong Kong completely under control by promulgating the "National Security Law for Hong Kong" and revising Hong Kong's election mechanism, squeezing the power of liberalism in Hong Kong and infiltrating the mainland. under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party. In Xinjiang, the Xi Jinping regime has used concentration camps and super-large-scale long-term detention to suppress the resistance activities of Muslims of Uyghur and other ethnic groups, and maintain stability with violence and high pressure. Although the Xi regime has been widely condemned and sanctioned by the international community for its actions in Hong Kong and Xinjiang, it shows no sign of backing down. However, such drastic actions face enormous pressure and risks both in the region and outside, and it is not yet known how long the radical measures can last. The strong actions taken by the Xi regime in these two important border areas demonstrate the coexistence of self-confidence and anxiety in the face of severe internal conflicts in the Xi era.

Xinjiang is relatively the most suffocating region in China under the Xi Jinping regime. Other regions have more or less built this model of high-pressure stability maintenance, and the Xinjiang model can be implemented in any other region of the country at any time. With the outbreak of the new crown epidemic, various isolation and behavior monitoring measures have gradually pushed this possibility into practice. Relying on the big data totalitarianism established by modern information technology, the Xi Jinping regime has unprecedented control over society and the people. This kind of control was unattainable even in the Mao era, because there was no technology like now, which can monitor and record people's every move at all times. The Xi Jinping regime not only has corresponding technical means, but its power is not restricted and supervised. The black box regime turns the people into transparent people, and the latter can only be slaughtered by the former in the face of technological dimensionality reduction.

The nearly ten years of Xi Jinping's rule have been a very unique period for the CCP. It does not have the violent revolution and brutal movement of the Mao era, but it has the anti-intellectualism, barbarism and paranoia of Mao's administration; it does not emphasize reform, opening up and economic development as clearly as Deng Xiaoping, but it is consolidating the expansion of bureaucratic capitalism caused by Deng's line. The wealth gap and moral decay. The CCP in the Xi era seems to be continuing to delay reforms and muddle through just like the Hu and Wen eras, but Xi is obviously creating a historical countercurrent by driving backwards, actively and strongly preventing the changes of the times. Xi Jinping is also imitating Mao Zedong, proposing the concept and blueprint of the "Chinese Dream", and revising Deng Xiaoping's conception and practice of "socialism with Chinese characteristics", trying to reshape the CCP and create a prosperous era led by him, becoming China after Mao and Deng. Another "great man" who even tried to surpass Mao Deng's "achievements". But in reality, Xi's attempt is a failure. Even if he can stay in power for more than ten years, there is no hope for his dream to succeed in the future. Instead, it will drag China into a darker abyss. The CCP led by Xi Jinping has become a strong interest group that is opposed to the masses. It maintains internal unity and external consistency through internal interest binding and step-by-step distribution of spoils, kidnaps the country, nation, and people, and continues this interest community like drums and flowers. passed down from generation to generation.

(6) Evolutionary trend

From the founding of the CCP to the present, the characteristics of the CCP regime are constantly changing, but there are also some laws and trajectories to follow amidst the uncertainty.

Before the 1950s, the CCP was an idealistic party, all aimed at overthrowing the old order and realizing earth-shaking changes. As the CCP gradually gains real power, its idealism has gradually faded, and its pragmatism and utilitarianism have become increasingly strong. After coming to power, especially after the 1990s, the CCP has gradually become a conservative party that sticks to its vested interests and maintains the existing order. It is obvious that the CCP has also transformed from a political party with strong ideology into a group that puts interests first.

The CCP has gone through several stages from decentralization to centralization, to decentralization, and to centralization again. Before Mao Zedong came to power, no leader of the CCP had absolute authority, and it was only during the Mao period that he became the leader of the party. During the Deng period, the leadership of the party was dispersed, and the Hu-Wen period further realized collective decision-making. But Xi Jinping has once again turned the CCP into a highly centralized system in which the top leaders of the party say nothing.

In terms of dealing with democratic politics, the voice of the people, and foreign relations, the CCP fluctuates between being liberal and conservative, but generally tends to be conservative. For example, the CCP in the 1940s and 1980s showed a strong tendency to be pro-democracy and open and inclusive. But for most of the rest of the time, it has firmly grasped political power, built a high wall of rule through institutions, ideology, and violent machines, and is wary of the call for democracy and the free and open outside world.

(4) Deriving the nature of the CCP from the history of the CCP

Based on the above, the general history and various characteristics of the CCP are relatively clear. So, fundamentally speaking, what kind of political party is the CCP?

The author's conclusion is that the CCP is a totalitarian party that is authoritarian, violent, flexible, stubborn, mixed with Chinese and foreign ruling skills, and uses faith as its signature and interests as its link. In seizing power and governing, it generally excludes other political parties and monopolizes political power; obtains power and implements rule by violent means; is highly pragmatic and flexible, and is willing to make major compromises and adjustments in ideology and policies to maintain rule ; is relentless in maintaining the rule and defending the interests of the privileged class, and the political red line has shifted but always exists; it combines traditional Chinese Confucianism and Legalism with the foreign Lenin-Stalin model and elements of fascism; it has constructed a complete ideological system, and the entire party has Shared historical memory and political honor, but essentially unite and consolidate the entire party based on common real interests, with the primary purpose of maintaining and expanding the special interests of party members. The nature of the CCP will not change fundamentally in the future, unless the current situation changes fundamentally.

(5) Will the CCP’s one-party autocratic model still have vitality in the foreseeable future?

Reading history can better predict the future. The future of the CCP can be obtained from the historical traces of the CCP and the current situation. Based on what has happened, and considering the special contemporary political and social environment, we can predict its future possibilities.

According to the above-mentioned history, characteristics and nature of the CCP, the CCP is obviously a political group that is very good at building political power and controlling the people. powerful. Above the bottom line of maintaining rule, the CCP has rare pragmatism, flexibility, and flexibility. It can adapt to changes in the current situation, effectively use factors in the environment that are beneficial to itself, and constantly update principles and policies to continue and consolidate its existence and develop.

For example, the "one big two public" and the Cultural Revolution led to China's economic collapse and social chaos, but the CCP has always firmly controlled the power. Even when starvation and violent turmoil are everywhere, it has successfully stifled the germination of any domestic political forces and blocked the outside world. Force any possible effective penetration. Soon after Mao's death, the CCP leadership resolutely abandoned class struggle and dogmatism, and moved towards reform and opening up. After 1989, in the face of domestic and international pressures, the CCP adhered to the political one-party dictatorship and at the same time insisted on deepening reforms in the economic field, raised the banner of "socialist market economy", successfully withstood the impact, created China's economic miracle, and stabilized the regime And gradually formed the "Chinese model". At the same time as economic liberalization, the party's ban on newspapers has always been strict, and the CCP's monopoly on political power and public opinion has been strengthened, and the opposition forces have not been given any chance to actually participate in politics.

Today's CCP has embedded itself in China's survival and development by constructing the "China Model", and has become "inseparable" from China. The so-called "China model", that is, political dictatorship and economic openness go hand in hand and cooperate with each other, using the "low human rights advantages" created by maintaining stability to motivate, induce, and force citizens to participate in production and construction, and then use power to distribute the fruits of labor according to strength, Mainly rely on the violent machine to suppress all dissatisfaction and resistance, and let the society operate in accordance with the order set by the power. This model is the opposite of the main characteristics of the liberal, open, and equal-minded society in the West, but it also has extraordinary vitality. Even because of its "low human rights advantages" and centralization advantages, it is sometimes more competitive than the Western model. The formation of the "China Model" has given the CCP the capital to "not follow the Western path", and even export the "China Model" to other developing countries, competing with the Western world.

The "Chinese model" can be traced back to ancient China. In the long history before the Opium War, China has long been a self-sufficient and self-contained social system with its own political logic, economic model, cultural characteristics and social relations that are completely different from those of the West. Despotism and the related systems and supporting systems for maintaining it are an important part of Chinese tradition. After China was involved in globalization, all aspects have been greatly impacted by the outside world, but China's own social and ecological system has not been destroyed. Although the CCP claims to be a revolutionary political party and once showed a strong tendency to destroy traditions, it actually imitates Chinese traditions unconsciously and even partially actively. After the Cultural Revolution, the CCP openly embraced tradition and used it as a tool against "Westernization." The "China model" shaped by the CCP is based on the existing social system in traditional China, and the old things are often very stable, and still have ubiquitous influence and lasting influence in modern society. Vitality, the CCP's borrowing from tradition is very successful. China's traditional system and culture, as well as the various experiences and habits left over to the present, are the CCP's inexhaustible ruling wealth and a magic weapon against modern civilization that originated in the West. From Mao to Deng and then to Xi, the ability to rely on "socialism with Chinese characteristics" to stabilize the country does not actually rely on "socialism" but "Chinese characteristics."

The prosperity and decline of the economy and whether the people's material life is sufficient are crucial to the legitimacy and stability of a regime. From the past few decades to the present and even the foreseeable future, the CCP has and will continue to use reform and opening up as the background, maintain a considerable degree of economic freedom, and give full play to the regulatory role of the regime, and strive to develop the economy and improve people's living standards. Although Xi Jinping's attitude towards reform and opening up is not positive, the line he actually pursues (especially the economic line) still follows the basic direction of reform and opening up. As long as this policy continues, China will not be like some other "failed countries" where the people lose confidence in the regime due to economic collapse and the regime collapses. Since Deng Xiaoping, the leaders of the Communist Party of China have indeed grasped the point of "grasping the economy". Compared with the ideological mobilization during the Mao era, which could lead to a momentary frenzy but could not last long, tangible economic benefits are more able to tie people's hearts.

The distribution of economic achievements is indeed extremely unfair, but it is also a fact that people's living standards have generally improved greatly compared with before. Even if the reason for this increase is the leap in productivity brought about by the four industrial revolutions sweeping the world, rather than the achievements of the CCP itself. There were frequent civil uprisings in ancient and modern times. People's resistance without fear of death is largely due to the extreme poverty of life. It is common to have no food and clothing. But today is different. Even if the lower class has no status, no culture, no connections, if they are willing to work hard, it is no problem to eat simple but sufficient and delicious meals for three meals a day. In addition, the development of science and technology and industrial renewal have also greatly reduced the average labor intensity and greatly improved the labor safety factor. On the other hand, the upper-middle class can live in a materially abundant and high-quality environment. These people with the most transformative ability are the beneficiaries of the political and economic model with Chinese characteristics, and they have no material motivation for revolution. On the other hand, resisting the regime means imprisonment, torture, death, and relatives. Excluding the pursuit of rights and dignity and other non-material aspects, from the perspective of pure interests and basic material desires, people today have no need to risk their lives to resist. As for injustice and injustice, more and greater injustice will be encountered after resistance. On the one hand, labor can survive, and on the other hand, the iron fist of the stability maintenance system, the vast majority of people will make an instinctive choice, even if this kind of survival lacks dignity, dignity, and freedom. Human desires are difficult to fill, but also easy to be satisfied, it depends on how the environment induces and how the system disciplines. The "titty music" produced by industrial civilization is effective for most people, but its cost is very low. The most important thing is that the CCP regime not only has "carrots" like "Nipple Le", but also a "big stick" for maintaining stability supported by violent machines. As long as the economy does not collapse or undergo a major downturn, the CCP regime can continue to be maintained for a long time.

The gains and losses of social governance are also important factors related to the legitimacy and stability of the regime. The so-called "social governance" refers to the management and service of the state, citizens, and society by the regime and its affiliated forces. The results are reflected in many aspects such as economy, technology, rule of law, public security, infrastructure, social welfare, culture, education and health. Social governance capability is a direct reflection of a regime's ability to govern, reflects the maturity of the regime's control over society, and is related to the people's satisfaction with the regime. Throughout the world, there is no linear relationship between social governance capacity and the nature of the regime (democracy or autocracy). There are high levels of social governance in both European and American democracies, as well as authoritarian regimes such as South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore before the transition. Democracy and autocracy coexist in the world. From the perspective of efficiency and results alone, democracy does not add too much to social governance, and may even become a constraining factor.

China's social governance is not easy to evaluate. On the one hand, it is remarkable in terms of economic and technological development, infrastructure construction, cultural, educational and health services, etc., the level of organizational modernization of social life is high, and the orderliness of social security and public space surpasses that of all developing countries and countries. some developed countries. On the other hand, its control is not authorized and supervised by the public, nor is it regulated by an independent judiciary, which grossly tramples on human rights and does not allow the development of citizens' self-organization. The first task of social organizations is to cooperate with the regime's rule and maintain stability; and its services It is seriously unbalanced and unfair, and corruption is serious. China's social governance also places emphasis on "management" rather than "service", emphasizing appearance and ignoring substance, based on the rise and fall of the regime rather than the people's happiness, and overall social Darwinism tends to achieve the goal by any means. But in any case, considering the weighting of governance efficiency and hard indicators, the level of social governance in China under the CCP’s rule can be regarded as above-average in the world, and it is certainly not the situation of a “failed country” with dilapidated mountains and rivers, social disorder, and people’s livelihood. Social governance, as a means of maintaining political power, of course includes specific social control techniques, and the technique of controlling the people is a part of social governance. And modern information technology has become a powerful assistant in social governance and a magical tool for managing the people.

The blessing of information technology is the key to the CCP's daring to act recklessly without worrying about large-scale and effective resistance. The revolutionary progress of science and technology and the advent of the information age have greatly and profoundly changed the relationship between people, the relationship between the strong and the weak, and the relationship between the ruler and the ruled. In the age of information technology, ubiquitous big data and surveillance systems have subverted people's situation and relative relationship with others. The strong and those in power use information technology to record and monitor every move, every word and deed of the weak and the managed, and can use weapons and machines closely related to information technology to control, restrain, and suppress. Information technology allows a very small number of people to easily and effectively manage the majority of people, and has an extremely efficient ability to allocate resources in suppression. The anti-riot weapons of the military and police have also achieved high-tech. Of course, the anti-riot command system is also information-based, which can achieve fast, precise, quiet, and moderate strikes, leaving the protesters with no power to fight back and no space to maneuver. The cost is to achieve the purpose of repression, and to minimize or even completely annihilate the impact of protest actions. It is no longer possible to "stir up the world's rebellion" by "cutting trees for soldiers and raising poles for banners". The combination of information-based surveillance systems, communication systems, and transportation systems can nip it in the bud, and there will be no resistance at all. opportunity to organize. From ancient times to the present, the methods that the weak can use to face the strong and the oppressed to face the oppressor, such as escaping, hiding, connecting, destroying, harassing, assassinating, guerrilla, etc., have lost their feasibility under the totalitarianism of big data. The ruled no longer have the considerable deterrence and bargaining power they had over the ruling class before the information age, and there is no danger of rebounding even if they are brutally persecuted. These seemingly technical issues were in some ways decisive for the survival of the autocracy.

As a result, "people's hearts" are becoming less and less important. For the CCP, the degree of totalitarian evolution makes it no longer need to worry so much about the dissatisfaction of ordinary people. The CCP, which has dominated the right to use information technology, is like a fortress covered with anti-nuclear materials. It no longer needs to worry about external threats, but focuses on preventing it from being disintegrated from within. What the CCP cares more about is whether the internal vested interest groups in the current system are dissatisfied and what their demands are.

It is precisely the resolute defense of the CCP’s vested interest groups for the CCP’s regime and its political party that can sustain the CCP’s regime for a long time. Since the founding of the CCP, it has accumulated tens of millions of vested interests, plus their close relatives, friends, and related parties. generally distributed in a pyramidal shape. Such a group, which accounts for about one-fifth of China's population, is a relative beneficiary of the CCP's rule over China. It also owns the vast majority of important social resources, occupies the vast majority of privileged positions, and has an overwhelming right to speak and Influence. It is true that this group is also composed of many members whose interests are not completely consistent or even have obvious conflicts of interest, and internal political struggles or other conflicts are also very intense, but they generally support the rule of the CCP (or are a member of the ruler), It is the basis for the survival and long-term continuation of the CCP regime (of course it does not mean that there are no vested interests against the system, but there are a small number of them. In other words, the vested interests who oppose the totalitarian CCP are generally silent, obey the status quo, and have not made any It is also difficult to make substantive resistance).

Most of the CCP’s vested interests are directly or indirectly attached to the CCP regime and the system it created to survive and profit. Their personal interests and family interests are consistent with the overall interests of the CCP regime, tied to their status, background, status and positions, and coexist and co-prosper with the current system , but inconsistent or even directly contrary to the interests of the country, the nation and the broad masses of the people. "Vested interests" not only refer to economic interests, but also include tangible and intangible interests in many fields such as power, status, social relations, discourse power, etc., especially in the interest game (or non-interest game) with other social members The benefit of achieving victory or superiority. Although those with vested interests are often dissatisfied with the superiority of the upper-level vested interests and the privileged class, they are even more unwilling to lose their relative superiority over the general public outside the scope of the vested interests. Even if they are dissatisfied, they tend to defend their rights and gain profits through personal struggle or abnormal means, rather than working with the oppressed people to overthrow the system and realize equality for everyone.

As for the political beliefs, ideals and beliefs that guide and restrain the thoughts, words and deeds of CCP members, they have long since disappeared from the hearts of the vast majority of party members today. Beliefs and beliefs are just curtains used to hide shame, and the pursuit of interests is the actual orientation of the CCP and its members. What was once pursued and defended by countless martyrs who shed their blood and sacrificed, but now whoever really pursues it will be considered a fool. Neither discipline nor the law can constrain them, so what effect can ideals and beliefs have on them. Of course, it does not rule out that the successors of the red regime will feel passionate and proud when commemorating various commemorations, but they can also think about how to be extravagant and lustful at the same time with peace of mind. They have their own set of logic that they think is self-consistent. The more corrupt and depraved the CCP is, the less it will lose its advocacy of political beliefs and ideals. This is not to encourage reform, but to make the insufficient fig leaf longer and wider.

It is worth explaining that the large-scale moral collapse of the members of the CCP did not appear only after Deng Xiaoping came to power and implemented the capitalist system. Food is divided into five classes" (however, during the Yan'an period, it was relatively restrained, mainly to buy the hearts of the domestic people and win the favor of foreign countries, especially the United States). It's just that, compared to the corruption in the Deng era, which was endorsed by bright money, the Mao era directly provided privilege distribution through power, which seemed to be hidden but actually more naked and cruel.

The vested interests of the CCP and their distribution are quite orderly, similar to the traditional feudal hierarchical society in China. It relies on and is subject to the state's violent machinery and the system itself, and has strong stability. From the vested interest class to the highest level, there is a set of customary flow mechanism, which gives the vested interest class the opportunity to further rise. Although this opportunity is not equal and unfair, it is not slim, and talent is a very important consideration. Of course, there are still channels for ordinary people outside the vested interest class to enter the class and further rise, such as the college entrance examination, civil service examination, etc., to attract elites who have not yet entered the system to "get into the network" to weaken the potential resistance of society. This is another imitation of the existing system in ancient China. Such a system and system are very important to avoid the decline of the regime and maintain the vitality of the regime and the vested interests. It is an important reason for the perfection and longevity of China's autocracy. At the same time, the CCP regime strictly prohibits the struggle for power and profit by challenging the system and endangering the survival of the regime, and brutally cracks down on such behavior. Those with vested interests also understand very well that if they want their interests to be maintained and passed on to their children, grandchildren, relatives and friends, they must defend this dictatorial regime and this party that is all about "interests" from head to toe.

When it comes to vested interests, we have to mention a special group, namely young students. Since modern times, young students have always been the vanguard of progress and change in all countries because of their relatively rich knowledge, pure and innocent souls, eagerness for change, and courage to sweep away old things. From the end of the Qing Dynasty to the Republic of China, the active participation of young students was indispensable in all reforms and self-improvement movements in China. Young students have played a pivotal role in the CCP from its inception to its seizure of power. From the "May 4th", "May 30th", "129th" to the "Anti-Hunger, Persecution, and Civil War" movement, the student movement has always been a key component of the Chinese Communist Party's revolutionary movement, and played an important role in the fight against warlords and the Kuomintang regime. important role.

However, when the CCP took power, it strictly guarded against the student movement. It not only dismantled and weakened the strength of humanities in colleges and universities on a large scale, but also established a management system based on party branches and ideological and political education in universities. The degree of control It is far beyond the infiltration of the campus by the Kuomintang military and police special constitution. In horizontal comparison, it is also far more stringent than most autocratic countries in the control of colleges and universities. Only the most stubborn regime in the Stalinist model, such as North Korea, can compare. Only two periods are special. First, in the early days of the Cultural Revolution, due to Mao's political needs, students were mobilized to "make a revolution," and the bureaucratic system once lost control over the campus. But at that time, anti-communism was still an absolute political taboo even more than ever before, and the premise of any rebel movement was loyalty to the CCP and Mao himself. The 1980s was an unprecedented and almost unprecedented period of freedom for universities under the rule of the Communist Party of China. Young students once again became the vanguard of social change, and even played a leading role in the 1989 democracy movement. Those ten years or so were also the period when Chinese universities were most like universities and students were most like students.

But after June 4th, the CCP resumed its strict control system in universities. Young students and university teachers were strictly controlled and monitored. Political activities in universities disappeared, and academic freedom was also stifled. Compared with the Mao era, after June 4th, the CCP’s management and control of universities became more professional and resilient. Instead of violent political campaigns and critical reforms, it was replaced by coercion and anesthesia under the appearance of tranquility and peace. Not only is action no longer possible, teachers and students are often interviewed even if they criticize or expose verbally. The chilling effect makes teachers and students only self-censor and stay away from critical politics. Universities carry out comprehensive brainwashing education, instill values of loyalty to the party and the government, and replace ideals of freedom and democracy with the banner of "patriotism." What is more practical is that the CCP regime induces teachers and students to turn to utilitarianism, to give up their family, country, and social responsibilities, and to pursue self-interest by "making a fortune silently" and implying that they can use any means. This kind of inducement by the CCP in colleges and universities is consistent with the atmosphere advocated in the society in the 1990s and later. They are all lured by profit, corrupting morality, numb the mind, and become supporters and fellow travelers of the CCP. In the Xi Jinping era, the high-pressure control over colleges and universities has intensified, and universities have become a key link in the stability maintenance system, putting heavy chains on young students who have the most momentum for change. While blocking the path of social movement and revolution, the CCP treats young students, especially students from key colleges and universities, and absorbs outstanding elements into the system to ensure that they become stable vested interests under the regime. The "unstable factors" that cause the most headaches for autocrats and conservatives around the world have been conquered by the CCP with both soft and hard tactics.

People have the instinct to seek advantages and avoid disadvantages. How important is right and wrong in the face of interests and punishments? The vast majority of those with vested interests who truly have the ability to change China generally choose to agree with the CCP’s autocratic rule in the face of reality and maintain their loyalty to the system. The CCP is also increasingly inclined to safeguard the "rights" and "interests" of those with vested interests in its policy direction and practice, and to firmly grasp the fundamentals in order to maintain the stability of the regime. This makes "fortress breaching from within" equally unrealistic.

Therefore, even if the CCP has various problems, even if some problems are very prominent, social conflicts are quite serious, and Xi Jinping and other CCP hardliners are too perverted, as long as the above points do not change, the CCP regime will maintain its vigorous vitality. Not to mention the collapse of the CCP, it is impossible for there to be severe public turmoil.

(6) The path from autocracy to democracy: What is the way out for China under the CCP dictatorship?

According to the content of the previous section, we can easily draw a conclusion that there are great difficulties for China to get rid of the dictatorship of the CCP and move towards democracy and freedom, and there is little hope in the foreseeable future.

We can compare the background of other countries transitioning from autocracy to democracy with the situation in China under the rule of the CCP to explore the reasons why the CCP has not achieved the transition to democracy like most countries in the world, and the dictatorship has become more stable.

The drastic changes in former socialist autocratic countries such as the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe occurred against the background of economic decline, regime shrinkage, system degradation, European wind and rain, and changes in people's minds. Changes are not only desired by the people and opposition forces, but also by the ruling groups. What most people want is a consensus between the government and the opposition. The Stalinist model has imprisoned these countries for too long. Under the planned economy, the material poverty lacks the necessities of life, political autocracy and cultural control are getting more and more tired, everything is lifeless, and there is no hope for the country's future. They can't think of it, let alone reform the economy without reforming politics. What's more, getting rid of the influence of the Soviet Union and Russia also meets the requirements of Eastern European nationalists. All nations in Eastern Europe are vigilant and dissatisfied with Russia’s expansionism for hundreds of years. Liberal democracy and national liberation both demand “de-Stalinization” and “de-Russia”. The demands of nationalists and democrats overlap significantly. . The eastern part of the Soviet Union has long been influenced by the humanistic spirit, liberalism, democratic politics, and open culture of Western Europe, which are both geographically and psychologically close. longing for.

Not so in China now and in the foreseeable future. China's economy is booming and materially abundant, but the problem lies in inequality rather than overall poverty and backwardness. In other words, the lives of those with vested interests, the middle class and above are not bad, and even better than similar classes in foreign countries. And the privileged class took advantage of China's rapid development and obtained huge benefits that could not be obtained in any other corner of the world. None of these people is willing to change, and those who have the voice and influence are happy to maintain the status quo. Although the regime is not full of vitality, it is not rigid and stagnant. It can keep pace with the times and update its ideas and policies, even if the starting point is not for the people but for the ruling group itself. Although China's management system is heavily bureaucratic, its efficiency in some aspects cannot be underestimated (such as the results of the prevention and control of the new crown epidemic and comparison with democratic countries), even if this efficiency is to damage the rights of citizens and consume tax revenue. at the expense of human wealth. And Chinese nationalism is just a tool to fight against the West. The CCP has used various brainwashing and inducements to make most people in the country oppose the maintenance of the interests of the country and the nation and the pursuit of freedom and democracy. China is also far away from the West in terms of history and geography, and has its own system. The modern humanistic spirit originated in the West has only limited penetration into China. The local and traditional things in China have always dominated or at least served as the main components of society. Similar to what is native and traditional around the world, they are in conflict with modern civilization.

The downfall of right-wing authoritarianism in South Korea, Taiwan, Portugal, and Latin America is largely due to the maturity and strength of domestic civil political resistance movements, the relatively independent public opinion environment and free academic atmosphere, and the external influence of Europe and the United States, which are closely related to the regime. democratization pressure. These former dictatorships, often ruled by right-wing military juntas, are far behind China and Stalin-style countries in terms of social control. For example, South Korea, which has been ruled by a military dictatorship since the 1960s, has had substantive elections during the military government, and there has always been the existence of opposition parties and public activities of opposition figures. In Brazil during the military government era, democrats were allowed to hold more than a quarter of the seats in Congress in a designated opposition party. Although limited, they could still act independently and supervise the government. The political opposition forces in these countries have been engaged in activities, accumulating strength, and have always had the ability to replace the old regime and the corresponding team, and finally won the struggle against the dictatorship around the 1980s. During the period of the military governments of various countries, even though there was a certain degree of public opinion control, independent media, voices that revealed the truth and criticized the regime always existed, and played an important role in enlightening and mobilizing the people during the critical period of change, and deterring regime suppression. However, countries such as the United States, Britain, France and Germany, which are "friends" of various military governments and political, economic and military partners, often put pressure on these regimes to improve human rights and return power to the people.

China under the rule of the CCP does not have the gap left for political opposition forces under the rule of these right-wing military juntas. The CCP completely monopolizes political power, does not allow any independent opposition party to exist, and does not allow the development and growth of civic organizations and civil society. Even in the enlightened 1980s, there were no opposition political forces that could challenge the CCP. The CCP has always cracked down on political opposition forces with high pressure, and it has also suppressed civic organizations that are marginalized in every possible way (of course, during the Xi Jinping era, it was completely wiped out just like the political rebels), and there is no room for them to openly operate and grow. China also hardly has any elections with actual political significance and authenticity. Representatives of all levels of legislatures and executive heads are actually appointed. China's public opinion is monopolized and fully controlled by the regime (even moderate criticism and exposure were banned during the Xi Jinping era), and the index of press freedom has been in the bottom five for many years (only slightly better than North Korea and other countries). When political opposition is nipped in the bud, there is no such thing as struggle, maneuver, and accumulation of power. Most of the "friends" of the CCP regime are authoritarian and semi-authoritarian countries. Of course, they are not promoting each other's democracy when they are together, but are exchanging skills to control the people, and they are working together to defend the dictatorship internationally.

In South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Africa (referred to as "Two Asia and One Africa"), there are also many examples of transition from autocracy to democracy. Most of the former authoritarian regimes in "Two Asia and One Africa" (especially those in Africa) were quite unstable, with weak power bases, no complete and systematic policy programs, and low control over society. Party dictatorship or one-person dictatorship, but it is difficult for the tentacles to go deep into the local and grassroots, and the dictatorship cannot control other fields such as the economy and ideology. Its autocratic system is very immature, only a certain political strongman and a limited number of cronies maintain the rule by relying on guns, and social governance is also a mess. Such an authoritarian regime is like water without a source and a tree without roots. When political strongmen lose power, go into exile, or die, authoritarian regimes often follow suit. Even if some dictators have heirs, their heirs tend to have less control and governance over the country. Such regimes are easily overthrown, and some of the forces that overthrow them become new dictators, and some establish democracies (even if their democracy is as immature and low-quality as autocracy). In addition, the dictatorship of "Two Asia and One Africa" often faces challenges from powerful anti-government armed forces, ethnic local armed forces, religious extremist armed forces and other large-scale and established armed forces, and may even be overthrown by these anti-government armed forces. The reliance of these dictatorships on the military is also often unreliable. When the regime collapses, they generally lose the support of the military, and sometimes the military just becomes the decisive force to overthrow their autocratic rule.

The very distinctive features of the CCP’s autocratic politics are stability, high efficiency, and strong organization. It also has a systematic policy program and theoretical system, and it has a set of proficient skills in managing the country and the people. Infiltration and control of the grassroots is the CCP's forte. The Kuomintang regime has launched many violent attacks on the CCP, but failed to destroy the strong organizational foundation of the CCP, and the CCP has grown stronger and stronger. As for the problem of established anti-government armed forces that is a headache for the "Two Asia and One Africa" dictatorship, the CCP completely resolved it as early as the 1950s. The CCP has also always maintained the party's absolute leadership over the military, such as the "branches are built on the company" and the political commissar system, as well as the extensive development of grassroots party members, making the military a part of the CCP's regime structure. "The Party directs the gun" and ensuring the absolute loyalty of the army to the Party has been realized as early as the early days of the CCP's army establishment. Such a regime is obviously not comparable to those dictatorial regimes like catkins and duckweed in "Two Asia and One Africa".

Nazi Germany and militaristic Japan, which were once glorious, completed democratization under foreign occupation after the failure of aggression and expansion. Both the Nazis and the Japanese Empire were dictatorial regimes with great expansionist desires. After making great achievements in domestic construction, they could not restrain their desire to break through their own land restrictions. They launched aggressive wars in an attempt to expand their territory and sphere of influence, but were eventually defeated by the anti-fascist camp. In order to avoid the revival of fascism and militarism, the victorious countries pushed Germany and Japan to de-fascist and transform them into democratic countries. When the Nazis and the Japanese Empire were in full swing, neither of the two countries had internal forces capable of overthrowing the regime, but external intervention did. The disintegration of the Soviet Union is also considered to have a major relationship with its expansionary policy that exhausted its national power and led to international countermeasures and containment. There are also criminal authoritarian regimes such as the Amin regime in Uganda and the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, which also collapsed because of their external expansion and provocation (attacking Tanzania and Vietnam respectively), which led to counterattacks by foreign enemies. The Taliban regime in Afghanistan was once in a state of invincibility in the civil war and was close to unifying the country. However, it was attacked by the United States after the 9/11 incident because of its support and shelter for the "Al Qaeda" organization led by Osama bin Laden. These few typical cases show that when domestic power is insufficient to overthrow the autocratic regime in the country, external intervention and foreign power can end the autocratic rule of the militant regime.

After the rise of China under the leadership of the CCP, many people at home and abroad compared the Nazis with the Japanese imperialists, and asked the world to be alert to China’s path of aggression and expansion under the leadership of the CCP regime. But the fact is that the CCP itself has no desire to invade, expand or wage war, and the current international environment is also different from that of the 1930s and 1940s. For the CCP, enslaving more than one billion people is enough for it to suck blood and parasitize, and it does not need to risk the risk of defeating the party to expand abroad. Even, it has no substantive willingness to take back Taiwan, which belongs to China, by force (including not launching troops against Hong Kong and Macau after the founding of the People's Republic of China), and only regards the Taiwan issue as a means to establish a target and unite people's hearts. It carefully learned the lessons of Germany, Japan and even the Soviet Union from international intervention and sanctions due to expansionism, and eventually the collapse of the regime. "Non-intervention," an acknowledgment of its rule over mainland China and its billion-plus people. The international community, especially major powers, did not attempt to overthrow the CCP’s rule. Even the United States, Japan and other countries have actively supported and nourished the CCP regime for various reasons at certain times, and are happy to see it continue to rule China.

To sum up, it can be seen that the democratization paths of other former autocratic countries in the world are not suitable for China (or they cannot be implemented in China), and China does "have its own unique national conditions." Most of the "unique national conditions" are deliberately created by the CCP. Some scholars call the CCP's rule over China a "perfect dictatorship," and they are right. There have been many dictatorships in the world since modern times, but they not only allow the economy to flourish, but at the same time completely monopolize political power, stifle political struggle and civil society in the bud, and have strict organization and efficient social governance, and they are restrained and unrestrained. The CCP is unique in a warlike dictatorship.

So, should we just do nothing and sit back and watch the CCP regime continue to rule China and let the Chinese people live in an unjust and unjust situation without democracy and the rule of law?

This should not be our choice. We have the responsibility to do something for our country, nation, and compatriots. It seems that the road is blocked, which forces us to try every direction and not give up any possibility of promoting change.

When action is temporarily impossible, we can still listen, think, record, and communicate. In Europe after the Middle Ages, there was the Renaissance and the Enlightenment first, and then the French Revolution and even the political revolution in Europe as a whole. In China at the end of the Qing Dynasty, there was also the enlightenment of nationalism and civil rights ideas first, and then the raging flames of the anti-Manchu and anti-imperialist republican revolution. Although Solzhenitsyn's "Gulag Archipelago" failed to shake the Soviet system when it was released, isn't it great that the voices in Siberian prisons spread widely? Similarly, Wu Ningkun's "A Drop of Tears" cannot change the tragic past of the Cultural Revolution, but isn't memory and confession itself a precious value?

It is indeed weak to stay only on the lip and words. However, if we even give up this position, it would be utter depravity. Intellectuals must write books and talk in this desperate era, enlighten the revolution, preserve the memory of the era, and pave the way for future generations.

An important point of ideological enlightenment is to encourage Chinese people to connect issues involving rights and livelihood in daily life with the national system and political environment. Many civil rights and people's livelihood issues in China are, in the final analysis, political and institutional issues. Of course, various problems will still exist after political democratization, but there will be more reasonable solutions. If the political shackles are not removed, there will be no time for a fair and open solution to all problems. When people know that everything in their lives is closely related to politics, they will no longer be indifferent to politics, and fundamental changes will come in the hope of everyone.

Among the vested interests of the CCP, there are still people with conscience after all, or conscience will not be completely wiped out. Even if 10% of the children of the vested interest class are not attracted by the desire for profit and the pollution of the environment, the seeds of change will germinate. We have to recall the end of the Qing Dynasty and the beginning of the Republic of China. At that time, the young people of the upper class in China transcended their own class and self-interest to fight for the liberation of the oppressed and struggle and sacrifice for the construction of a society where everyone is equal. . Could it be that the Chinese people after more than a hundred years have really fallen? I believe not. When the time comes, I believe that there will still be many people with vested interests, especially young students, who will stand up and stand with the people, and most other people will not stubbornly fight to the end.

Many domestic and foreign scholars regard the growth of the middle class as an important condition for the realization of democracy. Of course, most of the middle class in China today are within the system or indirectly attached to the system, so this article seems to be out of order. However, some influences of the growth of the middle class still exist, such as the pursuit of rights, the rule of law and dignity, as well as richer knowledge, higher social status and stronger bargaining power brought about by them. Relatively rational, both have a promoting effect on the realization of democracy. If China's middle class grows further, to more than half of the population, and its composition becomes more complex, and there are more and more non-dependent or lightly dependent people, will they as a whole be as obedient to the regime as they are now? At that time, even if the democratic transition is not a matter of course, there will be less resistance and more motivation.

Once there is a nationwide and all-people political resistance in China, and there is linkage and response, it will be very difficult for the CCP regime to suppress it. As long as the mainstream groups and all walks of life in major cities across the country generally participate in demonstrations at a certain time in the future, the regime will be wary and unwilling to take the risk of becoming an enemy of the people of the whole country for large-scale suppression. At that time, it was difficult for the regime to completely block and shield information. It is not easy to achieve this step, but as long as this step is achieved, the number of people is large enough and the momentum is large enough to exceed the threshold that the CCP can quell with a small cost, then the people's protests may lead to the success of political change.

International friends who care about China and the Chinese people, and compatriots all over the world, don't stand idly by anymore. Helping China realize democracy and freedom is the biggest step towards civilization for the world as a whole. Look at this world, how many others are in such a harsh political environment, public opinion control and Internet blockade like China? There are more than one billion people here, accounting for one-fifth of the world's population. China's move towards freedom, democracy and complete openness will also promote cooperation and progress in the world. In the face of severe challenges such as climate change that require the joint response of all mankind, we cannot expect a regime that lacks a sense of cooperation, seeks profit, and has no sense of morality and responsibility to undertake its obligations. Instead, we must help China establish an enlightened and responsible democratic regime that actively integrates into the world. Politicians, parliamentarians, and wise men from all walks of life, don't ignore and forget, don't be deceived, and don't be insensitive. "Saving a life is worth building a seven-level pagoda." If there are people of conscience and justice in the world who can help more than one billion people in China break the shackles and relieve oppression, it will be the greatest achievement in human history. The greatest benefactor and eternal friend of the Chinese nation, the Chinese people will also make full returns to their friends and the world.

The victories of democratic forces around the world have also contributed to the victory of China's march towards democracy. When the vast majority of countries in the world have achieved democratization, and have realized a high-level, real (rather than a country with an empty democratic body like Russia today) democratic politics, then the isolated autocratic China will It is difficult to support independently. If countries ruled by traditional Leninist parties such as Vietnam, Laos, and Cuba abandon autocracy and embrace freedom, and even a highly autocratic neighbor like North Korea moves towards democracy, how long can the CCP persist?

China also needs Gorbachev and de Klerk, and the mainland also needs Chiang Ching-kuo, who is willing to take the initiative to carry out reforms. We hope Mingjun is a little underestimated, but a person who is willing to promote reform from top to bottom will make the change come many years earlier, make the change less bloody or even bloodless, and achieve political and social transformation at the lowest possible cost .

China needs more rational and responsible people. The process of change must be thrilling, and the interests of all parties collide and friction. Everyone has the right to fight for their own rights, but they also need to consider the overall situation and respect others. To move towards democracy and the rule of law is to move towards peace, compromise and reconciliation, not a new round of bloody storms and intrigues. Only when the strong restrain themselves and the weak have restraint will the transition be fair and civilized. Although these are things after the change, it is always good to make some assumptions and preparations in advance, even if these naive ideas will be quickly shattered by reality.

The CCP has been entrenched in the land of China for a hundred years, and it should have withdrawn from the stage of history or undergo a complete transformation long ago. But it just won't withdraw, and hundreds of millions of vested interests will not withdraw. There is no justice without struggle, and no change without action. As far as the current situation is concerned, the Chinese people are temporarily unable to break through the strong and fine political net, and their situation will even worsen under the harsh political and economic situation. But I think that one day China will be full of fists and shouts from Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou to the frontiers of the border. Violent machines will also be intimidated by the justice of unity. The muzzles of the guns will be filled with flowers, and hundreds of millions of people will cheer together, indicating a new era. 's arrival

No government can last forever. No matter how late it is, there will definitely be such a day, the day when the CCP’s dictatorship ends and China’s democracy comes. We also understand that that is not the end of justice, but a major station that the Chinese nation should have reached on its journey from darkness to light.

Wang Qingmin

June 2, 2021

Pea Day in the Shepherd Moon in 229 of the Republican Calendar